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Abstrakt 
In diesem Forschungsprojekt werden aktuelle Preis- und Einkommenselastizitäten für Ener-
gie und andere Produktionsfaktoren bzw. Konsumgütergruppen in der Schweiz geschätzt. Im 
Weiteren wird der Rebound-Effekt für den privaten Transport untersucht. Im ersten Teil wer-
den auf Grundlage eines Schweizer Unternehmensdatensatzes Substitutionselastizitäten 
zwischen den Produktionsfaktoren Energie, Kapital, Arbeit und Material für Unternehmen mit 
tiefer, mittlerer und hoher Energieintensität berechnet. Unsere Resultate zeigen auf, dass 
energieextensive Unternehmen Energie nach einer Preiserhöhung durch alle anderen Pro-
duktionsfaktoren substituieren können. Jedoch zeigen unsere Schätzungen auf, dass bei 
energieintensiven Unternehmen die Produktionsfaktoren Energie und Kapital Komplemente 
und nicht Substitute darstellen. Dies ist ein Hinweis darauf, dass energieintensive Unterneh-
men grössere Anpassungsschwierigkeiten haben als energieextensive Unternehmen bei 
steigenden Energiepreisen. Im zweiten Kapitel werden Einkommens- und Kreuzpreiselastizi-
täten zwischen einzelnen Konsumgütergruppen von Schweizer Haushalten geschätzt. Die 
Eigenpreiselastizitäten zeigen beispielsweise auf, dass Transportleistungen unelastisch sind, 
der Energiekonsum hingegen einheitselastisch. Weiter decken wir verschiedene Muster der 
Substituierbarkeit zwischen den verschiedenen Konsumgütern auf. Die Einkommenselastizi-
täten weisen schliesslich Energie als Bedarfsgut aus, Transport hingegen besitzt eine Ein-
kommenselastizität nahe eins. Die zudem berechneten Engel-Kurven sind für den Energie-
konsum strikt fallend, hingegen sind sie für den privaten Transport S-förmig. Im dritten Teil 
werden Rebound-Effekte für den privaten Transport in der Schweiz berechnet. Dabei werden 
zwei Methoden verwendet, wobei die erste eher einen kurzfristigen und die zweite eher ei-
nen langfristigen Rebound-Effekt schätzt. Der Rebound-Effekt für den privaten Verkehr in der 
Schweiz, basierend auf der ersten Methode, liegt bei rund 20%. Die zweite Methode lieferte 
einen ungleich grösseren Effekt von rund 60%. Die Schätzung des Rebound-Effekts für ver-
schiedene Haushaltsgruppen deckt grosse Unterschiede zwischen diesen Gruppen auf: Die 
Resultate zeigen beispielsweise, dass der Rebound-Effekt bei ärmeren und älteren Haushal-
ten grösser ausfällt. Weiter ist der Rebound-Effekt kleiner, wenn der Freizeitverkehr betroffen 
ist und nicht die Fahrt zur Arbeit. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Im Auftrag des Bundesamts für Energie (BFE) schätzen wir in diesem Projekt Preis- und 
Einkommenselastizitäten für Schweizer Haushalte und Unternehmen. Dieser Bericht besteht 
aus drei eigenständigen Kapiteln: In Kapitel 1 werden Substitutionselastizitäten zwischen 
Produktionsfaktoren von Schweizer Unternehmen geschätzt. In Kapitel 2 schätzen wir Preis- 
und Einkommenselastizitäten von verschiedenen Konsumgüterkategorien von Schweizer 
Haushalten. In Kapitel 3 werden Rebound-Effekte für den privaten Transport in der Schweiz 
berechnet.  
Kapitel 1: Factor Substitution Elasticities in Swiss Manufacturing 
Schätzungen von Substitutionselastizitäten zwischen den Produktionsfaktoren Kapital, Ar-
beit, Energie und Material basieren für die Schweiz auf aggregierten Branchendaten und 
sind zudem bereits älteren Datums. Ziel dieses Kapitels ist es, diese Lücke zu schliessen 
und mit einem aktuellen und detaillierten Unternehmensdatensatz Substitutionselastizitäten 
zwischen den vier Produktionsfaktoren Energie, Kapital, Arbeit und Materialeinsatz zu schät-
zen. 
Die geschätzten ökonomischen Elastizitäten zeigen auf, wie sich die Mengen von Produkti-
onsfaktoren aufgrund von Änderungen der Faktorpreise anpassen. So erhält man wichtige 
Informationen darüber, wie sich Unternehmen im Falle von Faktorpreisveränderungen ver-
halten. Das Hauptaugenmerk dieses Projektes liegt auf dem Faktor Energie. Insbesondere 
liegt das Interesse darin, wie Unternehmen auf eine Erhöhung der Energiepreise reagieren 
und wie sie den teurer gewordenen Faktor Energie durch die anderen Produktionsfaktoren 
ersetzen. 
Aufgrund einer Linear Logit-Kostenfunktion und mittels Seemingly Unrelated Regression-
Ansatz (SUR) werden Eigenpreiselastizitäten, Kreuzpreiselastizitäten und Morishima-
Elastizitäten geschätzt. Die ersten beiden Elastizitätentypen geben an, wie sich die Menge 
eines Produktionsfaktors aufgrund einer Faktorpreisveränderung ändert. Morishima-
Elastizitäten drücken hingegen aus, wie sich das Mengenverhältnis zweier Faktoren auf-
grund der Preisänderung eines bestimmten Faktors verändert.  
Bei der Schätzung unterscheiden wir zwischen Unternehmen mit tiefer, mittlerer und hoher 
Energieintensität und weisen Elastizitäten für diese drei Gruppen aus. Unsere Resultate zei-
gen einerseits auf, dass energieextensive Unternehmen sowie Unternehmen mit einer mittle-
ren Energieintensität, Energie nach einer Energiepreiserhöhung durch alle anderen Produk-
tionsfaktoren substituieren, um die Produktionsmenge konstant zu halten. So produzieren die 
Unternehmen dieser beiden Gruppen nach einer Erhöhung der Energiepreise beispielsweise 
kapitalintensiver als zuvor. Im Gegensatz dazu zeigen die Resultate bei den energieintensi-
ven Firmen auf, dass die Produktionsfaktoren Energie und Kapital Komplemente und nicht 
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Substitute sind: In diesem Fall führt eine Preiserhöhung von Energie nicht nur zu einer Ab-
nahme vom Energieverbrauch, sondern auch zu einer Abnahme des eingesetzten Kapitals. 
Diese Unternehmen produzieren nach einer Energiepreiserhöhung also weniger kapitalin-
tensiv, dafür aber viel materialintensiver. Dies kann ein Hinweis darauf sein, dass die ener-
gieintensiven Unternehmen grössere Probleme bei der Substitution von Energie haben als 
weniger energieintensive Unternehmen. Eine Komplementarität zwischen den beiden Pro-
duktionsfaktoren Energie und Kapital führt so in der Regel und im Vergleich zur Substituier-
barkeit zu höheren Kosten für die Unternehmen bei einer Energiepreiserhöhung. 
Kapitel 2: Price and Income Elasticities of Swiss Households 
Kapitel 2 beschäftigt sich mit dem Konsumverhalten von Schweizer Haushalten. Insbesonde-
re sind wir daran interessiert, wie Preis- und Einkommenseffekte die Nachfrage nach einzel-
nen Konsumgütergruppen beeinflussen. Flexible Nachfragemodelle, die das Konsumverhal-
ten von Schweizer Haushalten abbilden, wurden bisher nur für einzelne Teilbereiche wie 
zum Beispiel Nahrungsmittel und Getränke oder für einzelne Energiequellen geschätzt. Sol-
che partiellen Schätzmodelle haben den Nachteil, dass sie Effekte auf den Konsum anderer 
Gütergruppen nicht berücksichtigten. Unser Vorgehen stellt aus dieser Sicht einen ganzheit-
lichen Ansatz dar. 
Die theoretische Grundlage unserer Untersuchung bildet das Exact Affine Stone Index (EA-
SI)-Nachfragemodell. Dieses Modell ist besonders flexibel und erlaubt es, beliebige, nicht-
lineare Engel-Kurven, welche die Nachfrage nach einem Gut in Abhängigkeit des Einkom-
mens abbilden, zu schätzen. Neben den Engel-Kurven werden in diesem Kapitel Substituti-
ons- und Einkommenselastizitäten der einzelnen Konsumgütergruppen berechnet. Die 
Schätzung basiert einerseits auf gepoolten Haushaltsdaten und andererseits als Kontrollspe-
zifikation auf einem Pseudo Panel-Regressionsmodell auf Basis von Individualdaten. 
Unser Interesse bei der Analyse der Resultate gilt besonders den Elastizitäten und Engel-
Kurven vom Energieverbrauch und den privaten Transportausgaben der Haushalte: Der 
Konsum von Transportleistungen wird als inelastisch geschätzt, der Energiekonsum ist unge-
fähr einheitselastisch. Während die meisten anderen Konsumgruppen ebenfalls in der Nähe 
der Einheitselastizität stehen, finden sich auch preiselastische Kategorien, nämlich „Aus-
wärts Essen“ und „Freizeit“. Die geschätzten Kreuzpreiselastizitäten zeigen ebenfalls einige 
interessante Muster auf, beispielsweise ist „Privater Transport“ ein Komplement zu „Woh-
nen“, „Bekleidung“ und „Zu Hause Essen“, jedoch ein Substitut für „Auswärts Essen“ und 
„Möbel“. 
Die geschätzten Einkommenselastizitäten zeigen auf, dass „Zu Hause Essen“, „Bekleidung“, 
„Energie“, „Wohnen“ und „Kommunikation“ Bedarfsgüter sind mit Einkommenselastizitäten 
zwischen 0 und 1. Hingegen sind „Auswärts Essen“, „Freizeit“ und „Möbel“ Luxusgüter mit 
grösseren Einkommenselastizitäten. Privater Transport ist demgegenüber einheitselastisch. 
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Schliesslich zeigen wir anhand der Engel-Kurven, wie sich die Nachfrage nach einem Gut als 
Funktion des Einkommens ändert: Während die Engelkurve von „Energie“ streng monoton 
fallend ist, nimmt die Engel-Kurve vom „Privaten Transport“ eine S-Form an. Das Modell er-
möglicht auch einen Vergleich der Engel-Kurven für verschiedene Haushaltstypen: Bei-
spielsweise zeigen wir die unterschiedlichen Kurven für den Energiekonsum zwischen Haus-
besitzern und Mietern auf. Insgesamt lässt sich zudem festhalten, dass die Schätzresultate 
aus dem gepoolten Regressionsmodell und dem Pseudo Panel zu ähnlichen Ergebnissen 
führen. Dies ist ein Hinweis auf die Robustheit unserer Schätzmodelle.  
Kapitel 3: The Direct Rebound Effect of Private Transportation in Switzerland 
In Kapitel 3 werden Rebound-Effekte für den privaten Verkehr in der Schweiz geschätzt. Ein 
Rebound-Effekt führt dazu, dass sich der Energieverbrauch nach der Steigerung der techni-
schen Effizienz einer Leistung weniger stark senkt als aus technischer Sicht erwartet: Der 
Grund dafür ist, dass Effizienzsteigerungen erstens den relativen Preis von Produkten oder 
Dienstleistungen senken und zweitens die realen Einkommen erhöhen. Dies führt zu einer 
grösseren Nachfrage nach dem betreffenden Produkt oder der betreffenden Leistung und so 
zu einer Reduktion der Energieeinsparung.  
Diese Rebound-Effekte sind für die Energie- und Klimapolitik der Schweiz von Bedeutung, 
denn die Höhe dieser Effekte bestimmen beispielsweise die Bewertung von effizienzstei-
gernden politischen Massnahmen oder die Prognosen des zukünftigen Energieverbrauchs 
oder CO2-Ausstoss in der Schweiz.  
Die exakte Grösse des Rebound-Effektes hängt von vielen Faktoren ab. Auch davon, wel-
cher methodische Ansatz bei der Schätzung des Rebound-Effektes verwendet wird. In die-
sem Kapitel verwenden wir zwei verbreitete empirischer Ansätze, um die Grösse des 
Rebound-Effekts des privaten Verkehrs in der Schweiz zu bestimmen.  
Unter dem ersten methodischen Ansatz werden die Rebound-Effekte aus den Eigenprei-
selastizitäten aus Kapitel 2 berechnet. Der grosse Vorteil dieser Methode ist, dass nur Preis- 
und Mengenangaben benötigt werden und die Grösse direkt aus bestehenden Studien, die 
Preiselastizitäten von Produkten oder Dienstleistungen berechnet haben, abgeleitet werden 
kann. Der wichtigste Nachteil dieses Ansatzes ist, dass Preisveränderungen nicht immer die 
gleiche Wirkung haben, wie eine Effizienzsteigerung. Somit kann Grösse des Rebound-
Effektes bei dieser Methode verzerrt geschätzt werden. 
Unter dem zweiten methodischen Ansatz wird anhand von möglichst detaillierten Informatio-
nen über die tatsächlichen Effizienzsteigerungen die Nachfrageentwicklung aufgrund dieser 
Effizienzsteigerung gemessen. Diese Schätzmethode ist genauer, setzt aber eine entspre-
chende Datenbasis voraus.  
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Wir vergleichen die Resultate dieser beiden Ansätze und zeigen auch Ergebnisse für ver-
schiedenen Haushaltstypen auf: Der Rebound-Effekt für den privaten Verkehr in der 
Schweiz, geschätzt mit der ersten Methode, liegt bei rund 20%. Die zweite Methode lieferte 
einen ungleich grösseren Effekt von rund 60%. Der grosse Unterschied zwischen diesen 
beiden Ergebnissen kann dadurch erklärt werden, dass der erste Ansatz eher einen kurz- bis 
mittelfristigen Rebound-Effekt misst, da er auf entsprechenden kurz- bis mittelfristigen Elasti-
zitäten beruht. Hingegen basiert der zweite Ansatz auf einer Schätzung mit Querschnittsda-
ten und ist somit eher als langfristiger Rebound-Effekt zu interpretieren. 
Die Schätzung des Rebound-Effekts für verschiedene Haushaltsgruppen deckt grosse Un-
terschiede zwischen diesen Gruppen auf: Die Resultate zeigen beispielsweise, dass der 
Rebound-Effekt bei Haushalten mit tieferen Einkommen und älteren Personen grösser aus-
fällt. Weiter ist der Rebound-Effekt kleiner, wenn der Freizeitverkehr betroffen ist und nicht 
die Fahrt zur Arbeit. 
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Chapter 1: Factor Substitution Elasticities in Swiss Manufac-
turing
1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, several national governments have revised their environmental
and energy policy strategies. European countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom
and Denmark have undertaken major environmental tax reforms to comply with their GHG
emission reduction goals and to foster the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy.1
Standard policy measures are taxes on GHG emissions and energy use, accompanied by
tighter environmental standards and efforts to improve energy efficiency in production, in
buildings and in the transport sector. While such measures are effective in reducing emis-
sions, they potentially increase energy prices and affect the production costs of firms and
households’ expenses. Policymakers are confronted with the challenge to achieve their
environmental targets without negatively affecting the overall economy and the competi-
tiveness of particular production sectors.
The Swiss government has decided to phase out nuclear power and to reduce GHG
emissions by 20% compared with 1990 levels by 2020 (CO2 Act). The government’s En-
ergy Strategy 2050 sets out the envisioned path of the energy transition in Switzerland. In
2008, a carbon tax was introduced at CHF 60 per metric tonne of CO2. The tax was raised
to CHF 84 in 2016 and a further increase is possible in 2018 if emissions are above tar-
get. Large emitters are exempted from the carbon tax and instead participate in a cap and
trade system. Moreover, medium size companies can also be exempted from the tax pro-
vided they commit to legally binding CO2 reduction goals. Similar exemptions or tax re-
ductions for emitters such as energy-intensive companies exist in almost all countries. To
evaluate the economic impact of such policies, a better understanding of substitution pos-
sibilities at the level of individual firms is needed. An important question is whether there
are differences in the degree of substitutability between energy-intensive firms and energy-
extensive firms, since a lower degree of factor substitution for energy-intensive firms might
justify exemptions from carbon taxes.
In this study, we analyze the relationship between factor substitutability and the energy
intensity of Swiss manufacturing firms.2 Our panel dataset comprises about 7,400 obser-
vations on the firm-level from 1997 to 2008. It provides detailed information about output,
1For an in-depth analysis of environmental tax reforms in Europe, see Ekins and Speck (2011) and Patuelli
et al. (2005).
2Elasticity estimates based on firm-level data do not exist for Swiss manufacturing firms. For Switzerland,
substitution elasticities have been estimated on a sectoral level (Mohler and Mueller, 2012).
1
labor, energy and material, as well as firm-specific characteristics such as the number of
employees and the stock of capital. This dataset, combined with price indices for the rel-
evant factors, allows the estimation of firm-specific substitution elasticities by making use
of the linear logit (LL) function. Additionally, we provide elasticity estimates based on the
translog (TL) function.
Our work is related to existing studies estimating substitution elasticities using firm-
level data. Woodland (1993) is the first study to use micro data to analyze substitution
between capital, labor and four energy types in Australia. Nguyen and Streitwieser (1999)
examine whether plant size in U.S. manufacturing has an impact on the degree of factor
substitution. Arnberg and Bjorner (2007) apply cross-section and panel data techniques to
a dataset of Danish firms. Finally, Tamminen and Tuomaala (2012) estimate substitution
elasticities for 71 different sectors employing a large panel of service and manufacturing
companies from Finland. Similar to the last two studies, we employ a panel of manufactur-
ing firms and estimate substitution elasticities, controlling for time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity. However, our focus is on the relationship between factor substitutability
and the energy intensity of manufacturing firms.
A descriptive analysis of our data reveals that the energy share of total production costs
is typically low for Swiss manufacturing firms, with a median cost share of 1.4% and a mean
cost share of 2.0%. However, there is substantial heterogeneity of the energy cost shares of
different firms, even within the same industry.3 Hence, to compare the degree of substi-
tutability between different energy intensities, we classify firms into three categories: low,
medium and high energy use. We measure substitutability of factors using both cross-price
elasticities as well as Morishima elasticities of substitution.
Our first finding is that substantial differences exist in firms’ substitution possibilities
when we contrast the substitution elasticities of firms with different levels of energy inten-
sity. We find evidence for substitutability between energy and all the other input factors for
firms with low and medium energy use, implying that upon an energy price increase, factor
shares of labor, capital and material increase to optimally compensate for the decreasing
energy share in the production process. In contrast, capital and energy are estimated to
be complements for the firms in the energy-intensive subset. As a consequence of this
complementarity between energy and capital, these energy-intensive firms substitute the
decreasing shares of energy and capital upon an energy price increase with higher shares
of material and, to a lesser extent, labor in their production process. In conclusion and due
to this complementarity, energy-intensive firms may have greater difficulty in adjusting to
potential energy price increases.
Our second finding is that even small energy price changes affect the energy intensity of
firms’ production: If energy prices increase, firms of all three energy-intensity categories
3E.g. in Sector 1 (Food products, beverages and tobacco products), energy cost shares in the 5 and 95
percentile span from 2.8 to 11.3 percent (c.f. Table 5 in Appendix F), respectively.
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produce less energy-intensively relative to every other input factor regarding the factor
quantities of input factors. While this is a result that is also prevalent in similar analyses
for other countries—it occurs when the own-price elasticity of energy is large enough—we
also find some evidence that despite the price increase of energy, the expenditure share of
energy is decreasing as well. Hence, the energy use of Swiss firms is generally responsive to
price changes, and policy measures that increase the price of energy will lead to less energy
intensive production processes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview and
discussion of previous micro data studies in the field of factor substitution. After introduc-
ing the modeling approach and the methodological procedure in Section 3 and Section
4, empirical evidence is provided in Section 5. The paper closes with the conclusions in
Section 6.
2 Related Literature
Research on substitution possibilities between energy and other production factors emerged
after the first oil crises in the 1970s. Earlier studies predominantly estimated substitution
elasticities using time-series or cross-section data for specific industrial sectors or aggre-
gate manufacturing. Enhanced data availability as well as more sophisticated estimation
methods have increased the interest in micro data studies. The empirical literature has
shown that elasticity estimates vary substantially and depend on the level of sector ag-
gregation, the geographical region, the time period, and the applied model specification
(Koetse et al., 2008).
The majority of studies find that production factors are substitutes in the production
process. However, there is an ongoing controversy whether the factors energy and capi-
tal are substitutes or complements. Cross-section studies tend to predict substitutability,
while time-series studies are more in favor of complementarity (Apostolakis, 1990). It is ar-
gued that the former measure long-run elasticities, whereas time series capture short-run
effects. This would imply that capital and energy are complements in the short-run and
substitutes in the long-run. More recently, similar patterns have been observed between
cross-section studies and panel studies based on micro panel data (Arnberg and Bjorner,
2007). In contrast, Arnberg and Bjorner (2007) argue that endogeneity problems with la-
bor and energy prices might cause the discrepancy. Thompson and Taylor (1995) show
that this gap vanishes if one considers Morishima elasticities (MES) instead of cross-price
elasticities. The factors capital and energy are usually MES-substitutes.
A general problem of studies using aggregated industry data is the difficulty to dis-
tinguish between factor substitution and concurrent effects. For instance, Solow (1987)
demonstrates convincingly that compositional changes in output can lead to incorrect
substitution estimates in aggregated studies. He concludes that “[f]actor substitution is
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a microeconomic phenomenon, and is best examined by looking at microeconomic data”
(p.612). However, only a few micro data studies exist which estimate factor substitution be-
tween energy and non-energy factors. The main reason is that energy expenses are rarely
available for individual firms. Below, we summarize the results of previous micro data stud-
ies in the field of factor substitution.
The first micro data study on substitution between energy and non-energy factors was
conducted by Woodland (1993). He used repeated cross-sectional data of approximately
10,000 manufacturing firms in New South Wales, Australia covering the period from 1977
to 1985. Woodland focused on different types of fuels (coal, oil, gas and electricity) as well
as labor and capital. He found that the demand for energy fuels is price-elastic (with the
exception of coal), whereas the demand for capital and labor is price-inelastic. Moreover,
he shows that substitution between fuels and the non-energy factors appears to be much
stronger than substitution between different types of fuels.
Nguyen and Streitwieser (1999) investigate whether differences exist in factor substitu-
tion between small and large production firms. They use cross-sectional data comprising
10,412 U.S. industrial companies in 1991 to estimate the standard KLEM model using the
translog specification. Nguyen and Streitwieser find that the demand of all four factors
is price-elastic, with energy having the highest value and capital the lowest. Furthermore,
when considering the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution (AES) and the cross-price elas-
ticity (CPE) as a measure of substitution, they find that the factors capital and energy are
either substitutes or complements depending on the size of employment. When using the
Morishima elasticity of substitution (MES), all factors become substitutes.
Arnberg and Bjorner (2007) apply cross-section and panel data techniques, respec-
tively, to a dataset of 903 Danish industrial firms for 1993 and the period from 1995 to 1997.
They estimate substitution elasticities between the factors electricity, other energy, labor
and machine capital using the translog and the linear logit specification. Their main find-
ing is that, in the fixed-effects model, electricity and capital as well as other energy and cap-
ital are complements, whereas they are substitutes in the cross-section model. They point
out that the results of the cross-section model might suffer from biased estimates due to
endogeneity problems with the price of labor and energy. They argue that firm fixed-effects
can control for unobservable quality differences of employees as well as for differences of
energy fuels. Similar to other studies, Arnberg and Bjorner find lower values for interfuel
substitution elasticities than for the elasticities between energy and non-energy factors.
Finally, Tamminen and Tuomaala (2012) employ panel data from 2000 to 2009 com-
prising 230,000 manufacturing and service companies operating in Finland. They estimate
substitution elasticities for the factors labor, capital, outside services, electricity and other
energy forms for 71 sectors. Their results show that the factors labor and capital are rel-
atively price-inelastic. In contrast, material and energy inputs are price-sensitive. Due to
the fact that energy expenses were only available for a subset of companies (the energy-
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intensive ones), energy elasticities could not be estimated for all sectors. As substitution
elasticities significantly differ across the 71 sectors, they recommend using sector-specific
estimates in computational general equilibrium models.
3 Modeling Approach
The translog (TL) function introduced by Christensen et al. (1973) is the preferred produc-
tion function used in the literature because of its functional flexibility and the relatively
low data requirements. While the majority of empirical studies make use of the TL func-
tion, more recent work also considers the linear logit (LL) function as developed in Consi-
dine and Mount (1984) as a functional specification. While the LL function is as flexible as
the TL function, it has the advantage that it is well-behaved for a broader range of factor
prices and shares. The LL model is especially suitable if some cost shares are very small
(Considine, 1989) and if there is relatively large variation between firms in the cost shares
(Arnberg and Bjorner, 2007). For these reasons, we rely on estimates gained from the LL
model in our analysis of the substitution possibilities of Swiss manufacturing firms. The
results from a TL specification can be found in Appendix A and will serve as a reference.4
3.1 The Linear Logit Function
We use the logistic production function with the factors capital (K), labor (L), energy (E)
and material (M) to represent the production function of firms, developed in Considine
and Mount (1984). In the linear logit model, the factor shares can be represented as
si n,t =
exp(βi n +∑
j
βi j n · ln(p j n,t )+βi ny · ln yn,t )∑
i
exp(βi n +∑
j
βi j n · ln(p j n,t )+βi ny · ln yn,t )
, (1)
where i and j stand for the respective input factors (K,L,E,M), y denotes the output of firm
n, and t is a time index. To estimate the linear logit model, we linearize it and directly im-
pose the homogeneity and the symmetry restriction. We have to drop one share equation
to obtain a non-singular system. This is done by dividing each share equation by the ma-
terial share equation and by taking the logarithm. By dividing by the material share equa-
tion, the denominator in Equation 1 cancels out and the logarithm linearizes the functional
form.
Following the procedure of Arnberg and Bjorner (2007), we transform the share equa-
tions in such a way that the restrictions can be imposed directly into our system of equa-
4Another possibility would be to employ the Generalized Leontief (GL) cost function, proposed by Diewert
(1971). We refrain from doing so, because Tovar and Iglesias (2013) show in their study that the TL cost
function has a better fit than the GL cost function.
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tions. We define β∗i j n =βi j n/mi n , where mi n is the mean cost share of input factor i . Then
the linearized form can be written as follows:
ln
(
si n,t
sMn,t
)
= β∗i n +
∑
j
αi j n ·m j n · ln
(
p j n,t
pMn,t
)
+β∗i ny · ln yn,t , (2)
where β∗i n ≡ βi n −βMn , αi j n ≡β∗i j n −β∗M j n and β∗i ny ≡βi ny −βMny ,
for i and j = {K,L,E}. To derive the elasticities, we first have to impose the symmetry and
homogeneity restrictions and subsequently estimate the system of share equations (Equa-
tion 2). The symmetry restriction implies that β∗j i =β∗i j . The second important property of
producer theory is that the production function is homogeneous of degree zero in prices.
Therefore, the homogeneity restriction implies that β∗i i = −
∑ j 6=i
j s j ·β∗i j /si . Applying the
proposed normalization from Considine and Mount (1984) and adding an error term yields
the system of share equations ready for estimation:
ln
(
si n,t
sMn,t
)
= β∗i n +
∑
i 6= j
β∗i j n ·m j n · ln
(
p j n,t
pi n,t
)
−
[∑
j 6=i β∗j Mn ·m j n · ln
(
p j n,t
pMn,t
)]
−β∗i Mn · (mi n +mMn) · ln
(
pi n,t
pMn,t
)
+β∗i ny · ln yn,t +εi n,t ,
for i and j = K,L,E .
(3)
The remaining parameter values can be derived by using the imposed symmetry and
homogeneity restrictions.
3.2 Concepts of Substitution Elasticities
In this section, two different concepts of substitution elasticities are introduced. First, we
examine the cross-price elasticity (CPE) of demand as a standard measure for factor sub-
stitution. Second, the Morishima elasticity of substitution (MES) is presented as a different
measure used for considering factor ratios rather than simple quantities.
3.2.1 Own- and Cross-price Elasticities
The CPE between factors i and j (ηi j ) measures the relative change in the quantity of factor
i (qi ) due to a relative change in the price of factor j (p j ). It is therefore called a one-factor-
one-price elasticity. As can be seen from Equation (4), ηi j can be derived by the estimated
factor share elasticity coefficient β∗i j and the factor shares si and s j , respectively.
ηi j ≡ s j · βˆ∗i j + s j , ηi i ≡−
∑
j 6=i
s j · βˆ∗i j + si −1 for all i , j , (4)
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where the second term illustrates the special case of a own-price elasticity (OPE). If ηi j > 0,
a price increase of input factor j leads to a higher quantity demand of factor i , with out-
put and all other prices held constant. Firms compensate the price increase of factor j by
using a higher amount of factor i instead. Consequently, the input factors are substitutes.
However, if ηi j < 0, a price increase of j decreases the demand for factor i . Thus, firms
reduce the amounts of factor i and j in the production process, for a constant output level.
In this case, inputs are considered to be complements. Mundra and Russell (2004) further
distinguish between whether or not the magnitude of the CPE is larger than unity. If the
value of the CPE estimate is above 1, the factors are sufficiently substitutable. Analogously,
if the CPE value is below –1, the factors will be sufficient complements.
3.2.2 Morishima Elasticity of Substitution
An alternative substitution elasticity concept was developed by Morishima (1967) and re-
fined by Blackorby and Russell (1981, 1989). In contrast to the CPE, the MES (σmi j ) belongs
to the group of one-price-two-factor elasticities.5 Specifically, σmi j measures the relative
change in the quantity ratio of the factors i and j , (qi /q j ), due to a relative price change of
factor j (p j ). Note that the MES can be derived directly from the OPE and CPE. The effect
of a change in p j on qi /q j is the CPE of factor i and j (ηi j ) minus the OPE of factor j (η j j ),
formulated as
σmi j = ηi j −η j j , for all i , j . (5)
Since η j j is generally negative (concavity constraint), one can conclude that σmi j > ηi j .
Hence, complementarity as implied by the CPE concept must not hold in the case of MES
if the magnitude of η j j is large enough.6 The interpretation of the MES is as follows: If
σmi j > 0, a price shift for good j leads to an increase in the optimal quantity of factor i rel-
ative to the optimal quantity of factor j , holding the amount of output constant. In this
case, factor i is considered to be a direct Morishima substitute for j (Mundra and Russell,
2004). If however σmi j < 0, a factor price increase of j would lead to a reduction in the opti-
mal quantity of factor i relative to the optimal quantity of factor j . In this case, j is called a
direct Morishima complement to input i .
Similar to the CPE case, Mundra and Russell (2004) make a further distinction between
whether or not the magnitude of the MES is larger than unity. If σmi j > 1, an increase in the
price of input i increases not just the quantity of input i relative to the quantity of factor j ,
but also the expenditure of i relative to j . According to Mundra and Russell (2004), this is
true for factors which are sufficiently substitutable in the sense of Morishima.
5See Stern (2011) for an overview of different substitution elasticity concepts.
6The standard errors of the estimated elasticities can be calculated by using the Delta method (see e.g.,
Greene (2000)).
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4 Methodological Procedure
The methodological approach is based on a pooled regression using seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) on transformed data with firm fixed effects. The general model is dis-
played below:
ynt =αn +x ′ntβ+εnt , (6)
where ynt is the endogenous variable, xnt the exogenous variable of firm n at time t , while
αn is a random variable capturing the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across in-
dividuals (firms). Furthermore, β is the vector of coefficients, and εnt denotes the error
term with elements being iid over n and t . Before the fixed effects model can be estimated,
the data has to be transformed. According to Cameron and Trivedi (2009), this is done by
calculating the variables’ mean over time in the individual-specific effects model:
y¯n =αn + x¯ ′nβ+ ε¯n , with
y¯n ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
ynt , x¯n ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
xnt and ε¯n ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
εnt .
(7)
Subsequently, the within transformation is performed by subtracting Equation (7) from (6),
which yields the fixed effects model presented below.
ynt − y¯n = (xnt − x¯n)′β+ (εnt − ε¯n)
y¨nt = x¨ ′ntβ+ ε¨nt , n = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ...,T.
(8)
As the individual-specific effect αn is time-invariant, it is canceled out. The variables y¨nt
and x¨nt vary within the observations of an individual n. However, the correlation between
individuals (firms) and over time is not considered. Consequently, the estimated standard
errors are not valid and must be corrected. Applying cluster-robust standard errors, treat-
ing each individual as a cluster is the usual method of standard error correction. We employ
an alternative possibility to estimate a cluster-robust covariance matrix, which consists in
bootstrapping by randomly resampling the series k times. This procedure was first de-
scribed in Efron (1979), while most extensions were performed in the last decade.
Considering the symmetry conditions, the system of equations in (9) can be estimated
by pooled OLS, or, as in this paper, by the SUR approach which accounts for error correla-
tions across the system of equations. The simultaneous estimation of the model, which is
also applied in Arnberg and Bjorner (2007), is more efficient compared to the equation-by-
equation OLS estimation and allows for a straightforward implementation of the various
parameter restrictions.7
7 Furthermore, SUR accounts for cross-equation contemporaneous correlations but assumes cross-time
independence of the residual vectors (ε¨ jn,t , with j ∈ {K,L,E}). In other words, we assume E [ε¨ jn,r ε¨ jn,s |X ] = 0 if
r 6= s and E [ε¨in,s ε¨ jn,s |X ]=σi j .
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
s¨Knt
s¨Lnt
s¨Ent
=

βKK,n β
K
L,n β
K
E,n
βLK,n β
L
L,n β
L
E,n
βEK,n β
E
L,n β
E
E,n
 ·

p¨K,nt
p¨L,nt
p¨E,nt
+

ε¨Kn,t
ε¨Ln,t
ε¨En,t
 s.t .
βKL,n = βLK,n
βKE,n = βEK,n
βLE,n = βEL,n
. (9)
5 Empirical Evidence
5.1 Data
5.1.1 Data Description
We use firm-level panel data comprising capital, labor, energy and material expenditures
as input factors for the period from 1997 to 2008. These data as well as the number of em-
ployees and the firm’s output are collected in the context of the survey “Production and
value added statistics” (WS), conducted by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO). The
survey levies detailed information on the balance sheets and the income statements of
Swiss firms in manufacturing, retail and services. A total of 10,400 companies were inter-
viewed in 1997/1998, and this number increased to about 20,000 companies in 2008/2009.
The response rate is about 90% for large firms, 70% for medium firms, and 60% for small
firms.8 The WS survey has been published since 1997 on an annual basis. The sample used
in this study, comprises 1,965 manufacturing firms (7,396 observations) from 22 industry
divisions.9
Factor cost shares of an input are obtained by dividing the firm’s cost of an input by the
total costs of all considered factors consumed or used in production. While this approach
is suitable for labor, energy and material, obtaining the annual real consumption of capital
is a challenging task. While Arnberg and Bjorner (2007) calculate factor cost shares by us-
ing total costs as the denominator and correcting the model by the building capital stock,
Woodland (1993) calculate the share of capital as a residual value. This is done by using the
value of firm’s output as the denominator. After subtracting the cost of labor, energy and
material, capital is obtained as the residual. In this paper, we follow the second approach.
Furthermore, deflators on these input factors are needed as we want to identify the ad-
justment in consumption within the set of input factors after prices have altered. We use a
weighted industry-wide capital deflator and sector-specific series for material and output
that are taken from the OECD. Also, sector-specific energy price indices are calculated on
the basis of price surveys from the IEA and the SFOE, as well as the survey “Energy con-
sumption statistics in the industry and services sectors” (EVID) published by the SFOE.10
8Data are made available for specific industries, corresponding to the 2-digit ISIC 3.1 classification.
9Only observations of firms stating their energy consumption have been considered. The sample is an
unbalanced panel due to firms’ entry, exit and non-response of the survey.
10More precisely, we calculate a chain Laspeyres index where the weights are updated annually by using
the expenditure shares of the different energy sources as weights. Sector-specific expenditure shares were
computed by using energy prices and physical quantities (measured in TJ) of the major energy sources (elec-
9
In accordance with Arnberg and Bjorner (2007), the price index for labor is obtained by
dividing the annual wage bill of company n by the number of employees (full-time equiv-
alents). As they mention, the price of labor tends to depend on the quality of labor cho-
sen, therefore, endogeneity might be an issue. However, they argue that if labor quality
is firm-specific and does not vary over time (time-constant), using fixed effects mitigates
the endogeneity problem. This line of reasoning applies analogously to the remaining in-
put factors, because the energy mix of demand, and capital good requirements, as well as
materials are likely to be firm-specific rather than time-dependent.11
After the within transformation introduced in Section 4, we are left with 7,396 obser-
vations covering 1,965 companies in 22 manufacturing divisions. Because energy price
indices are only available for 12 aggregate sectors, we aggregate the 22 divisions into 12
manufacturing sectors as displayed in Table 13 in Appendix E.
5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
In the production process of Swiss manufacturing firms, the factor with the largest mean
cost share is material (41.0%), followed by labor (35.5%), capital (21.4%) and energy (2.0%).
The mean cost share of energy in Switzerland is only half the size of the U.S. manufacturing
firms in the dataset of Nguyen and Streitwieser (1999). The energy cost share (electricity
and other energy) of the Danish firm sample is roughly 4.5% (Arnberg and Bjorner, 2007).12
As can be seen from Figure 1, the firms’ mean cost shares of capital, labor and material
exhibit a smooth distribution over the observations. In contrast, mean energy cost shares
are far from being equally distributed over the observations.
Higher energy prices resulting from new policy measures will, as a matter of course,
hit the companies with high energy shares hardest. However, firms that can easily substi-
tute energy using other production factors are able to mitigate the negative effects of rising
energy prices to a greater extent. In this paper, we are interested in finding differences in
the substitution possibilities between energy-intensive firms and energy-extensive firms.
Consequently, the dataset is subdivided into three subsets of similar sizes according to the
firms’ mean energy cost share. Subset 1 (S1) comprises the set of firms with a mean energy
cost share below 1.1% (c.f. Figure 1). Firms within S1, will be called low energy-use firms.
On the other hand, subset 3 (S3) includes the most energy-intensive firms, with mean en-
ergy cost shares above 2.0%. Subset 2 (S2) contains the remaining firms with medium en-
ergy use. Every subset represents one third of total observations. While the differences
of firms’ energy intensity are negligible in S1 and S2, there exist substantial differences
tricity, natural gas, light fuel oil, heavy fuel oil and coal). The same method to compute sector-specific price
indices for energy has been used in Mohler and Mueller (2012).
11We checked for possible endogeneity issues by applying 3SLS estimations on data from 1998 to 2008,
using the one period lagged price series. The results were very similar to those of the SUR approach.
12 Note that (Arnberg and Bjorner, 2007) exclude material, which leads to a higher energy share. Exclud-
ing material in our sample, would result in an mean energy cost share of 3.5%, which is still lower than in
Denmark.
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between firms in S3. For this reason, we will also consider other subdivisions of S3 in Ap-
pendix D.
The cost shares in the three subsets are generally stable over time with the exception of
S1, where we observe a slight decline in the mean cost share of material, while the labor
share increases. In all subsets, material is the major cost share and accounts for about 40%
of total cost, while labor and capital contribute about 35% and 20%.
Figure 1: Percentiles of the Factor Cost Shares
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5.2 Results
In the LL model (and the TL model), the concavity condition is not globally satisfied, and
it has to be checked whether the cost function is concave at the sample means and at each
observation. Concavity violations may indicate a misspecification of the underlying pro-
duction model and result in biased elasticity estimates (Diewert and Wales, 1987). We use
likelihood ratio (LR) tests and the concavity condition as criteria to choose the best speci-
fication for the LL model and the TL model.
Table 10 in Appendix B displays the Eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix at the sample
means and the percentage of observations that satisfy concavity for the LL model and the
TL model. The cost function is concave if the Hessian matrix of second partial derivatives
is negative semi-definite (Considine, 1989). The table first shows that all Eigenvalues are
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negative semi-definite in the LL model and in the majority of cases in the TL model, when
considering the sample means of the three subsets. If we check concavity at each observa-
tion, the rate of observations that satisfy concavity can be very low as the last row implies.
The gray-shaded areas indicate the specification that performs best subject to our two cri-
teria and we use these specifications in our analysis.
The estimated parameter values from the systems of equations for the three subsets
and the two production models are displayed in Table 11 in Appendix C. Below, we discuss
the results of the model estimations: We present the OPEs, CPEs and MES for the three
different subsets. In our description of the results, we focus on the firms’ reaction upon
an energy price change. Remember that, by definition, the estimated elasticities describe
firms’ optimal adjustment of the production process under the assumption of constant
output quantity. For example, if increased energy prices lead to a decrease of energy use
in the production process (own-price elasticities are typically negative), one or more of the
other factors have to increase to hold output of firms at a constant level. In other words,
there will always be at least one of the other factors that is substitutable with energy by
construction and consequently increases upon an energy price increase. The other two
factors can, in principle, increase or decrease, thus being substitutes or complements vis-
a-vis the factor energy.
5.2.1 Low Energy-Use Firms
Table 1 displays the estimated OPEs and CPEs for S1 containing firms with energy shares
below 1.1%. Each Table is supplemented by a graphical representation of the 95% confi-
dence intervals.13 In S1, all OPEs are negative. The OPE of energy is about –1, indicating
that energy is unit elastic in demand. The OPEs of the other factors are between –1 and
0, indicating that the factors capital, labor and material are less price-sensitive than the
factor energy. All four OPEs are significantly smaller than zero at least at the 5% level.
The CPEs describe the reaction of the quantity of the remaining factors upon a price
change of a factor and they are presented next in the table. For example, µK E denotes the
percentage change of the capital input upon an energy price increase of one percent. The
mostly positive estimates of the CPEs indicate substitution possibilities among the con-
sidered input factors, though there are considerable differences in the ease of substitution
indicated by the magnitude of the estimates. Regarding changes in the energy prices, we
observe that the factors material (CPE of 0.00), capital (0.02) and labor (0.00) are weak sub-
stitutes, however, not estimated as being significantly different from zero. Since the energy
share is generally low for these firms, naturally an energy price increase of one percent
is not having a large impact on the employed quantity of the other factors in percentage
terms. Hence, the small CPEs associated with energy price increases do not come as a
surprise.
13LCL, UCL denote the lower and the upper confidence limit of the elasticity estimates, respectively.
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Table 1: Own- and Cross-price Elasticities for Low Energy-Use Firms
Estimate LCL UCL SE t-values p-values
ηKK -0.865 -1.318 -0.411 0.231 -3.736 0.000
ηLL -0.715 -0.900 -0.530 0.094 -7.586 0.000
ηEE -1.031 -1.942 -0.121 0.464 -2.220 0.027
ηMM -0.710 -0.971 -0.449 0.133 -5.332 0.000
Negative 4 (4)
ηLK 0.172 0.085 0.259 0.045 3.855 0.000
ηEK 0.740 0.225 1.254 0.263 2.817 0.005
ηMK 0.251 0.039 0.464 0.108 2.317 0.021
ηKL 0.267 0.131 0.403 0.069 3.855 0.000
ηEL 0.212 0.000 0.424 0.108 1.962 0.050
ηML 0.360 0.261 0.458 0.050 7.177 0.000
ηKE 0.020 0.006 0.034 0.007 2.817 0.005
ηLE 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.002 1.962 0.050
ηME 0.000 -0.007 0.006 0.003 -0.082 0.935
ηKM 0.478 0.074 0.882 0.206 2.317 0.021
ηLM 0.440 0.320 0.560 0.061 7.177 0.000
ηEM -0.020 -0.495 0.455 0.242 -0.082 0.935
Substitutes 10 (8) | Complements 2 (0) N = 2,462
−2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 0
−1 0 1
Table 2: Morishima Elasticities for Low Energy-Use Firms
Estimate LCL UCL SE t-values p-values
σmLK 1.037 0.575 1.499 0.236 4.398 0.000
σmEK 1.604 0.918 2.290 0.350 4.583 0.000
σmMK 1.116 0.615 1.617 0.256 4.366 0.000
σmKL 0.982 0.753 1.212 0.117 8.395 0.000
σmEL 0.927 0.646 1.208 0.143 6.467 0.000
σmML 1.075 0.866 1.284 0.107 10.068 0.000
σmKE 1.051 0.141 1.962 0.465 2.263 0.024
σmLE 1.035 0.124 1.945 0.464 2.228 0.026
σmME 1.031 0.121 1.941 0.464 2.219 0.027
σmKM 1.188 0.707 1.669 0.246 4.839 0.000
σmLM 1.150 0.863 1.438 0.147 7.845 0.000
σmEM 0.690 0.148 1.232 0.276 2.497 0.013
Substitutes 12 (12) | Complements 0 (0) N = 2,462 0 1 2
Table 2 displays the Morishima elasticities (MES) of S1. As mentioned in Section 3.2.2,
MES belong to the class of two-factor-one-price elasticities. They measure how the ratio of
the two factors alters if there is a price increase of one percent for one of these factors. All
MES are positive implying that the share in production of a factor that experiences a price
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increase relative to each other factor is decreasing due to the price increase. The MES that
describe the reaction to an energy price change are all close to one. Hence, an energy price
increase of one percent leads to an increase of the other factor’s share relative to energy use
of roughly one percent.
5.2.2 Medium Energy-Use Firms
Table 3 displays the estimated OPEs and CPEs for S2, containing the firms with medium
energy use. The factor energy is less price-elastic than in S1, with an OPE of -0.56, note
however the relatively large standard errors of both estimates. Similar to S1, energy price
increases have a small effect on capital (0.02) and almost no effect on labor and material
for medium energy-use firms.
Table 3: Own- and Cross-price Elasticities for Medium Energy-Use Firms
Estimate LCL UCL SE t-values p-values
ηKK -1.328 -1.738 -0.918 0.209 -6.347 0.000
ηLL -0.563 -0.743 -0.383 0.092 -6.130 0.000
ηEE -0.561 -1.353 0.230 0.404 -1.390 0.165
ηMM -0.800 -1.028 -0.573 0.116 -6.903 0.000
Negative 4 (3)
ηLK 0.159 0.073 0.245 0.044 3.638 0.000
ηEK 0.308 -0.137 0.752 0.227 1.356 0.175
ηMK 0.435 0.268 0.603 0.085 5.096 0.000
ηKL 0.289 0.133 0.444 0.079 3.638 0.000
ηEL 0.063 -0.163 0.289 0.115 0.547 0.585
ηML 0.257 0.153 0.361 0.053 4.840 0.000
ηKE 0.022 -0.010 0.053 0.016 1.356 0.175
ηLE 0.002 -0.006 0.011 0.004 0.547 0.585
ηME 0.003 -0.011 0.016 0.007 0.422 0.673
ηKM 0.913 0.562 1.264 0.179 5.096 0.000
ηLM 0.297 0.176 0.417 0.061 4.840 0.000
ηEM 0.086 -0.313 0.484 0.203 0.422 0.673
Substitutes 12 (6) | Complements 0 (0) N = 2,461
−2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 0
−1 0 1
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Table 4: Morishima Elasticities for Medium Energy-Use Firms
Estimate LCL UCL SE t-values p-values
σmLK 1.487 1.068 1.906 0.214 6.956 0.000
σmEK 1.636 1.031 2.240 0.309 5.299 0.000
σmMK 1.763 1.320 2.206 0.226 7.802 0.000
σmKL 0.852 0.614 1.089 0.121 7.017 0.000
σmEL 0.626 0.337 0.914 0.147 4.250 0.000
σmML 0.820 0.612 1.028 0.106 7.730 0.000
σmKE 0.583 -0.209 1.375 0.404 1.442 0.149
σmLE 0.564 -0.228 1.355 0.404 1.396 0.163
σmME 0.564 -0.228 1.356 0.404 1.397 0.163
σmKM 1.713 1.295 2.131 0.213 8.029 0.000
σmLM 1.097 0.840 1.354 0.131 8.364 0.000
σmEM 0.886 0.428 1.345 0.234 3.787 0.000
Substitutes 12 (9) | Complements 0 (0) N = 2,461 0 1 2
The MES estimates of S2 are displayed in Table 4. As a consequence of the lower OPE of
energy, MES describing the behavior of the firms after an energy price change are smaller
than in S1, roughly 0.60. Still, energy price increases lead to less energy-intensive produc-
tion.
5.2.3 High Energy-Use Firms
Table 5 displays the OPEs and the CPEs for the high energy intensity subsample (S3). Again,
all estimated OPEs are negative and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, except
for the factor energy which is significant at the 10% level. The factor energy is unit-elastic
in demand (ηEE =−1.03). The factors labor and material are both inelastic in S3, while the
OPE of capital is marginally more elastic than the one of energy with a value of -1.09.
The substitution possibilities for firms with low and medium energy use, as shown by
the CPE estimates for S1 and S2, persists for the majority of elasticity estimates in S3, with
the exception of energy and capital, which are complements instead of substitutes in the
production process of energy-intensive firms (ηKE = −0.09, ηEK = −0.59). These CPEs be-
tween energy and capital are significantly different from zero at the 10% level. The ob-
served complementarity between these factors implies that an energy price increase of one
percent leads to a decrease in the amount of capital of 0.09%, holding the firm’s output con-
stant. If the price of capital increases by one percent, firms reduce the amount of energy
by approximately 0.59% when holding output constant.
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Table 5: Own- and Cross-price Elasticities for High Energy-Use Firms
Estimate LCL UCL SE t-values p-values
ηKK -1.087 -1.675 -0.500 0.300 -3.629 0.000
ηLL -0.588 -0.806 -0.370 0.111 -5.289 0.000
ηEE -1.028 -2.244 0.188 0.620 -1.657 0.098
ηMM -0.713 -1.099 -0.327 0.197 -3.619 0.000
Negative 4 (3)
ηLK 0.278 0.171 0.385 0.055 5.102 0.000
ηEK -0.587 -1.267 0.093 0.347 -1.691 0.091
ηMK 0.327 0.042 0.611 0.145 2.251 0.024
ηKL 0.490 0.302 0.678 0.096 5.102 0.000
ηEL 0.336 0.034 0.638 0.154 2.179 0.029
ηML 0.161 0.026 0.296 0.069 2.330 0.020
ηKE -0.093 -0.201 0.015 0.055 -1.691 0.091
ηLE 0.030 0.003 0.057 0.014 2.179 0.029
ηME 0.105 0.049 0.161 0.029 3.667 0.000
ηKM 0.571 0.074 1.067 0.254 2.251 0.024
ηLM 0.159 0.025 0.294 0.068 2.330 0.020
ηEM 1.159 0.540 1.778 0.316 3.667 0.000
Substitutes 10 (10) | Complements 2 (0) N = 2,473
−2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 0
−1 0 1
As a consequence of this complementarity, how does an energy-intensive firm react to
a price increase? First and due to the negative OPE of energy, an energy price increase of
one percent leads to a reduction of energy use by 1.02%. Since capital is a complement of
energy, capital use will also decrease, namely by 0.09%. To hold output constant, the firm
must therefore increase material and labor use by 0.11% and 0.03%. One possible story
that may fit these facts is that these firms are not able to absorb an energy price increase by
increasing their capital stock (e.g. using more energy-efficient technologies). Since capital
use is falling, a substantial increase in material use and to a lesser extent, labor use, is
needed to hold output constant.14
In Appendix D, we test whether our finding of complementarity depends on our defi-
nition of S3, by excluding gradually the least energy-intensive firms and re-estimating the
CPEs. Moreover, we control for a possible misspecification of the production model with
respect to the concavity condition. We show that complementarity becomes even stronger
when we exclude the least energy-intensive firms of S3. Hence, the adaption costs for very
energy-intensive firms tend to be higher. However, the reliability of the estimation results
falls as we decrease the number of firms in S3 to only include the firms with the highest
energy shares. Notice, that it does not suffice to simply check that the concavity condition
14For instance, by outsourcing some production steps and replacing them by using more intermediate
goods instead. This is just one of many possible interpretations and is presented here to illustrate how
energy-intensive firms adjust their production process after an energy price increase.
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is satisfied at the sample means. Our exercise shows that in the 15% subset, for example,
concavity is still satisfied at the sample means, but only 9.6% of the observations satisfy
concavity.
Regarding the MES in S3, displayed in Table 6, we observe that these CPEs translate into
similar MES as in S1 and S2: energy price increases of one percent lower the energy share
compared to all the other factors by roughly one percent.
Table 6: Morishima Elasticities for High Energy-Use Firms
Estimate LCL UCL SE t-values p-values
σmLK 1.365 0.769 1.962 0.305 4.484 0.000
σmEK 0.500 -0.398 1.399 0.458 1.091 0.275
σmMK 1.414 0.762 2.067 0.333 4.248 0.000
σmKL 1.077 0.790 1.365 0.147 7.337 0.000
σmEL 0.924 0.551 1.296 0.190 4.862 0.000
σmML 0.749 0.492 1.005 0.131 5.722 0.000
σmKE 0.935 -0.286 2.155 0.623 1.501 0.133
σmLE 1.058 -0.158 2.274 0.620 1.706 0.088
σmME 1.133 -0.084 2.350 0.621 1.825 0.068
σmKM 1.283 0.654 1.913 0.321 3.998 0.000
σmLM 0.872 0.463 1.281 0.209 4.183 0.000
σmEM 1.872 1.142 2.602 0.372 5.026 0.000
Substitutes 12 (8) | Complements 0 (0) N = 2,473 0 1 2
5.2.4 Comparison of the Elasticity Estimates
A summary of substitution elasticities of Swiss manufacturing firms reveals that there exists
a link between firms’ energy intensity and the way firms substitute towards other produc-
tion factors. Table 7 displays the price elasticities (OPEs and CPEs) related to an energy
price increase of low, medium and high energy-use firms. Moreover, the last three rows
show how the firms’ energy shares adjust after a price increase of one of the remaining
production factors.
The table shows that the OPEs of energy are unit elastic for low and high energy-use
firms. The factor energy is slightly less price-elastic for medium energy-use firms, but not
significantly different from the other two subsets. At the same time, cross-substitution
possibilities seem to play an important role in Swiss manufacturing. First, the majority of
cross-price elasticities are significantly different from zero. Moreover, the specification test
for Cobb-Douglas, displayed in in Appendix A.1, is rejected in S2 and S3 at the 1% level and
in S1 at the 10% level, confirming the result.
While capital and energy are cross-price substitutes for firms in the low and medium
energy intensity subset, complementarity was detected for firms in the high energy in-
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Table 7: Comparison of the Elasticity Estimates Related to Energy
Low Energy-Use Med. Energy-Use High Energy-Use
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
ηEE -1.031 0.464 -0.561 0.404 -1.028 0.620
ηKE 0.020 0.007 0.022 0.016 -0.093 0.055
ηLE 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.030 0.014
ηME 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.105 0.029
ηEK 0.740 0.263 0.308 0.227 -0.587 0.347
ηEL 0.212 0.108 0.063 0.115 0.336 0.154
ηEM -0.020 0.242 0.086 0.203 1.159 0.316
tensity subset (ηKE = −0.09, ηEK = −0.59). Low substitutability or complementarity be-
tween these factors implies that the firms’ adjustment to higher energy prices will be more
difficult, and unit costs may rise substantially (Berndt and Wood, 1975). Remember that
the exclusion of less energy-intensive firms from the sample and the re-estimation of the
production models results in even stronger complementarity. We find that very energy-
intensive manufacturing firms would have to reduce their capital stock more than less
energy-intensive firms in S3, after energy price increases. Hence, the adaption costs for
very energy-intensive firms tend to be even higher.
Another interesting result is that there exists a link between firms’ energy intensity and
the way firms substitute towards other production factors. For example, low and medium
energy-use firms only marginally substitute material or labor for energy (ηME = 0.00, ηLE =
0.00), while energy-intensive firms substitute material for energy more extensively after an
energy price increase (ηME = 0.11, ηLE = 0.03).
5.3 Comparison of Linear Logit and Translog Elasticity Estimates
Considine and Mount (1984) and Arnberg and Bjorner (2007) favor the linear logit model
for the estimation of substitution elasticities when using firm-level data, because the model
can handle high heterogeneity in the size of factor shares as well as factor shares that are
close to zero in a more appropriate manner than other function forms. Yet, the translog
cost function has been the standard approach used in the literature since the 1970s to esti-
mate substitution elasticities between production factors of individual industries, or, more
generally, the whole industry. As a benchmark and to show that our results do not depend
on the choice of the underlying cost function, we also display the elasticity estimates from
the translog model in Table 9 in Appendix A.2. Instead of discussing the TL elasticity esti-
mates, we use a graphical representation to compare the results.
Figure 2 displays the elasticity estimates of the LL model (upper panel) and the esti-
mates of the TL model (lower panel) in form of heatmaps for low, medium and high energy
use firms. The heatmaps show the relative magnitude of own-price elasticities on the di-
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agonal and the degree of substitutability (+) and complementarity (−) on the off-diagonal
elements, among the production factors capital, labor, energy and material. The substi-
tutability patterns are very similar for the two models. Notice the low magnitude of sub-
stitution after an energy price change in S1 and S2, represented by the white off-diagonal
elements of the third columns. In contrast, the magnitude of substitution (complemen-
tarity) is higher for material (capital) in S3. Complementarity between energy and capital
in the high energy intensity subset is detected by both the LL as well as the TL model. To
summarize, the elasticity estimates generally correspond in both sign and magnitude over
the two models.
Figure 2: Graphical Representation of the LL and TL Elasticity Estimates
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Notes: The diagonal cells display the magnitude of the own-price elasticities. All OPE estimates are
negative (−). The off-diagonal cells display the magnitude of the cross-price elasticities, where + (−)
indicates substitutability (complementarity). The cell-specific opacity provides information about the
magnitude.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides an analysis of factor substitution among capital, labor, energy and
material in Swiss manufacturing using micro panel data from 1997 to 2008. The focus lies
on examining the relationship between factor substitutability and the energy intensity of
manufacturing firms in Switzerland. Consequently, the firms are subdivided into three
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groups, namely low, medium and high energy-use firms. The findings from the elasticity
estimates in Swiss manufacturing bear strong implications for policy makers.
Substitution possibilities between capital, labor, energy and material help to mitigate
the negative effects of increasing factor prices: Firms adjust their production process by
substituting towards other production factors after relative factor price increases. One in-
teresting result of our study is that there exists a link between firms’ energy intensity and
the way firms substitute towards other production factors: While capital and energy are
cross-price substitutes for firms in the low and medium energy intensity subset, comple-
mentarity was detected for firms in the high energy intensity subset. These results imply
that the high energy-use firms’ adjustment to higher energy prices will be more difficult,
and, as a consequence, unit costs may rise more than in the case of substitutability. A
possible explanation for the complementarity result is that these firms have to consider-
ably adjust their production process by producing more material-intensively; possibly by
importing more intermediate products or shifting parts of their production to other coun-
tries. However, further research is needed to explain the adjustment process thoroughly.
The complementarity result for energy-intensive firms is in line with the results of Tovar
and Iglesias (2013) and Arnberg and Bjorner (2007). The former analyze the relationship
between capital and energy for the eight industries with the highest energy consumption in
the United Kingdom. Using industry-level data, the authors find complementarity between
capital and energy in all eight industries. Applying firm fixed-effects, Arnberg and Bjorner
also find complementarity between capital and energy in their Danish industrial dataset.
Energy-intensive firms in Switzerland and in other countries seem to have greater difficulty
in adjusting to energy price increases.
Another finding of the study of Arnberg and Bjorner (2007) is of interest: The comple-
mentarity result is reversed if the time dimension of the panel data is ignored. Pooling the
data, the elasticities between capital and energy are positive, implying substitutability be-
tween capital and energy, as is the case with the other factors of production. This result
might indicate that firm-specific factors such as the firm’s production technology and the
goods produced are fixed in the short run. In the longer term, however, substitution possi-
bilities might increase as firms are able to undertake more substantial adjustments in their
production (e.g. underlying technology). Hence, the considered time horizon of the ad-
justment process to relative price changes in a production factor is crucial and might be a
reasonable explanation for the differing results between panel and cross-section estimates.
While we are interested in the relationship between substitutability and the energy in-
tensity of firms, Nguyen and Streitwieser (1999) examine the question of whether plant
size, as indicated by the number of employees, has an impact on factor substitutability.
Our elasticity estimates are smaller in magnitude than the elasticities of U.S. firms. In-
terestingly, considering cross-price elasticities, they also find complementarity between
capital and energy and to a smaller extent between capital and labor for some of the plant
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size classes. Yet, in the overall sample, all production factors are substitutes; and if Mor-
ishima elasticities are considered, all production factors are substitutes in all plant-size
classes. They find no structural differences in the ease of substitution between small and
large manufacturing plants and therefore conclude that policies which result in raising en-
ergy prices will not affect plants differently depending on their size. Testing for differences
between small and large firms with our sample revealed no significant differences in the
ease of factor substitution, confirming the findings of Nguyen and Streitwieser (1999).
The policy implications to be drawn from this analysis are that both the low and medium
energy-use firms are unlikely to face severe problems in dealing with rising energy prices.
These firms are able to reduce their energy use by producing slightly more capital-intensively
and by adopting energy-saving measures without making major changes in their produc-
tion processes. In contrast, energy-intensive firms have substantially higher energy cost
shares: In our sample, these firms have a mean energy cost share of 4.0%, compared to
0.5% (1.4%) for low (medium) energy-use firms. More importantly, energy intensive firms
face further problems in coping with energy price increases, as there is evidence for com-
plementarity between energy and capital, at least in the short and medium run.
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A Translog Function
The translog (TL) function was proposed in Christensen et al. (1973) and has become a very
popular modeling approach in factor demand models over the last decades. The main rea-
son for the success of the TL is its flexible functional form which does not impose any prior
constraints on the elasticities. Typically, the elasticities of substitution are derived from
cost functions. An exception is Berndt and Christensen (1973) which estimate the elastici-
ties directly from the production function. The TL function requires two model restrictions
to be fulfilled. First, the factor shares si n,t have to sum up to 1 at each point in time and
for each individual firm n. Furthermore, symmetry has to be satisfied, such that βi j =β j i .
The factor share equations of the TL cost function can be stated as follows:
si n,t =βi n +
4∑
j=1
βi j n ln
(
p j n,t
)+βi ny ln(yn,t )+εi n,t , (10)
where i and j denote the four considered factor inputs capital, labor, energy and material,
while n and t stand for the firm and the time index, respectively. In the right-hand side
of the equation, βi n captures input and firm-specific effects which are considered to be
constant over time when using panel data. Furthermore, the log of output (y) of firm n at
time t is included to control for different production levels. Finally, an error term denoted
by εi n,t is added.
The adding up restriction of the factor shares leads to singularity, because the sum of
error terms is zero for each firm. To obtain a non-singular system of equations, we omit
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the factor share equation of material and normalize the remaining factor share equations
by the price of material. The reformulated factor share equation is
si n,t =βi n +
3∑
j=1
βi j n ln
(
p j n,t
p4n,t
)
+βi ny ln
(
yn,t
)+εi n,t . (11)
The factor shares in Equation (11) can be estimated by a system of equations approach.
The elasticities of the factor material can be calculated subsequently by using the adding-
up and homogeneity conditions.
As can be seen from Equation (12), the cross-price elasticity ηi j can be derived by the
estimated factor share elasticity coefficientβi j and the factor shares si and s j , respectively:
ηi j ≡
βˆi j + si s j
si
, η j j ≡
βˆ j j + s j s j − s j
s j
, for all i , j , (12)
where the second term illustrates the special case of an own-price elasticity (OPE). The
Morishima elasticity, σmi j is stated in Equation (13). As one aims to isolate the effect of a
change in p j on qi /q j , the OPE of factor j (η j j ) must be subtracted from the CPE of factor
j and i (ηi j ).15
σmi j = ηi j −η j j , for all i , j . (13)
A.1 Cobb-Douglas Specification Test
The Cobb-Douglas function is a nested function of the translog function (Christensen et al.,
1973). With a likelihood ratio (LR) test, we check whether the Cobb-Douglas form is suf-
ficient to fit the production process of Swiss manufacturing firms. Table 8 displays the LR
test results for the three subsets. In S2 and S3, Cobb-Douglas is rejected at the 1% level and
in S1 at the 10% level. Hence, cross-substitution possibilities seems to play an important
role and assuming Cobb-Douglas production functions might lead to biased results.
Table 8: Cobb-Douglas Specification Tests
Subset N df F p-value
1 2,462 3 2.1844 0.08768
2 2,461 3 5.3912 0.00105
3 2,473 3 4.4149 0.00416
15The standard errors of the estimated elasticities can be calculated by using the Delta method (see e.g.,
Greene (2000)).
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A.2 Translog Elasticity Estimates
Table 9: Own-, Cross-price and Morishima Elasticities in the Translog Case
Subset 1
OPE
ηKK −0.836∗∗∗
(0.197)
ηLL −0.765∗∗∗
(0.054)
ηEE −0.971∗∗
(0.424)
ηMM −0.621∗∗∗
(0.139)
CPE
ηLK 0.262
(0.049)
∗∗∗
ηEK 1.082
(0.728)
ηMK 0.223
(0.123)
∗
ηKL 0.390
(0.072)
∗∗∗
ηEL 0.041
(0.155)
ηML 0.400
(0.063)
∗∗∗
ηKE 0.030
(0.020)
ηLE 0.001
(0.049)
ηME −0.002
(0.017)
ηKM 0.416
(0.229)
∗
ηLM 0.502
(0.080)
∗∗∗
ηEM −0.153
(1.128)
MES
σmLK 1.098
∗∗∗
(0.200
σmEK 1.919
∗∗
(0.754)
σmMK 1.059
∗∗∗
(0.213)
σmKL 1.155
∗∗∗
(0.085)
σmEL 0.806
∗∗∗
(0.164)
σmML 1.165
∗∗∗
(0.071)
σmKE 1.001
∗∗
(0.425)
σmLE 0.972
∗∗
(0.424)
σmME 0.969
∗∗
(0.424)
σmKM 1.037
∗∗∗
(0.252)
σmLM 1.123
∗∗∗
(0.154)
σmEM 0.468
(1.136)
−1.5 −1 −0.5 0
−2 −1 0 1 2
−2 −1 0 1 2 3
Subset 2
−1.21
(0.193)
∗∗∗
−0.502
(0.053)
∗∗∗
−0.427
(0.263)
−0.701
(0.136)
∗∗∗
0.189∗∗∗
(0.046)
0.244
(0.311)
0.424∗∗∗
(0.116)
0.329∗∗∗
(0.081)
−0.052
(0.127)
0.269∗∗∗
(0.068)
0.016
(0.021)
−0.002
(0.005)
0.008
(0.018)
0.865∗∗∗
(0.236)
0.315∗∗∗
(0.079)
0.234
(0.555)
1.399∗∗∗
(0.196)
1.455∗∗∗
(0.366)
1.634∗∗∗
(0.207)
0.831∗∗∗
(0.092)
0.449∗∗∗
(0.137)
0.771∗∗∗
(0.073)
0.443∗
(0.264)
0.425
(0.263)
0.434∗
(0.263)
1.566∗∗∗
(0.258)
1.016∗∗∗
(0.151)
0.936
(0.572)
−1.5 −1 −0.5 0
−2 −1 0 1 2
−2 −1 0 1 2 3
Subset 3
−0.928∗∗∗
(0.214)
−0.582∗∗∗
(0.051)
−1.138∗∗∗
(0.347)
−0.509∗∗∗
(0.191)
0.361
(0.058)
∗∗∗
−0.474
(0.396)
0.244
(0.159)
0.593
(0.096)
∗∗∗
0.540
(0.157)
∗∗∗
0.152
(0.083)
∗
−0.086
(0.072)
0.060
(0.017)
∗∗∗
0.113
(0.072)
0.422
(0.275)
0.161
(0.088)
∗
1.071
(0.682)
1.289∗∗∗
(0.218)
0.455
(0.448)
1.172∗∗∗
(0.243)
1.174∗∗∗
(0.101)
1.122∗∗∗
(0.165)
0.734∗∗∗
(0.083)
1.051∗∗∗
(0.352)
1.198∗∗∗
(0.347)
1.251∗∗∗
(0.350)
0.931∗∗∗
(0.316)
0.670∗∗∗
(0.204)
1.580∗∗
(0.706)
−1.5 −1 −0.5 0
−2 −1 0 1 2
−2 −1 0 1 2 3
Notes: The symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Asymptotic
standard errors in parentheses.
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B Concavity and Specification Tests
Table 10: Concavity in the Translog and the Linear Logit Model
Eigenvalues
none linear trend quadratic trend quadratic and linear trend
Subset 1 Subset 2 Subset 3 Subset 1 Subset 2 Subset 3 Subset 1 Subset 2 Subset 3 Subset 1 Subset 2 Subset 3
Linear Logit
λ1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
λ2 -0.009 -0.011 -0.039 -0.009 -0.009 -0.043 -0.009 -0.009 -0.042 -0.009 -0.009 -0.042
λ3 -0.270 -0.282 -0.312 -0.268 -0.270 -0.285 -0.268 -0.273 -0.297 -0.268 -0.270 -0.277
λ4 -0.443 -0.473 -0.335 -0.442 -0.519 -0.405 -0.441 -0.526 -0.386 -0.441 -0.521 -0.383
Pct. of sam-
ple concavity
100 100 87.2 100 100 90.0 100 100 88.8 100 100 89.9
Translog
λ1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000
λ2 -0.004 -0.008 -0.050 -0.040 0.000 -0.006 -0.008 0.000 -0.011 -0.008 0.000 -0.010
λ3 -0.282 -0.264 -0.256 -0.282 -0.258 -0.253 -0.279 -0.259 -0.261 -0.280 -0.258 -0.249
λ4 -0.438 -0.459 -0.347 -0.438 -0.480 -0.425 -0.436 -0.479 -0.413 -0.433 -0.479 -0.416
Pct. of sam-
ple concavity
82.6 89.7 96.5 84.7 10.9 30.9 100 15.5 39.0 100 12.6 37.0
Notes: The gray-shaded areas indicate our specification choice based on LR-tests for the linear logit model and the translog model.
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C Estimated Parameters
Table 11: Estimated Parameter Values from the Systems of Equations
Linear Logit Translog
Subset 1 Subset 2 Subset 3 Subset 1 Subset 2 Subset 3
βKK −0.3261
(1.40383)
−2.8252
(1.37144)
∗∗ −1.4632
(1.89095)
−0.0146
(0.04405)
−0.0859
(0.03973)
∗∗ −0.0325
(0.04697)
βKL −0.1439
(0.22205)
−0.1153
(0.24317)
0.4746
(0.28905)
∗ 0.0115
(0.01667)
−0.0062
(0.01671)
0.0510
(0.02104)
∗∗
βKE 2.6823
(1.30739)
∗∗ 0.7123
(1.26284)
−4.1125
(1.8406)
∗∗ 0.0054
(0.00446)
0.0005
(0.00428)
−0.0278
(0.01588)
∗
βKM 0.2512
(0.53995)
1.4241
(0.4757)
∗∗∗ 0.7326
(0.76975)
−0.0023
(0.05161)
0.0916
(0.04804)
∗ 0.0093
(0.06072)
βLL −0.0876
(0.34239)
0.3397
(0.3597)
0.2412
(0.46448)
−0.0355
(0.0183)
∗ 0.0499
(0.01913)
∗∗∗ 0.0209
(0.01845)
βLE −0.3215
(0.34582)
−0.8072
(0.35269)
∗∗ 0.0108
(0.4639)
−0.0019
(0.00096)
∗ −0.0057
(0.00174)
∗∗∗ 0.0072
(0.00629)
βLM 0.1518
(0.1605)
−0.2123
(0.16274)
−0.5160
(0.20774)
∗∗ 0.0259
(0.02718)
−0.0380
(0.02806)
−0.0791
(0.03152)
∗∗
βEE −25.0307
(1.12522)
∗∗∗ 13.6234
(1.09236)
∗∗∗ −1.8234
(1.52994)
0.0001
(0.00268)
0.0077
(0.00362)
∗∗ −0.0071
(0.01391)
βEM −1.0517
(0.6342)
∗ −0.7720
(0.53985)
2.5192
(0.95967)
∗∗∗ −0.0036
(0.00699)
−0.0026
(0.00775)
0.0277
(0.02741)
βMM −0.2413
(0.85543)
−0.4695
(0.74858)
−0.1279
(1.2455)
−0.0200
(0.05867)
−0.0511
(0.05643)
0.0421
(0.07306)
βl i n.tr end −0.0109
(0.00417)
∗∗∗ −0.0136
(0.00536)
∗∗ −0.0004
(1e−04)
∗∗∗
βsq.tr end 3e−05
(1e−05)
∗∗∗
βy1 0.0010
(0.0407)
−0.1820
(0.02987)
∗∗∗ −0.0660
(0.03257)
∗∗ 0.0175
(0.00299)
∗∗∗ 0.0028
(0.00317)
0.0182
(0.00334)
∗∗∗
βy2 −0.3025
(0.03541)
∗∗∗ −0.3755
(0.02483)
∗∗∗ −0.3589
(0.02521)
∗∗∗ −0.0550
(0.00382)
∗∗∗ −0.0629
(0.00369)
∗∗∗ −0.0635
(0.00327)
∗∗∗
βy3 −0.2746
(0.04123)
∗∗∗ −0.2315
(0.02563)
∗∗∗ −0.2133
(0.04538)
∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.00021)
∗∗∗ −0.0005
(0.00027)
∗ 0.0002
(0.00116)
N 2,462 2,461 2,473 2,462 2,461 2,473
Notes: The symbols *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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D Complementarity - Concavity Relationship
In this section, we test whether our finding of complementarity between capital and energy
in the production process of energy-intensive firms depends on our definition of subset 3.
Specifically, we exclude the less energy-intensive firms from the sample and re-estimate
our the two production models with the remaining firms. Moreover, we test the percent-
age of observations that satisfy the concavity condition, since violations may indicate a
misspecification of the underlying production model (Diewert and Wales, 1987).
The LL model generally performs better than the TL model regarding the concavity
condition. In the LL model, concavity is satisfied for all observations in S1 and S2 (see Ta-
ble 10 in Appendix B). However, the LL model has more violations of concavity in S3 than
the TL model.16 The subsample of energy-intensive firms exhibits significant heterogene-
ity with respect to energy shares. The energy shares of the energy-intensive firms range
between 1.85% and 29.1%. This might be an explanation why the concavity condition is
not satisfied for all the data points in the LL model.
Figure 12 discloses the relationship between the cross-price elasticities (ηke ,ηek ) and
the concavity measure for the linear logit model and the translog model. In addition, the
mean factor shares for each energy intensity subset is displayed. Specifically, the figure
shows how the cross-price elasticity between capital and energy changes if the number
of firms in S3 is decreased step by step to only include the firms with the highest energy
shares. Contemporaneously, the percentage of observations which satisfy concavity are
noted for each energy intensity subset.
Table 12: Degree of Complementarity and Concavity between Energy and Capital
Most energy
intensive
firms (N )
Linear Logit Translog Mean factor shares
ηKE ηEK t-val Conc. ηKE ηEK t-val Conc. sK sL sE sM
40 % (2,967) -0.05 -0.33 -1.01 94.2∗ -0.07 -0.40 -0.99 97.0∗ 0.216 0.358 0.036 0.390
35 % (2,596) -0.10 -0.63 -1.83 85.6∗ -0.08 -0.47 -1.15 96.6∗ 0.219 0.362 0.039 0.381
33 % (2,473) -0.09 -0.59 -1.69 90.0∗ -0.09 -0.47 -1.20 96.5∗ 0.215 0.363 0.040 0.382
30 % (2,226) -0.10 -0.62 -1.78 84.6∗ -0.10 -0.50 -1.19 90.6∗ 0.220 0.358 0.042 0.379
25 % (1,857) -0.12 -0.64 -1.60 89.0∗ -0.10 -0.48 -1.02 99.1∗ 0.222 0.355 0.047 0.376
20 % (1,491) -0.21 -1.03 -2.30 64.1∗ -0.17 -0.76 -1.63 79.9∗ 0.228 0.353 0.052 0.367
15 % (1,116) -0.21 -0.93 -1.86 9.6 -0.06 -0.22 -0.39 70.9∗ 0.234 0.348 0.060 0.359
10 % (748) -0.35 -1.32 -2.35 2.4 -0.20 -0.67 -1.28 5.1 0.242 0.346 0.072 0.340
Notes: The table displays the degree of complementarity between capital and energy and the rate of observations
that satisfy concavity as well as mean factor shares for different energy intensity subsets. ∗ denotes whether
concavity is satisfied at the respective sample means.
The complementarity between capital and energy increases if the size of the subset is
decreased. In the 40% subset, the CPE of capital and energy is -0.05 and not statistically
significant. The complementarity becomes stronger and significant at the 1% level as we
16Excluding the observations that violate concavity and re-estimating the two production models does not
affect our elasticity estimates.
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decrease the sample size of S3, with an CPE of -0.35 in the 10% subset. However, the con-
cavity condition is only satisfied in 2.4% of observations, indicating a misspecification of
the underlying cost function.
A look at the factor mean cost shares reveals that the share of capital increases when
we exclude the less energy-intensive firms from S3. The capital share increases from 21.6%
to 24.2%. Thus, the production of very energy-intensive firms tends to be more capital-
intensive and less labor and material-intensive. At the same time, the complementar-
ity between capital and energy increases. This finding suggest that very energy-intensive
manufacturing firms would have to reduce their capital stock even more than less energy-
intensive firms in S3, after energy price increases. Hence, the adaption costs for very energy-
intensive firms tend to be higher.
Another important result of this exercise is that it does not suffice to simply test whether
the concavity condition is satisfied at the sample means. In the subsample, where the 20%
most energy-intensive firms are considered, only 64.1% of observations satisfy concavity
(79.9% in the TL model), whereas concavity is still satisfied at the sample means. Only
when the 15% (in TL 10%) most energy-intensive firms are considered, the concavity falls
below 10%, and concavity as measured at the sample means is no longer satisfied. Low
concavity rates point to severe specification problems and the underlying elasticity esti-
mates are very likely to be biased.
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E Distribution of Observations over Sectors and Subsets
Table 13: Manufacturing Sectors and Divisions
Sector Division Industry Description Obs.
1 15,16 Food products, beverages and tobacco products 746
2 17-19 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products 555
3 20 Wood, products of wood and cork 279
4 21,22 Paper, paper products, printing and publishing 914
5 24 Chemicals, chemical and pharmaceutical products 392
6 25 Rubber and plastic products 471
7 26 Other non-metallic mineral products 317
8 27,28 Basic metals and fabricated metal products 1,256
9 29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 790
10 30-33 Electrical equipment, electronic and optical products 1,152
11 34,35 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 186
12 36,37 Furniture and other manufacturing 338
Notes: Divisions according to NOGA 2002 industrial classification of Switzerland, 2-digit.
n.e.c.: not elsewhere classified. Sector 12 is a residual division, where the production pro-
cesses, input materials and use of the produced goods can vary widely.
Table 14: Distribution of Observations over Sectors and Subsets
Subset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N
1 197 152 92 252 143 136 97 472 330 444 64 83 2,462
2 200 172 95 366 143 224 92 359 196 458 39 117 2,461
3 349 231 92 296 106 111 128 425 264 250 83 138 2,473
All 746 555 279 914 392 471 317 1,256 790 1,152 186 338 7,396
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Figure 3: Distribution of observations Within the Subsets
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Notes: The panels on the left display the rate of observations as percentages of total observations
of each sector. The panels on the right display the rate of observations as the percentage of total
observations within the respective subset.
31
F Factor Cost Shares
Figure 4: Subset-specific Cost Shares
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.214 0.086 0.153 0.205 0.266 0.370
SL 0.355 0.151 0.278 0.356 0.430 0.553
SE 0.020 0.004 0.008 0.014 0.023 0.060
SM 0.410 0.164 0.318 0.408 0.496 0.664
N = 7,396 Whole sample
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.226 0.096 0.164 0.212 0.274 0.387
SL 0.341 0.151 0.272 0.343 0.406 0.528
SE 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.010
SM 0.427 0.188 0.346 0.436 0.515 0.641
N = 2,462 Subset 1
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.202 0.080 0.145 0.199 0.249 0.339
SL 0.361 0.134 0.279 0.368 0.439 0.577
SE 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.018
SM 0.422 0.183 0.328 0.407 0.497 0.735
N = 2,461 Subset 2
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Material Labor Capital Energy
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.215 0.067 0.153 0.222 0.293 0.444
SL 0.363 0.157 0.247 0.327 0.443 0.548
SE 0.040 0.038 0.043 0.057 0.086 0.137
SM 0.382 0.110 0.229 0.338 0.458 0.605
N = 2,473 Subset 3
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Figure 5: Sector-specific Cost Shares (I)
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.217 0.094 0.145 0.215 0.267 0.363
SL 0.345 0.170 0.273 0.339 0.415 0.511
SE 0.005 0.028 0.010 0.018 0.030 0.113
SM 0.409 0.216 0.322 0.411 0.498 0.611
N = 746 Sector 1
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.234 0.093 0.163 0.209 0.287 0.478
SL 0.378 0.162 0.281 0.366 0.462 0.618
SE 0.021 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.026 0.058
SM 0.366 0.134 0.225 0.380 0.469 0.652
N = 555 Sector 2
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.194 0.061 0.154 0.191 0.242 0.309
SL 0.377 0.222 0.320 0.372 0.438 0.547
SE 0.017 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.026 0.046
SM 0.411 0.256 0.341 0.393 0.477 0.613
N = 279 Sector 3
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Material Labor Capital Energy
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.219 0.081 0.166 0.218 0.271 0.366
SL 0.358 0.159 0.286 0.355 0.425 0.588
SE 0.019 0.004 0.008 0.015 0.020 0.048
SM 0.404 0.167 0.326 0.390 0.496 0.645
N = 914 Sector 4
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Figure 5: Sector-specific Cost Shares (II)
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.214 0.086 0.153 0.205 0.266 0.370
SL 0.355 0.151 0.278 0.356 0.430 0.553
SE 0.020 0.004 0.008 0.014 0.023 0.060
SM 0.410 0.164 0.318 0.408 0.496 0.664
N = 392 Sector 5
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.196 0.080 0.149 0.195 0.249 0.321
SL 0.339 0.114 0.248 0.367 0.433 0.517
SE 0.017 0.005 0.008 0.014 0.018 0.038
SM 0.448 0.183 0.331 0.434 0.548 0.766
N = 471 Sector 6
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.197 0.086 0.138 0.186 0.242 0.338
SL 0.352 0.148 0.307 0.352 0.410 0.540
SE 0.020 0.005 0.009 0.015 0.023 0.056
SM 0.431 0.287 0.344 0.415 0.488 0.735
N = 317 Sector 7
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Material Labor Capital Energy
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.218 0.088 0.156 0.209 0.260 0.388
SL 0.352 0.166 0.278 0.355 0.425 0.526
SE 0.022 0.004 0.007 0.013 0.026 0.083
SM 0.408 0.159 0.313 0.412 0.490 0.666
N = 1,256 Sector 8
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Figure 5: Sector-specific Cost Shares (III)
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.213 0.087 0.147 0.190 0.265 0.403
SL 0.351 0.174 0.259 0.348 0.430 0.554
SE 0.019 0.002 0.006 0.013 0.022 0.076
SM 0.417 0.134 0.304 0.425 0.510 0.657
N = 790 Sector 9
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.213 0.098 0.157 0.205 0.261 0.341
SL 0.353 0.148 0.281 0.362 0.420 0.538
SE 0.016 0.004 0.008 0.012 0.017 0.043
SM 0.417 0.213 0.331 0.410 0.494 0.642
N = 1,152 Sector 10
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Mn Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95
SK 0.191 0.073 0.151 0.176 0.220 0.339
SL 0.388 0.223 0.306 0.380 0.464 0.587
SE 0.018 0.005 0.008 0.014 0.022 0.047
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N = 338 Sector 12
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G Descriptive Statistics on Factor and Output Prices
Capital Price Index
Figure 6: Capital Price Index
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Notes: The mean annual price change of capital is 0.21, with a mini-
mum, maximum and standard deviation of -1.15, 1.94 and 0.95, respec-
tively.
Labor Price Indices
Figure 7: Labor Price Indices (I)
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
90
100
110
120
Sector 1
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
90
100
110
120
Sector 2
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
90
100
110
120
Sector 3
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
90
100
110
120
Sector 4
36
Figure 7: Labor Price Indices (II)
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Energy Price Indices
Figure 8: Energy Price Indices (I)
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Figure 8: Energy Price Indices (II)
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Material Price Indices
Figure 9: Material Price Indices (I)
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Figure 9: Material Price Indices (II)
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Output Price Indices
Figure 10: Output Price Indices (I)
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Figure 10: Output Price Indices (II)
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Descriptive Statistics on Sectoral Factor Price Indices
Table 15: Sector-specific Annual Price Changes of Input Factors and Output
Sector
Labor Energy Material Output
Ave. Min Max SE Ave. Min Max SE Ave. Min Max SE Ave. Min Max SE
1 1.31 -0.01 3.58 1.01 2.27 -5.54 9.19 4.72 0.56 -1.32 5.53 1.81 0.67 -0.66 5.52 1.73
2 1.19 -2.75 3.67 1.79 1.85 -4.69 9.08 4.56 0.64 -0.49 2.33 0.93 0.74 -0.62 2.38 0.96
3 1.34 -3.18 6.03 2.97 0.66 -4.03 4.94 2.84 1.24 -0.66 4.74 1.86 1.34 -0.78 4.79 1.84
4 1.30 0.26 2.56 0.83 1.41 -5.18 6.78 3.74 0.02 -5.88 3.27 2.76 0.12 -5.25 3.32 2.67
5 1.66 -1.15 4.51 1.70 1.36 -5.00 6.35 3.63 -0.75 -3.12 1.78 1.71 -0.66 -2.81 1.69 1.60
6 1.25 -2.44 3.43 1.81 0.66 -4.03 4.94 2.84 1.39 -1.72 4.07 1.95 -0.66 -2.81 1.69 1.60
7 1.28 -1.57 4.05 1.54 3.72 -6.21 15.82 6.46 1.15 -4.29 4.71 2.44 1.26 -3.65 4.76 2.33
8 1.23 -4.32 3.36 1.93 0.24 -3.51 4.15 2.38 2.13 -1.19 6.91 2.77 2.24 -1.15 6.97 2.75
9 1.64 -1.26 5.51 1.66 1.22 -4.08 6.89 3.59 1.15 -0.67 3.76 1.10 1.25 -0.01 3.80 1.02
10 1.48 -1.32 4.11 1.38 0.69 -3.79 5.19 2.92 0.69 -1.63 1.90 1.01 0.81 -1.63 1.95 1.00
11 0.71 -5.36 8.59 4.07 0.66 -4.03 4.94 2.84 0.61 -3.81 3.73 2.36 0.71 -3.83 3.80 2.35
12 1.22 -1.12 4.96 1.82 0.66 -4.03 4.94 2.84 1.24 -2.36 7.22 2.79 1.35 -1.71 7.26 2.74
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Chapter 2: Price and Income Elasticities of Swiss Households
1 Introduction
The Swiss government has decided to phase out nuclear power and to reduce CO2 emissions
until 2020 by 20 percent below 1990 levels. To secure long-term energy supply, the objective
of the Swiss government is, among the promotion of renewable energy sources, to substan-
tially reduce overall energy consumption and the associated CO2 emissions (Energy Strategy
2050). In Switzerland, households account for approximately 29 percent of total energy con-
sumption and substantially more if energy used in private transportation is taken into account.1
Our contribution is aimed at a better understanding of households’ energy consumption be-
havior. This will be key to achieve the objectives of the energy transition in Switzerland.
The literature on energy demand finds large variations in households’ energy consumption
between countries and household types (Withana et al., 2013). Factors such as regulations in
place, the price mix of energy sources and the technologies in use in a country influence
the actual consumption behavior of households. There is a number of studies that have es-
timated demand elasticities for different energy sources of the residential sector in Switzer-
land. For example, Baranzini and Weber (2013) estimate the elasticity of gasoline demand in
Switzerland. They find short-run price elasticities of -0,09 and long-run elasticities of -0,34.
Bernstein and Madlener (2011) estimate residential electricity demand elasticities for several
OECD countries including Switzerland. They find long-run price elasticities between -0,09
and -0,23. Income elasticities are above unity with values between 1,34 and 1,72. Another ex-
ample are the studies by Filippini (1999, 2011) on the elasticity of residential energy demand
in Switzerland. The former study finds a demand elasticity of -0,30 for electricity and an in-
come elasticity of 0,33. In the latter study, Filippini compares short- and long-run elasticities
for peak and off-peak electricity consumption. The short-run peak elasticities vary between
-0,77 and -0,84 and the long-run peak elasticities between -1,60 and -2,26. The off-peak elas-
ticities are similar but of slightly lower magnitude. In a recent study, Filippini et al. (2015)
estimate price elasticities for residential electricity consumption. Therefore, the authors use
a promising index based on the stock of electrical appliances. Filippini et al. find short-run
elasticities of -0,4 and long-run elasticities vary between -0,4 and -0,6. All these studies have
in common that they rely on single equation models or very basic consumer demand mod-
els. In contrast, the employment of sophisticated consumer demand models offer interesting
insights on consumption patterns and complement the results of the above mentioned studies
that can only take substitution possibilities with other goods into account to a certain extent.
Instead of using a single equation model such as the widely used double-log models or
error correction models that (implicitly or explicitly) assume that energy is separable from
other consumption goods, we employ a flexible system of demand equations that does not
rely on the separability assumption and is consistent with demand theory. This allows us to
reflect households’ consumption behavior taking into account potential substitution possibil-
ities between energy and other consumption goods. Moreover, it enables us to examine the
link between income and the demand for energy. Specifically, we employ the Exact Affine
1In 2013 the energy use of households was 259,950 TJ and that of private and public transportation (house-
holds, industries and agriculture) 313,220 TJ (Overall Energy Statistics for Switzerland, 2013).
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Stone Index (EASI) demand system to estimate elasticities and Engel curves for ten expen-
diture categories, including energy and transportation. In order to capture both static and
dynamic effects, we use a repeated cross-section and a constructed pseudo panel dataset on
Swiss households from 2001 to 2011 and estimate own-price, cross-price and income elastic-
ities as well as Engel curves. Moreover, we compare the consumption patterns of particular
household types such as singles, couples, families or car-owners.
Our results provide evidence that in Switzerland, households’ transportation is price in-
elastic with elasticity estimates between -0.18 and -0.08. Energy use on the other hand is
close to a unit elasticity, similar to most other consumption categories we consider. Excep-
tions are the price elastic groups food out and recreation. Cross-price elasticities of private
transportation and energy use vis-a-vis the other categories are relatively modest in magni-
tude. However, we find significant elasticities indicating that transportation is a complement
to housing, clothing and food in, and a substitute to food out and household operations. En-
ergy is a significant complement to household operations and substitutable with food in. The
estimated income elasticities show that food in, energy, housing and communication are ne-
cessity goods, while food out, clothing, household operations and recreation tend to be luxury
goods. The income elasticity of private transportation is unit elastic.
The Engel curves of private transportation, housing and clothing are S-shaped, indicat-
ing the importance of our model choice for these categories. The Engel curve of energy is
strictly decreasing as is the one for food in and communication. Moreover, we find substantial
differences of consumers’ energy expenses when comparing different household types. For
example, the comparison of the Engel curves of homeowners and tenants shows that the curve
of tenants runs halfway below the curve of homeowners. This difference can only partly be
explained by the fact that tenants pay a portion of their energy expenses as part of their ad-
ditional property expenses. In fact, the remaining discrepancy results from differences in the
household size, the dimension of the living area and distributional differences in urban and
rural areas. As a further result, we find differences between households with a car and house-
holds without a car regarding private transportation behavior. Specifically, while car owners
spend a higher share of their income on transportation for all income levels, the Engel curve
is slightly decreasing while the Engel curve of non-owners is mostly increasing with income.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the EASI demand
system and shows how price and income elasticities as well as Engel curves are derived.
Section 3 shows how the pseudo panel is constructed from the repeated cross section data and
outlines the estimation approach. Section 4 describes the employed data, Section 5 presents
the results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Modeling Approach
2.1 The EASI Demand System
The Exact Affine Stone Index (EASI) demand system, proposed by Lewbel and Pendakur
(2009), belongs to the class of consumer demand models such as the Almost Ideal Demand
System (AIDS) and the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QAIDS).2 It possesses sev-
eral advantages over the latter two consumer demand models. First, real expenditures can be
considered up to an arbitrary higher order polynomial enabling the Engel curves to assume
2Examples of empirical studies using Swiss data and using the AIDS or the QUAIDS model are Abdulai
(2002) on food categories using a QUAIDS model and Filippini (1995) on electricity using a rudimentary AIDS
model.
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any shape. Secondly, interactions of demographic characteristics with prices and expendi-
tures can be included easily. Finally, linearity in parameters and additive error terms, make
empirical implementation and interpretation straightforward. Results from studies based on
the family of consumer demand models offer therefore interesting insights on consumption
patterns and complement the results of related demand models that do not take into account
substitution possibilities with other goods.
According to (Lewbel and Pendakur, 2009), the class of EASI cost functions can be char-
acterized by the following equation:
C(p,u,z,ε) = u+p′m(u,z,ε)+T (p,z)+S(p,z)u, (1)
where p is the log of the price vector of J goods, u is utility, z are demographic characteristics
and ε is an additive error term. The EASI model allows to include interaction terms among
the variables of prices, expenditures and demographic characteristics. For the estimation of
the EASI demand system, the authors derive the implicit Marshallian demand functions and a
measure of real expenditures.
The first step is to derive Hicksian demand functions from the EASI cost function (Equa-
tion (1)) by applying Shepard’s lemma. The Hicksian demand, e.g. the vector of budget
shares w = ω(p,u,z,ε), is a function of p, z, ε and the respective utility level u. Then, Lew-
bel and Pendakur (2009) suggest to express the utility level u by a function g(w,p,x,z) and
call it implicit utility y. Substituting this expression into Hicksian demands leads to a modified
version of Marshallian demand, what the authors call implicit Marshallian demand function
w = ω(p,y,z,ε). Note that the expression for the implicit Marshallian demand function is
equal to the Hicksian demand function after replacing unobservable utility level u by the im-
plicit utility function y. The main advantage of this transformation is that the implicit utility
function only depends on observed data (w, p, z, x) and can be interpreted as a measure of
real expenditures. To recapitulate, instead of obtaining Marshallian demands by solving for
indirect utility u as a function of p, z and x and afterwards substituting the term into Hicksian
demands, Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) suggest a cost function with the objective of directly
modeling utility as a function of shares, prices, household characteristics and income.
Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) propose the following EASI cost function specification for
the empirical implementation:
C(p,u,z,ε) = u+p′
[
R
∑
r=0
brur+Cz+Dzu
]
+
1
2
L
∑
l=0
zlp′Alp+
1
2
p′Bpu+p′ε, (2)
where the employed function for the term m(u,z,ε) in Equation (1) consists of a polynomial
in y of degree R as well as interaction terms with demographic characteristics z. Applying
Shepard’s Lemma and replacing u by y, we obtain the following implicit Marshallian demand
function.
w =
R
∑
r=0
bryr+Cz+Dzy+
L
∑
l=0
zlAp+Bpy+ ε. (3)
Integrating Equation (3) into Equation (2) and solving for u, respectively y, gives the
closed-form solution for implicit utility (y) as presented in Equation (4). Implicit utility is
an affine transformation of the log Stone index deflated expenditures (Lewbel and Pendakur,
2009). We simultaneously estimate Equation (3) and (4), using nonlinear three-stage least
squares (3SLS) methods. Detailed information about the estimation method is given in Sec-
tion 3.
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y= g(w,p,x,z) =
x−p′w+∑Ll=0 zlp′Alp/2
1−p′Bp/2 . (4)
2.2 Price and Income Elasticities
Following Hoareau et al. (2012), we can derive semi-elasticities of budget shares (w) with
respect to prices (p), demographic characteristics (z) and real expenditures (y). The formula
is displayed in Equation (5).
ζi = ∇iω(p,y,z,ε) for i= p,z,y. (5)
The estimated coefficients of the EASI model can directly be interpreted as marginal ef-
fects. The derivation of price and income elasticities is more cumbersome because we have to
investigate how actual quantities change. Below, we present the expressions for price and the
income elasticities based on the functional specification of Equation (2).3
Price elasticities measure the relative change in the quantity of good i (qi) due to a relative
change in the price of good j (p j). Equation (6) depicts the expression of the cross-price
elasticity (ηi j) and the own-price elasticity (ηii).
ηi j ≡ ∂ lnqi∂ ln p j =
H
wi
, ηii ≡ ∂ lnqi∂ ln pi =
H
wi
−1, (6)
where H = p j
∂y
∂ p j
(
R
∑
r=1
briyr−1+
L
∑
l=1
dlizl+
I
∑
j=1
b ji ln(p j))+
L
∑
l=0
al jizl+b jiy.
Analogously, the impact of changes in income (x) on the demand of good j can be calcu-
lated as displayed in Equation (7):
εix ≡ ∂ lnqi∂ lnx = 1+
∑Rr=1 briyr−1+∑
L
l=1 dlizl+∑
I
j=1 b ji ln(p j)
wi
. (7)
Engel curves allows an in-depth analysis of households’ consumption patterns subject to
their income. Specifically, an Engel curve describes how an households’ demand for a good,
expressed either as real expenditures or shares, varies as a function of income or total ex-
penditures, holding prices constant (Lewbel, 2008). In contrast to related consumer demand
models, Engel curves from the EASI model can replicate almost any shape over real expen-
ditures. Moreover, empirical evidence clearly shows that the actual shape of an Engel curve
depends on the good of interest and on households characteristics. The EASI model is able
to explain much of the observed variation in households consumption behavior as interaction
terms between observable characteristics, prices and income are included and it takes into
account unobserved preference heterogeneity.
3 Methodology
3.1 Cross Section and Pseudo-Panel Data
The application of cross-section data allows us to catch the static long-term degree of con-
sumer response with respect to price changes. Certainly, short-run effects might also be in-
teresting when dealing with elasticity estimates and their magnitude. Unfortunately, the latter
3For a detailed derivation of price and income elasticities see Hoareau et al. (2012).
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cannot be derived from cross-section data, as the specific individual demand adjustment over
time is not observed. Instead, one needs to make use of panel data, tracing individuals i over
time t. However, this type of data is rare in the majority of countries. In most instances, the
survey design is according to the concept of repeated cross-sections, i.e. a collection of the
same information for different individuals over time. Note however, that there are some severe
drawbacks of using non-panel data. Baltagi (2005) provides an overview of specific benefits
from using panel data instead based on Hsiao (2003) and Klevmarken (1989). Those include,
among others, the possibility of controlling for individual heterogeneity as well as the gain of
more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees
of freedom and more efficiency. Moreover, panel data are better in catching the dynamic ad-
justment and in identifying and measure effects that are neither detectable in cross-section nor
in pure time series data. Especially the latter two benefits of panel data are of interest if one
seeks to distinguish static from dynamic consumer response to price and income changes.
Following the seminal idea of Deaton (1985), the use of pseudo panel data might—in
our application—tackle the issue of catching the dynamic adjustment. Accordingly, rather
than tracing individuals over time, one can provide a remedy by using “cohorts” instead. A
cohort is defined as a group of individuals sharing certain time invariant characteristics and
hence feature a fixed affiliation to the group. When cohort means are used as observations it
is considered a pseudo panel. As Verbeek (2008) points out, besides the two dimensions of
sample size N and time horizon T in genuine panel data, there are two more dimensions in the
case of pseudo panel data. Those are the number of cohortsC and the number of observations
per cohort nC forming an inverse relationship per construction given fixed values for N and T .
Among others, he distinguishes the most reasonable specifications in which either (i) N→ ∞,
C fixed, so that nC → ∞ or (ii) N → ∞ and C→ ∞, with nC fixed. Given that the number of
observations is typically limited in empirical applications, there is always a trade-off between
the optimal number of cohorts and the number of observations per cohort.
One distinct advantage of this approach is the diminishing of sample attrition, a severe
issue in some panel data sets. However, taking cohort means rather than individual observation
can be costly in terms of an optimal information usage. A priori it is not clear whether static
information on the micro-level is lost in this procedure or whether it was efficiently condensed
for the benefit of information on dynamic response. Furthermore, the calculation of cohort
means is done for a specific set of individuals rather than the whole population what might
end up in measurement errors. However, if the groups are large enough, measurement errors
can be ignored. As Bernard et al. (2011) conclude, there is no general inferiority of pseudo
panel data towards “real” panel data. They determine a trade-off between more precise (static)
information subject to attrition and the measurement error arising in more complete pseudo
panels with additional dynamic information.
Following Verbeek (2008), one condition for the within estimator for pseudo panel data to
be consistent is a genuine time variation in cohort averages used for estimation. Furthermore,
according to Moffitt (1993) letting nC→∞ and using asymptotics as in (i), the estimator for β
arrives at consistency. However, Verbeek and Nijman (1992) show substantial measurement
errors by small-sample bias to occur even in settings where n¯c is large. This problem can
usually resolved by applying the k-means algorithm for clustering the observation into co-
horts with minimum variance within the cluster (cohesion) and maximum variance between
them (separation).4 This approach makes efficient use of information gained from specific
consumption patterns caused by homogeneous and heterogeneous features.
4An alternative has been presented by Cottrell and Gaubert (2003), who use the neural network concept of
Kohonen mapping as introduced by Kohonen (1989) to attain an optimal number of cohorts.
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3.2 Estimation Approach
For the estimation of the EASI model, we follow Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) and estimate
Equation (3) and (4) simultaneously, by using nonlinear three-stage least squares (3SLS)
methods.5 This estimation method allows us to account for potential endogeneity issues,
while the symmetry conditions are satisfied. We base our estimation approach on a pooled
regression using 3SLS on repeated cross section data and transformed pseudo-panel data with
cohort fixed effects. While the first model approach is straightforward, the fixed effects model
is stated explicitly below. Consider the following linear equation model with n individuals:
ynt = αn+ x′ntβ + εnt , (8)
where ynt is the endogenous variable, xnt the exogenous variable at time t, while αn is a
random variable capturing the unobserved and time-constant heterogeneity across individuals
(cohorts) n. Furthermore, β is the vector of coefficients and εnt denotes the error term with
elements being iid over n and t. Before the fixed effects model can be estimated, the data has
to be transformed. According to Cameron and Trivedi (2009), this is done by calculating the
variables’ mean over time in the individual-specific effects model.
y¯n = αn+ x¯′nβ + ε¯n, with
y¯n ≡ 1T
T
∑
t=1
ynt , x¯n ≡ 1T
T
∑
t=1
xnt and ε¯n ≡ 1T
T
∑
t=1
εnt
(9)
Subsequently, the within transformation is performed by subtracting Equation (9) from (8)
which yields the fixed effects model presented below.
ynt− y¯n = (xnt− x¯n)′β +(εnt− ε¯n)
y¨nt = x¨′ntβ + ε¨nt , n= 1, ...,N and t = 1, ...,T
(10)
This model framework is used to estimate the Equations (3) and (4) under the usual symmetry
conditions for the level of prices Al = A′l , for all l and the prices interacted with implicit
utility y (B = B′). As the individual-specific effect αn is time-invariant it cancels out. The
variables y¨nt and x¨nt vary within the observations of an cohort n. However, the correlation
between individuals (cohorts) and over time is not considered. Consequently, the estimated
standard errors are not valid and have to be corrected. Applying cluster-robust standard errors,
treating each cohort as a cluster is the usual method of standard error correction. We employ
an alternative possibility to estimate a cluster-robust covariance matrix, which consists in
bootstrapping by resampling the series randomly k times. This procedure was first described
in Efron (1979).
4 Data and Specification Tests
4.1 Data Description
We use data on household expenditures and demographic characteristics from the Swiss
Household Budget Survey (HBS), gathered by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO)
for the period from 2001 to 2011. For the estimation of the EASI model, we consider monthly
5A consistent and efficient alternative would be the general methods of moments (GMM) estimator. However,
(Lewbel and Pendakur, 2009, pp. 839) found that the weighting matrix is numerically less stable than 3SLS.
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expenditures of the following ten categories: food and beverages (named in the following food
in), meals in restaurants and hotels (food out), clothing and footwear (clothing), energy, hous-
ing, household operations, private transportation (transportation), communication, recreation
and health.
The HBS contains information about the time period when the survey was conducted. This
allows to apply monthly price variables, leading to 132 distinct price vectors, normalized to
prices in January 2010. After excluding observations from households with monthly dispos-
able incomes below 1,000 and above 20,000 CHF, as well as keeping only observations with
positive expenditures for transportation, recreation, health and household operations, we are
left with a total of 27,332 observations. From the information on households’ expenditures,
household-specific budget shares can be calculated for all categories. In line with Lewbel and
Pendakur (2009), log prices are used and large durables such as washing machines, lawnmow-
ers and cars are excluded.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Household Consumption
Variable Mean SE Min Max Variable Mean SE Min Max
Budget Shares Average Price Level
s.foodin 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.73 p.total -0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.01
s.foodout 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.71 Log Expenditures
s.cloth 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.57 x (nom) 8.30 0.45 6.83 9.87
s.ener 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.63 x (real) 8.34 0.44 6.91 9.9
s.hous 0.31 0.14 0.00 0.84 Household Characteristics
s.furn 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.78 num persons 2.55 1.28 1 11
s.trans 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.83 num kids 0.55 0.92 0 8
s.com 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.36 Household Dummies
s.recr 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.82 singles 0.21 0.41
s.health 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.82 couples 0.37 0.48
Log Prices families 0.31 0.46
p.foodin -0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.02 others 0.11 0.31
p.foodout -0.06 0.05 -0.14 0.02 old HH 0.17 0.38
p.cloth -0.09 0.08 -0.24 0.05 young HH 0.16 0.37
p.ener -0.15 0.14 -0.35 0.15 sex 0.27 0.44
p.hous -0.07 0.05 -0.15 0.02 rent 0.51 0.50
p.furn -0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.01 car 0.83 0.37
p.trans -0.08 0.12 -0.28 0.20 Seasonal Dummies
p.com 0.14 0.11 -0.01 0.28 q2 0.25 0.43
p.recr 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.04 q3 0.25 0.43
p.health 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 q4 0.24 0.43
Table 1 provides an overview of summary statistics for the estimation sample. Housing
represents by far the largest average share accounting for 31 percent of disposable income, fol-
lowed by food in, recreation and food out, with shares above 10 percent. The budget shares for
transportation, health, household operations, clothing, communication and energy range be-
tween 3 and 8 percent of income. The dataset is approximately balanced between homeowners
and tenants, whereas only 27 percent of households are represented by a woman. Roughly,
a fifth of households are single households, 37 percent are couples, 31 percent are families
with children and 11 percent represent the remaining households. Since households are very
diverse and heterogeneous, we define a reference household based on the demographic char-
acteristics of the an average Swiss household to calculate meaningful Engel curves with ample
confidence intervals. This reference household is defined as a family with two kids that owns
at least one car, is a homeowner, and is represented by a middle-aged male reference person.
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Figure 1: Monthly Price Indices by Expenditure Category
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Figure 1 displays the price indices of the ten consumption categories over the period from
2001 to 2011. It shows substantial differences in the development of prices over time. The
largest variations in prices is observed for the category energy. Energy prices started to rise
in 2005 and peaked in 2008. Subsequently, energy price decreased considerably and began to
rise again in 2009, resulting in 40 percent higher energy prices in 2011, compared to the price
level in 2001. Since prices of gasoline and diesel depend on the oil price, a similar develop-
ment is depicted for prices of private transportation, although less pronounced. The prices of
housing and of food out have steadily increased over time, the price of food in shows only
a moderate increase. On the other hand, the prices of communication have fallen after 2005
by roughly 30 percent and the prices of recreation have fallen after 2009 by approximately
10 percent until 2011 in Switzerland. The prices for health services and household operations
were nearly constant over time. Finally, for some of the categories, seasonalities in prices
are observed, especially for clothing. We include quarterly dummies into our estimation to
account for these seasonalities.
Figure 2: Mean Budget Shares by Expenditure Category
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Figure 2 displays budget shares of the nine consumption categories over time. There
is little variation in the magnitude of the budget shares. The most noticeable changes are
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increasing values for recreation and transportation. On the other hand, the mean shares of
food in and housing slightly decrease over time. In summary, the average budget shares of the
nine categories remain relatively constant over time.
The expenditure shares of the two categories energy and private transportation differ con-
siderably. Table 2 displays the expenditure share for energy used at home. The shares are
computed as expenses for energy divided by overall disposable income. In addition, we also
show the absolute costs in CHF for energy that arise during one month. For the purpose of
comparison, we normalize the monthly costs by dividing by the number of persons in a house-
hold. The differences in the consumption patterns between different household types do, in
general, not depend on the income level. At the bottom, the average energy expenditures
in CHF and relative to income, are displayed for the income quintiles. While the absolute
expenses for energy are increasing with income, the relative share is decreasing.
Table 2: Distribution of Energy Shares by Household Type and Quintile
Income Quintiles Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
% Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF
Household type
Singles 6.60 78.49 3.42 64.63 3.12 73.30 2.69 79.11 2.12 95.56
Couples 6.47 121.35 4.31 122.51 3.67 129.12 3.19 140.58 2.60 175.84
Families 4.10 119.23 3.27 133.48 2.92 143.70 2.68 161.50 2.31 198.31
Others 5.01 139.41 3.90 166.78 3.42 178.47 2.96 191.85 2.90 259.31
Age
Young 3.54 85.79 2.50 78.89 2.10 76.92 1.71 72.34 1.31 76.54
Middle Aged 4.88 121.40 3.66 129.91 3.32 136.83 2.92 142.98 2.41 163.99
Old 7.29 114.40 4.65 116.84 4.09 125.98 4.02 155.78 3.35 205.44
Housing Situation
Owner 7.22 147.94 5.26 177.63 4.73 190.48 4.25 205.59 3.56 246.23
Tenant 3.30 74.54 2.42 71.77 2.12 73.72 1.82 75.46 1.41 81.85
Transport Type
Carowner 5.49 125.72 3.85 130.67 3.43 136.11 2.99 141.09 2.52 168.98
Non-carowner 5.32 90.85 3.31 90.66 2.77 91.44 2.60 107.03 2.05 122.57
Average 5.44 114.56 3.69 119.09 3.26 124.79 2.90 133.13 2.41 158.64
Notes: Households’ energy consumption at home by household type and income quintile.
Table 3 displays the expenditure share for private transportation by household type and
income quintiles. The average expenditures for transportation are increasing in income. In
contrast to energy, the relative expenses for transportation are also increasing with income.
Not surprisingly, we find the largest differences between car owners and non-owners.
Table 3: Distribution of Transport Shares by Household Type and Quintile
Income Quintiles Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
% Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF
Household type
Singles 7.00 95.39 7.05 138.11 7.46 179.93 8.25 248.58 8.12 367.96
Couples 7.18 146.16 7.13 207.97 7.22 260.90 7.62 344.31 7.32 504.23
Families 6.65 206.43 6.56 272.99 7.01 351.29 7.07 434.59 6.92 586.81
Others 7.29 224.91 7.31 324.52 7.94 427.56 7.83 516.03 7.76 713.22
Age
Young 7.20 189.15 7.22 229.38 7.65 280.90 8.22 345.12 8.19 477.06
Middle Aged 6.99 194.43 6.88 256.00 7.28 312.77 7.62 379.52 7.60 513.17
Old 6.70 124.63 6.69 179.81 6.88 226.52 7.12 290.11 6.55 410.04
Housing Situation
Owner 7.38 183.30 7.08 258.26 7.32 321.32 7.44 386.46 7.27 526.22
Tenant 6.37 169.14 6.74 219.76 7.24 269.36 7.83 339.56 7.75 458.16
Transport Type
Carowner 7.26 187.70 7.34 256.54 7.68 312.00 8.11 385.86 7.90 518.51
Non-Carowner 5.46 127.54 4.87 153.91 5.21 198.79 5.34 233.81 5.68 356.38
Average 6.95 177.29 6.91 238.51 7.28 293.64 7.66 360.85 7.52 490.93
Notes: Households’ expenses for private transportation by household type and income quintile.
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Figure 4 displays how households’ energy consumption at home breaks down into ex-
penses for electricity and fossil fuels. The largest differences are found between owner and
tenants, the latter exhibiting approximately 20 percentage points higher shares for electricity.
One explanation for this large differences is that, in Switzerland, tenants heating costs are
often included in the additional charges of the rent. So in reality, the electricity share is higher
for tenants than depicted in the table. Unfortunately, we are not able to further breakdown the
rent category and correct the electricity share of tenants.
Table 4: Households’ Energy Consumption Subdivided into Electricity and Fuels
Income Quintiles Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
CHF Elect. Fuels CHF Elect. Fuels CHF Elect. Fuels CHF Elect. Fuels CHF Elect. Fuels
Household Type
Singles 83.18 0.61 0.39 63.32 0.68 0.32 74.89 0.61 0.39 79.07 0.59 0.41 97.51 0.56 0.44
Couples 120.76 0.59 0.41 125.73 0.59 0.41 130.01 0.58 0.42 137.01 0.56 0.44 176.02 0.48 0.52
Families 118.53 0.72 0.28 133.38 0.67 0.33 143.97 0.61 0.39 160.07 0.57 0.43 194.88 0.58 0.42
Other 138.78 0.68 0.32 165.89 0.62 0.38 179.32 0.61 0.39 193.63 0.57 0.43 260.14 0.48 0.52
Age
Young 85.11 0.74 0.26 79.15 0.74 0.26 74.47 0.73 0.27 70.81 0.73 0.27 73.41 0.68 0.32
Middle Aged 123.17 0.69 0.31 133.38 0.64 0.36 139.80 0.61 0.39 143.71 0.57 0.43 166.00 0.54 0.46
Old 124.27 0.56 0.44 132.86 0.55 0.45 142.29 0.50 0.50 166.41 0.45 0.55 222.60 0.39 0.61
Housing Situation
Owner 149.18 0.61 0.39 178.39 0.57 0.43 192.84 0.53 0.47 205.13 0.50 0.50 246.50 0.46 0.54
Tenant 75.83 0.81 0.19 73.17 0.80 0.20 72.81 0.77 0.23 74.99 0.73 0.27 81.83 0.67 0.33
Transport Type
Carowner 121.31 0.66 0.34 128.44 0.63 0.37 133.25 0.59 0.41 137.39 0.56 0.44 166.53 0.51 0.49
Non-carowner 102.47 0.67 0.33 105.40 0.65 0.35 106.49 0.63 0.37 117.12 0.58 0.42 134.66 0.55 0.45
Average 118.05 0.66 0.34 124.39 0.64 0.36 128.90 0.60 0.40 134.06 0.57 0.43 161.12 0.52 0.48
Notes: Elect. denotes the share of electricity and Fuel the share of fossil fuels and others of households overall energy consumption at
home.
Figure 18 and 19 in the Appendix display the regional differences in Switzerland. We find
that the energy expenses relative to households’ disposable income are largest in the region
Ticino. Comparing the composition of household types between the different regions shows
that the composition of household types within a specific region is a major driver for energy
expenses. Especially, whether a household lives in a rural or an urban area or whether the
household is a tenant or owner.
4.2 Model Specification
We drop the share equation of health to obtain a non-singular system of equations. To cap-
ture the variation in households consumption behavior, we consider observable households’
characteristics and characteristics specific to the households’ reference person. Specifically,
we include the sex of the reference person and dummies for young and old household. A
household is considered young if the reference person’s age is below 35 and old if it is above
65. Moreover, information on the landlord/tenant situation, the household size and on whether
children are living in the household is considered. To control for seasonal differences, we also
include quarterly dummies.
Table 5 provides information on the model specification for the case of cross-section data.
We consider interaction terms between p and y, z and y and p and z as well as any combination
among them. According to BIC, we choose the model with interactions between demographic
variables and implicit utility. The rank of y is considered to be of order 3.6 We further use
information about the specific month in which the household has been interviewed.7
6The model specifications for rank y< 3 show similar pattern concerning interactions of exogenous variables
but lower BIC values and therefore are neglected in Table 5.
7Significant seasonal differences have been detected in the consumption patterns of households obtained from
the cross section model.
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Table 5: Model Specification
Interaction Power
of y log |Σˆε |
a Number of
parameters BIC
b AIC c
p, y z, y p, z
3 -145.938 198 -4668088 -4670123
x 3 -145.983 783 -4663443 -4670376
x 3 -146.046 315 -4670326 -4673340
x x 3 -146.090 900 -4665652 -4673565
x 3 -145.949 243 -4667962 -4670373
x x 3 -145.997 828 -4663447 -4670757
x x 3 -146.058 360 -4670235 -4673626
x x x 3 -146.106 945 -4665703 -4670138
Notes: a Calculated as uˆ>i uˆ j/T with T being the number of observations per equation. b Calculated
as n · log |Σˆε |+ log(n)(∑mi=1 pi+0.5 ·m(m+1)) with m equals the number of equations, n denoting the
number of observations per equation and pi the number of independent parameters in equation i. c
Calculated as n · log |Σˆε |+2∑mi=1 pi+m(m+1) with m equals the number of equations, n denoting the
number of observations per equation and pi the number of independent parameters in equation i.
The construction of the pseudo-panel with the k-means algorithm is covered in detail in
Section A in the Appendix. Similar to the cross-section data, the information criterion is ap-
plied to determine the optimal number of cohorts (C). After applying the k-means algorithm,
we were left with a panel consisting of 484 observations gained by 11 cohorts (C) over the
quarterly time period from 2001 to 2011. Empirical studies such as Browning et al. (1985),
Banks et al. (1994), Blundell et al. (1994), Alessie et al. (1997), Blundell et al. (1998) and
Propper et al. (2001) employ mean cohort sizes n¯C ranging from 80 to more than 1500 while
the number of cohorts has a minimum in 5 and a maximum in 90. Hence, our pseudo-panel is
suitable for the estimation of the EASI model.
5 Price and Income Effects
5.1 Own-price Elasticities
The effects of a price change on the quantity consumed for the nine categories are displayed in
Table 6. The cross-section own-price elasticities (OPE) in the upper panel are all negative and
are at least significant on the five percent level, with the exception of household operations.
The highest elasticity is estimated for food out, where a price increase of one percent causes
a reduction in the quantity consumed of approximately 3 percent. Food in, clothing, energy,
housing, household operations, communication and recreation are all close to unit elastic
demand. In stark contrast, private transportation is price inelastic with an OPE of –0.18.
The lower panel provides estimates on own-price elasticities obtained from the pseudo
panel estimation. In general, the estimates are similar to those from cross-section data. How-
ever, while the magnitude of the OPE of private transportation is even lower and insignificant,
the OPEs of all other categories are slightly higher. On average, own-price elasticity estimates
from the pseudo panel data set exhibit a slightly higher degree of variability.
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Table 6: Own-price Elasticities
Cross-section Estimate SE t-value
η f oodin -0.88 0.19 -4.67
η f oodout -3.06 0.88 -3.47
ηclothing -0.84 0.14 -5.86
ηenergy -0.97 0.17 -5.78
ηhousing -1.17 0.24 -4.78
ηoper -1.10 1.81 -0.61
ηtrans -0.18 0.07 -2.48
ηcommunic -1.07 0.10 -10.80
ηrecr -1.43 0.57 -2.53
−9 −7 −5 −3 −1 0 1 3 5
Pseudo panel Estimate SE t-value
η f oodin -1.28 0.26 -5.00
η f oodout -4.19 1.28 -3.28
ηclothing -0.99 0.18 -5.57
ηenergy -1.06 0.26 -4.16
ηhousing -1.51 0.36 -4.15
ηoper -2.95 3.01 -0.98
ηtrans -0.08 0.10 -0.77
ηcommunic -1.08 0.14 -7.56
ηrecr -1.91 0.84 -2.28
−9 −7 −5 −3 −1 0 1 3 5
5.2 Cross-price Elasticities
Table 7 displays the cross-price elasticities (CPE) of Swiss households. Categories that expe-
rience a price change are depicted on the vertical axis. As a consequence, the consumption
of the categories on the vertical axis adjusts by the stated values in the table. For example,
assume that the price of food in increases by 1%, then the shares of food out and clothing de-
crease by 0.39% and 0.66%, respectively. OPEs are depicted on the diagonal. As the focus lies
on the categories energy and private transportation, we have a closer look on the substitution
patterns of these two categories. We find that in the cross-section (upper panel), transportation
is a complement to food in, clothing and housing and a substitute to food out. In the pseudo
panel (lower panel), clothing and housing remain significant complements. Energy is esti-
mated as a significant substitute to food in the static model and as a significant complement
to household operations in the dynamic model.
Table 8 provides heatmaps of cross-price elasticity estimates for the cross-section (upper
panel) and the pseudo panel (lower panel) data set. The comparison between cross-section
and the pseudo panel shows that the substitution patterns are very similar. When a CPE is
significant in both models, it exhibits the same pattern of substitutability or complementarity,
and it is also of similar magnitude.
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Table 7: Cross-price Elasticities
Cross-section
food in food out clothing energy housing oper trans communic recr
food in −0.88
[−4.67]
−0.39
[−0.99]
−0.66
[−3.74]
0.49
[1.74]
0.14
[1.19]
1.59
[2.46]
−0.48
[−4.12]
0.84
[4.29]
0.44
[1.35]
food out −0.15
[−0.62]
−3.06
[−3.47]
0.02
[0.08]
−0.32
[−0.79]
0.44
[1.96]
−0.18
[−0.15]
0.31
[1.89]
0.12
[0.43]
−0.1
[−0.18]
clothing −0.15
[−2.62]
0.02
[0.21]
−0.84
[−5.86]
0.14
[1.13]
0
[−0.1]
0.22
[1.09]
−0.2
[−3.32]
−0.17
[−1.97]
0.22
[2.29]
energy 0.1
[1.78]
−0.13
[−1.02]
0.05
[0.64]
−0.97
[−5.78]
0.01
[0.27]
−0.09
[−0.39]
−0.02
[−0.28]
−0.04
[−0.54]
−0.1
[−0.94]
housing 0.37
[1.73]
1.16
[1.74]
−0.26
[−0.96]
0.24
[0.56]
−1.17
[−4.78]
−1.38
[−1.28]
−0.49
[−2.73]
0.34
[1.08]
−0.1
[−0.22]
oper 0.62
[2.83]
−0.07
[−0.11]
0.25
[1.14]
−0.08
[−0.2]
−0.2
[−0.99]
−1.1
[−0.61]
0.03
[0.21]
−0.55
[−1.91]
−1
[−1.72]
trans −0.16
[−3.23]
0.2
[1.71]
−0.31
[−3.8]
0
[0.04]
−0.1
[−2.39]
−0.01
[−0.06]
−0.18
[−2.48]
−0.06
[−0.76]
0.14
[1.46]
communic 0.21
[4.42]
0.02
[0.14]
−0.18
[−2.61]
−0.05
[−0.49]
0.03
[0.79]
−0.45
[−2.15]
−0.05
[−1.24]
−1.07
[−10.8]
−0.39
[−4.19]
recr 0.4
[1.89]
−0.09
[−0.15]
0.44
[2.21]
−0.22
[−0.64]
0.04
[0.25]
−1.94
[−1.76]
0.26
[1.79]
−0.94
[−3.8]
−1.43
[−2.53]
Pseudo panel
food in food out clothing energy housing oper trans communic recr
food in −1.28
[−5]
0.56
[0.97]
−0.63
[−2.76]
0.27
[0.68]
0.06
[0.34]
2.26
[2.41]
−0.38
[−2.31]
0.82
[3.1]
0.74
[1.57]
food out 0.44
[1.21]
−4.19
[−3.28]
0.13
[0.42]
−0.13
[−0.21]
0.59
[1.79]
−2.88
[−1.58]
0.13
[0.54]
−0.2
[−0.52]
−0.41
[−0.49]
clothing −0.15
[−1.96]
0.08
[0.5]
−0.99
[−5.57]
0.13
[0.73]
−0.02
[−0.36]
0.35
[1.22]
−0.13
[−1.6]
0.02
[0.15]
0.13
[0.91]
energy 0.05
[0.69]
−0.07
[−0.37]
0.04
[0.38]
−1.06
[−4.16]
0.07
[1.02]
−0.89
[−2.57]
0.03
[0.33]
−0.01
[−0.08]
−0.03
[−0.2]
housing 0.25
[0.8]
1.6
[1.68]
−0.31
[−0.84]
0.85
[1.27]
−1.51
[−4.15]
1.9
[1.17]
−0.65
[−2.39]
0.41
[0.9]
0.05
[0.07]
oper 0.92
[2.68]
−1.62
[−1.54]
0.41
[1.29]
−1.6
[−2.44]
0.44
[1.36]
−2.95
[−0.98]
0.51
[1.93]
−0.43
[−1.02]
−1.31
[−1.43]
trans −0.11
[−1.56]
0.08
[0.48]
−0.2
[−1.84]
0.13
[0.59]
−0.14
[−2.13]
0.55
[1.76]
−0.08
[−0.77]
−0.17
[−1.5]
0.09
[0.66]
communic 0.22
[3.32]
−0.1
[−0.67]
−0.02
[−0.19]
0
[0.02]
0.05
[0.78]
−0.33
[−1.18]
−0.11
[−1.77]
−1.08
[−7.56]
−0.31
[−2.39]
recr 0.63
[1.98]
−0.41
[−0.46]
0.27
[0.92]
0.01
[0.02]
0.09
[0.39]
−2.49
[−1.46]
0.19
[0.86]
−0.78
[−2.15]
−1.91
[−2.28]
Notes: Elasticity estimates from cross-section (upper panel) and pseudo panel (lower panel). Goods with
negative cross-price elasticities are complements and goods with a positive cross-price elasticity substitutes.
OPEs are depicted on the diagonal. The t-values are indicated by square brackets.
Table 8: Heatmaps of the Cross-price Elasticities
Cross-section
food in food out clothing energy housing oper trans communic recr
food in * * * * * *
food out * * *
clothing * * * * *
energy * *
housing * * * *
oper * * *
trans * * * * *
communic * * * * *
recr * * * * * *
Pseudo panel
food in food out clothing energy housing oper trans communic recr
food in * * * * *
food out * *
clothing * *
energy * *
housing * * *
oper * * *
trans * * *
communic * * * *
recr * * *
Notes: Heatmaps from cross section (upper panel) and pseudo panel (lower panel). While the cell-color
indicates whether the goods are complements (red) or substitutes (blue), the opacity reflects the magnitude of
the effect. OPEs are depicted on the diagonal. Significance on the 10 percent level is indicated by a ∗.
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5.3 Income Elasticities
Table 9 provides the estimates of income elasticities from the cross-section (upper panel) and
the pseudo panel (lower panel) data. Income elasticities capture the effect of an increase in
(disposable) income on the consumed quantity of goods. All income elasticities are greater
than zero, indicating that all expenditure groups are normal goods. Our results show that
food in, energy, housing and communication are necessities with elasticities smaller than one.
On the other hand, food out, clothing, household operations and recreational activities are
luxuries with elasticities greater than one. This implies that the demand for these categories
increases over-proportionally if income increases. Finally, for private transportation a unit
elastic demand is found. The dynamic model leads to similar income elasticity estimates.
Table 9: Income Elasticity Estimates
Cross section Estimate SE t-value
ε f oodin 0.46 0.02 22.85
ε f oodout 1.27 0.04 34.36
εclothing 1.55 0.05 29.54
εenergy 0.39 0.05 8.33
εhousing 0.81 0.02 42.04
εoper 1.81 0.06 29.16
εtrans 1.01 0.04 24.63
εcommunic 0.51 0.03 15.11
εrecr 1.49 0.04 40.05
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Pseudo panel Estimate SE t-value
ε f oodin 0.39 0.03 11.24
ε f oodout 1.18 0.06 19.55
εclothing 1.42 0.08 17.51
εenergy 0.28 0.09 3.19
εhousing 0.85 0.03 25.20
εoper 1.87 0.10 17.97
εtrans 1.07 0.07 15.64
εcommunic 0.65 0.07 9.27
εrecr 1.51 0.07 22.08
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
5.4 Engel Curves
The size of the categories’ expenditure shares depends considerably on the income level of
households in Switzerland. Table 10 displays average expenses of energy and private trans-
portation by income quintiles. The energy share, measured as energy expenses divided by
total disposable income, is decreasing in income. Low-income households use more than 4
percent of their disposable income for energy-related expenditures. Expenditure shares of
private transportation are even higher and attain their maximal value of 10 percent in the 4th
quintile of the income distribution.
Engel curves offer an accurate visualization of the relationship between income and the
demand for a specific good. Figure 3 depicts the Engel curves of each good for the reference
household. The reference household is a family with two kids that owns at least one car, is a
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homeowner, and is represented by a middle-aged male reference person. We calculate Engel
curves for the relatively homogeneous reference household to obtain meaningful results with
relatively small confidence intervals.
Table 10: Energy and Transportation Expenditures
Income Energy Transport
Quintiles CHF CHF % Inc CHF % Inc
Btm 2,782 121 4.42 252 8.41
2nd 3,656 122 3.24 353 8.95
3rd 4,344 131 2.85 452 9.68
4th 5,100 137 2.54 541 10.00
Top 7,062 162 2.19 728 9.93
Notes: Income depicts households’ monthly disposable income normalized by
the household size.
The Engel curves of food in, energy and communication decline continuously as dispos-
able income increases. In contrast, the Engel curves of the categories household operations,
recreation and clothing are rising continuously as households’ income increases. For hous-
ing, food out and private transportation, the curvature of the Engel curves are more complex.
While the curvature of food out and recreation is well described by a quadratic function, the
Engel curves of housing and private transportation reveal an S-shaped form. As mentioned
before and argued in Lewbel and Pendakur (2009), S-shaped Engel curves cannot be captured
in rank restricted models like the AIDS model and its quadratic extension the QUAIDS. Using
a demand model with only linear or quadratic Engel curves might lead to biased results, espe-
cially for households in the lowest or the highest percentiles. The Engel curves of energy and
private transportation reveal that the consumption shares of these categories are higher for
low-income households. Hence, policy instruments that affect the prices of energy sources
and fuels tend to hit poorer households hard.
Figure 4 compares the Engel curves of tenants and homeowners for the categories energy
and housing. For low-income households that own a house we see a significantly higher share
of energy consumption (almost 10 percent) compared to a tenant household (slightly over 4
percent). At the same time, the share for housing for the same income group is much higher
for tenants (over 45 percent) as for homeowners (around 20 percent). In both cases, the gap
diminishes as income increases. While there is a distinct decrease of the expenditure share of
energy for higher incomes for both household types, this is not the case for housing. There, a
decline of the expenditure share associated with an increase in household income can only be
observed for tenants.
The reason for the differences in the Engel curves in terms of both magnitude and shape
is mainly driven by the distributional differences of household types in the two subsets of
tenants and homeowners. For instance, the average household size of homeowners (2.8) is
greater than that of tenants (2.3). Another reason for the large difference is that tenants pay
a portion of their energy expenses as part of their additional property expenses and differ-
ences in the payment schedule.8 Tenants energy share might therefore be downward biased.
The remaining discrepancy can be explained by differences in living area dimension and the
distributional differences in urban and rural areas.
8In the case of energy, tenants are often charged by an advance payment schedule, while homeowners pay
their actual energy consumption.
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Figure 3: Engel Curves by Expenditure Category
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Notes: The shaded area respresents the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval. The Engel
curves have been derived from the cross-section data and represent the consumption behavior of the reference
household. Income is the logarithm of normalized monthly disposable income.
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In the third panel of Figure 4, the Engel curves for private transportation are displayed for
car owners and non-owners. While the Engel curve of car owners is always above the one of
non-owners, the non-owners slightly increase their expenditure share with rising income. The
discrepancies disclose the importance of demographic characteristics.
Figure 4: Engel Curves of Homeowners, Tenants, Car Owners and Non-owners
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Note: The dotted lines represent lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval.
6 Summary
The elasticity estimates presented in this paper indicate that food out and recreation are the
most price elastic categories in Swiss households, followed by food in and energy. While
most other categories exhibit OPEs close to unity, transportation clearly is price inelastic.
Cross-price effects are small for most expenditure categories, energy and private transporta-
tion are no exception. However, we do find some interesting substitution patterns of energy
and transportation with the rest of the households’ consumption categories, indicating the
need of taking into account all these substitution effects. The estimated income elasticities
show that food in, energy, housing and communication are necessity goods, while food out,
clothing, housing equipment, recreation tend to be luxury goods. The income elasticity of
transportation is close to unity. A comparison of Engel curves of different household types
reveals considerable differences in the energy and transportation spending patterns. All these
results hold under both considered specifications, cross-section and pseudo-panel.
The relationship between residential energy consumption and the efficiency of heating
systems and appliances is of great importance regarding the objectives to decrease overall
energy use. Unfortunately, the limitations of the household expenditure data do not allow to
take these characteristics into account. Quantitative studies that analyze how new technologies
and more efficient appliances affect the energy use of households in Switzerland are needed
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to shed more light on this relationship. Another important point to mention is that we solely
consider short- and medium-term effects of price changes. The long-term effects might be of
greater magnitude as other studies tend to indicate. Further research is needed to measure the
long-term price and income elasticities of Swiss households.
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A Construction of the Pseudo Panel
In order to estimate the dynamic response of households towards relative price or income
changes, the dataset as presented in Section 4.1 is extended by a time dimension. This is done
by constructing a pseudo panel as introduced in Section 3.1. The cohorts of the pseudo panel
are constructed by using the concept to the k-means algorithm for standard clustering.
The set-up is straightforward and can be stated as follows:
1. Choose k (arbitrary) points from the dataset to serve as original cluster centroids (c1, ...,ck).
2. Each data point is assigned to a cluster such that the increase of within clusters variance
is minimized.
3. Update group centroids.
4. Steps (2) and (3) are repeated until the process has converged.
The number of clusters can be determined by standard measures like the Bayesian infor-
mation criterion (BIC) or the Akaike information criterion (AIC). As the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) prefers in general bigger models compared to Bayesian information criterion
(BIC), one has to consider the trade-off between model precision as represented by sample
size (number of cohorts,C) and the measurement error of population means occurring through
small cohort sizes.9 Based on the fact that the standard deviation of individuals per cohort is
sufficiently small, a mean cohort size (n¯c) of 66 should be enough to avoid measurement
errors.
We set the maximum cohort size to 25. In order to attain cohorts of minimum within
and maximum between variance, we consider information on expenditure shares, similar to
Cottrell and Gaubert (2003). This approach appears convincing as different shares represent
different consumption preferences and thus a measure of inter-group heterogeneity as well as
intra-group homogeneity. As these patterns show substantial heterogeneity for each level of
income, we cluster the observations first by income quintile and apply k-means afterwards.
AIC suggests clustering the observations into 19 cohorts. However, as the number of obser-
vations per cohort significantly differs, measurement errors become more severe. Hence, we
follow BIC and set the number of cohorts to 11.10
The cohorts obtained from the nested clustering approach arranged according to their in-
come are illustrated in Figure 5. The main differences can be detected for the categories of
housing, food in, recreation as well as household operations. Other goods seem to be more
or less equally consumed by the groups, hence, they do not serve as optimal variables to
maximize cohesion and separation in our dataset.
9The calculations are as follows: AIC= SSW+2 ·m ·k and BIC= SSW+0.5 · ln(n) ·m ·k, where SSW denotes
the total within-cluster sum of squares, k the number of clusters, m is the number of means and n the number of
data points.
10Note that we do not find extreme differences in the model fit compared to the specification preferred by AIC.
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Figure 5: Pseudo-panel Construction: Consumption Patterns of the 11 Cohorts
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Notes: The 11 cohorts (x-axis), obtained from the kmeans algorithm, are ordered by households’ log in-
come. The month to which the consumption pattern refers to is neglected for simplicity.
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B Parameter Estimates
Table 11: Parameter Estimates of the EASI Model from Repeated Cross-section
food in food out clothing energy housing oper trans communic recr
βConstante 0.924
[0.86]
2.608
[2.12]
4.771
[5.45]
0.51
[1.05]
−17.867
[−9.49]
−4.568
[−4.05]
3.611
[3.86]
0.248
[0.56]
7.245
[5.61]
β y1 −0.07
[−0.18]
−1.067
[−2.46]
−1.62
[−5.25]
−0.058
[−0.34]
6.004
[9.04]
1.797
[4.52]
−1.293
[−3.91]
−0.036
[−0.23]
−2.317
[−5.08]
β y2 −0.008
[−0.18]
0.153
[2.96]
0.192
[5.22]
−0.004
[−0.21]
−0.674
[−8.51]
−0.236
[−4.98]
0.157
[3.99]
0.001
[0.03]
0.253
[4.66]
β y3 0.001
[0.31]
−0.007
[−3.55]
−0.008
[−5.34]
0.001
[0.68]
0.026
[8.14]
0.01
[5.58]
−0.006
[−4.06]
0
[0.15]
−0.009
[−4.28]
β num.pers 0.545
[1.31]
−0.925
[−1.94]
−1.289
[−3.8]
0.291
[1.54]
1.545
[2.12]
0.138
[0.32]
−0.041
[−0.11]
0.213
[1.25]
−1.015
[−2.03]
β sq.num.pers −0.093
[−0.58]
0.342
[1.85]
0.496
[3.77]
−0.117
[−1.59]
−0.641
[−2.26]
−0.017
[−0.1]
0.032
[0.23]
−0.061
[−0.93]
0.26
[1.34]
β tenant −0.259
[−16.49]
−0.246
[−13.64]
−0.099
[−7.71]
−0.173
[−24.25]
1.19
[43.1]
0.003
[0.19]
−0.069
[−5.02]
−0.007
[−1.09]
−0.178
[−9.39]
β carown −0.074
[−4.12]
−0.066
[−3.19]
−0.021
[−1.42]
0.015
[1.84]
0.059
[1.87]
0.008
[0.4]
0.085
[5.39]
0.011
[1.49]
−0.046
[−2.12]
βNumKids −0.006
[−0.22]
−0.012
[−0.4]
0.021
[0.96]
0.003
[0.25]
−0.084
[−1.81]
−0.004
[−0.13]
−0.021
[−0.93]
−0.018
[−1.63]
0.06
[1.9]
β single 0.041
[0.19]
−0.253
[−1.04]
−0.638
[−3.67]
0.099
[1.02]
1.042
[2.79]
−0.024
[−0.11]
−0.044
[−0.24]
0.097
[1.11]
−0.593
[−2.31]
βFamilies −0.251
[−3.52]
0.013
[0.16]
0.155
[2.67]
−0.04
[−1.24]
0.237
[1.89]
−0.028
[−0.38]
−0.033
[−0.53]
0.013
[0.44]
0.151
[1.76]
βMPHH −0.114
[−1.64]
0.004
[0.06]
0.159
[2.81]
−0.015
[−0.47]
0.038
[0.31]
0.048
[0.66]
−0.067
[−1.11]
0.015
[0.53]
0.107
[1.28]
β oldHH 0.118
[5.95]
0.105
[4.62]
0.104
[6.43]
−0.009
[−0.98]
−0.106
[−3.02]
0.038
[1.8]
−0.019
[−1.1]
−0.082
[−10.04]
0.044
[1.85]
β youngHH −0.125
[−5.46]
0.137
[5.21]
0.034
[1.82]
−0.021
[−2]
0.002
[0.06]
−0.149
[−6.17]
0.006
[0.31]
0.096
[10.17]
−0.033
[−1.18]
βQ2 0.027
[1.36]
−0.001
[−0.03]
−0.029
[−1.84]
−0.031
[−3.49]
0.043
[1.27]
−0.026
[−1.25]
−0.02
[−1.16]
−0.006
[−0.78]
0.043
[1.83]
βQ3 0.042
[2.14]
−0.009
[−0.42]
−0.003
[−0.17]
−0.027
[−3.07]
0.007
[0.21]
−0.025
[−1.23]
0.007
[0.4]
0.004
[0.44]
−0.001
[−0.02]
βQ4 0.051
[2.58]
0.015
[0.66]
−0.043
[−2.69]
−0.02
[−2.2]
−0.027
[−0.8]
0.003
[0.14]
0.004
[0.25]
0.002
[0.28]
0.017
[0.72]
β y∗num.pers −0.055
[−1.12]
0.114
[2.02]
0.148
[3.7]
−0.035
[−1.55]
−0.163
[−1.89]
−0.023
[−0.44]
0.002
[0.05]
−0.03
[−1.47]
0.117
[1.96]
β y∗sq.num.pers 0.012
[0.64]
−0.042
[−1.92]
−0.057
[−3.68]
0.014
[1.64]
0.065
[1.96]
0.003
[0.14]
−0.002
[−0.15]
0.01
[1.26]
−0.03
[−1.33]
β y∗tenant 0.029
[15.34]
0.028
[13.09]
0.011
[7.35]
0.018
[20.69]
−0.129
[−39.25]
−0.003
[−1.59]
0.008
[4.86]
0.001
[1.61]
0.018
[8.06]
β y∗carown 0.009
[3.98]
0.007
[2.94]
0.002
[1.11]
−0.002
[−1.65]
−0.007
[−1.98]
−0.001
[−0.48]
−0.007
[−3.99]
−0.001
[−1.28]
0.005
[1.94]
β y∗NumKids 0
[−0.07]
0
[0.05]
−0.003
[−1.03]
0
[−0.34]
0.012
[2.19]
0.001
[0.45]
0.002
[0.76]
0.001
[0.92]
−0.006
[−1.66]
β y∗single −0.005
[−0.21]
0.034
[1.16]
0.074
[3.59]
−0.012
[−1.06]
−0.113
[−2.54]
0
[−0.01]
0.005
[0.22]
−0.014
[−1.31]
0.07
[2.29]
β y∗Families 0.028
[3.32]
−0.004
[−0.46]
−0.017
[−2.47]
0.005
[1.25]
−0.028
[−1.9]
0.005
[0.51]
0.004
[0.52]
0
[−0.02]
−0.019
[−1.82]
β y∗MPHH 0.013
[1.54]
−0.003
[−0.27]
−0.018
[−2.71]
0.002
[0.55]
−0.006
[−0.44]
−0.004
[−0.48]
0.008
[1.11]
0
[−0.1]
−0.013
[−1.3]
β y∗oldHH −0.012
[−5.11]
−0.016
[−5.7]
−0.013
[−6.75]
0.002
[1.76]
0.01
[2.28]
−0.004
[−1.56]
0.001
[0.55]
0.009
[8.6]
−0.005
[−1.72]
β y∗youngHH 0.012
[4.23]
−0.014
[−4.37]
−0.003
[−1.49]
0.002
[1.64]
−0.001
[−0.2]
0.019
[6.42]
0
[−0.05]
−0.011
[−9.34]
0.004
[1.2]
β y∗Q2 −0.002
[−0.77]
0
[0]
0.004
[2.13]
0.004
[3.33]
−0.006
[−1.37]
0.003
[1.19]
0.003
[1.31]
0.001
[0.79]
−0.006
[−2.29]
β y∗Q3 −0.004
[−1.87]
0.002
[0.78]
0
[0.16]
0.003
[2.93]
−0.001
[−0.27]
0.003
[1.15]
−0.001
[−0.3]
0
[−0.44]
−0.001
[−0.35]
β y∗Q4 −0.004
[−1.91]
−0.002
[−0.8]
0.006
[3.22]
0.002
[1.94]
0.002
[0.48]
0
[−0.13]
0
[−0.1]
0
[−0.15]
−0.003
[−0.9]
β p f oodin 0.004
[0.11]
−0.036
[−0.87]
−0.03
[−3.21]
0.013
[1.38]
0.033
[0.92]
0.1
[2.67]
−0.035
[−4.11]
0.032
[3.86]
0.058
[1.59]
β p f oodout −0.036
[−0.87]
−0.216
[−2.31]
0.004
[0.34]
−0.013
[−0.94]
0.132
[1.87]
−0.006
[−0.08]
0.023
[1.9]
0.003
[0.25]
−0.006
[−0.1]
β pclothing −0.03
[−3.21]
0.004
[0.34]
0.01
[1.31]
0.004
[0.88]
−0.005
[−0.32]
0.015
[1.29]
−0.015
[−3.31]
−0.008
[−2.27]
0.026
[2.51]
β penergy 0.013
[1.38]
−0.013
[−0.94]
0.004
[0.88]
0
[0.03]
0.002
[0.13]
−0.004
[−0.29]
−0.001
[−0.28]
−0.002
[−0.73]
−0.01
[−0.83]
β phousing 0.033
[0.92]
0.132
[1.87]
−0.005
[−0.32]
0.002
[0.13]
−0.071
[−0.94]
−0.065
[−1.04]
−0.036
[−2.72]
0.008
[0.6]
0.006
[0.12]
β poper 0.1
[2.67]
−0.006
[−0.08]
0.015
[1.29]
−0.004
[−0.29]
−0.065
[−1.04]
−0.003
[−0.03]
0.003
[0.21]
−0.024
[−2.01]
−0.107
[−1.68]
β ptrans −0.035
[−4.11]
0.023
[1.9]
−0.015
[−3.31]
−0.001
[−0.28]
−0.036
[−2.72]
0.003
[0.21]
0.06
[11.31]
−0.004
[−1.23]
0.019
[1.79]
β pcommunic 0.032
[3.86]
0.003
[0.25]
−0.008
[−2.27]
−0.002
[−0.73]
0.008
[0.6]
−0.024
[−2.01]
−0.004
[−1.23]
−0.004
[−0.9]
−0.042
[−4.02]
β precr 0.058
[1.59]
−0.006
[−0.1]
0.026
[2.51]
−0.01
[−0.83]
0.006
[0.12]
−0.107
[−1.68]
0.019
[1.79]
−0.042
[−4.02]
−0.042
[−0.67]
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Table 12: Parameter Estimates of the EASI Model from Pseudo Panel
food in food out clothing energy housing oper trans communic recr
βConstante 18.957
[3.82]
7.716
[1.39]
5.657
[1.47]
11.084
[4.51]
−37.049
[−4.13]
−0.664
[−0.12]
3.762
[0.86]
−4.303
[−1.72]
1.36
[0.2]
β y1 −6.496
[−3.66]
−3.033
[−1.53]
−2.081
[−1.51]
−3.779
[−4.3]
13.083
[4.08]
0.409
[0.21]
−1.368
[−0.88]
1.573
[1.76]
−0.328
[−0.14]
β y2 0.754
[3.57]
0.396
[1.67]
0.253
[1.54]
0.431
[4.12]
−1.515
[−3.97]
−0.073
[−0.31]
0.168
[0.91]
−0.188
[−1.76]
0.02
[0.07]
β y3 −0.03
[−3.53]
−0.017
[−1.81]
−0.01
[−1.56]
−0.016
[−3.97]
0.058
[3.85]
0.004
[0.44]
−0.007
[−0.93]
0.007
[1.75]
0
[0.02]
βQ2 0.011
[4.79]
−0.001
[−0.24]
0.005
[3.03]
−0.002
[−1.9]
−0.001
[−0.27]
−0.003
[−1.19]
0.001
[0.63]
−0.001
[−0.88]
−0.01
[−3.4]
βQ3 0.005
[3.5]
0.009
[5.94]
−0.001
[−0.8]
−0.002
[−2.38]
−0.001
[−0.4]
−0.003
[−1.95]
0
[0.18]
0
[0.33]
−0.008
[−4.62]
βQ4 0.013
[6.33]
−0.002
[−0.96]
0.009
[5.91]
−0.003
[−2.59]
−0.009
[−2.78]
−0.001
[−0.29]
0
[0.19]
−0.001
[−0.61]
−0.003
[−1.19]
β num.pers 0.205
[4.92]
−0.09
[−1.92]
0.018
[0.55]
0.05
[2.43]
−0.168
[−2.23]
0.074
[1.58]
−0.009
[−0.25]
−0.002
[−0.08]
−0.054
[−0.94]
β sq.num.pers −0.052
[−1.38]
0.06
[1.42]
−0.004
[−0.12]
−0.034
[−1.81]
0.101
[1.48]
−0.1
[−2.38]
−0.021
[−0.63]
0.006
[0.33]
0.032
[0.61]
β p f oodin −0.064
[−1.51]
0.062
[1.02]
−0.031
[−2.45]
0.005
[0.39]
0.009
[0.18]
0.146
[2.56]
−0.027
[−2.24]
0.032
[2.88]
0.093
[1.75]
β p f oodout 0.062
[1.02]
−0.336
[−2.48]
0.009
[0.57]
−0.007
[−0.33]
0.176
[1.74]
−0.17
[−1.53]
0.01
[0.57]
−0.01
[−0.62]
−0.041
[−0.43]
β pclothing −0.031
[−2.45]
0.009
[0.57]
0.002
[0.21]
0.003
[0.51]
−0.01
[−0.5]
0.024
[1.38]
−0.009
[−1.55]
0
[0]
0.017
[1.08]
β penergy 0.005
[0.39]
−0.007
[−0.33]
0.003
[0.51]
−0.003
[−0.34]
0.02
[0.94]
−0.053
[−2.5]
0.002
[0.35]
−0.001
[−0.17]
−0.002
[−0.13]
β phousing 0.009
[0.18]
0.176
[1.74]
−0.01
[−0.5]
0.02
[0.94]
−0.169
[−1.52]
0.132
[1.33]
−0.046
[−2.31]
0.013
[0.67]
0.023
[0.31]
β poper 0.146
[2.56]
−0.17
[−1.53]
0.024
[1.38]
−0.053
[−2.5]
0.132
[1.33]
−0.116
[−0.63]
0.037
[1.95]
−0.019
[−1.07]
−0.146
[−1.4]
β ptrans −0.027
[−2.24]
0.01
[0.57]
−0.009
[−1.55]
0.002
[0.35]
−0.046
[−2.31]
0.037
[1.95]
0.068
[8.99]
−0.008
[−1.73]
0.015
[0.9]
β pcommunic 0.032
[2.88]
−0.01
[−0.62]
0
[0]
−0.001
[−0.17]
0.013
[0.67]
−0.019
[−1.07]
−0.008
[−1.73]
−0.004
[−0.68]
−0.034
[−2.27]
β precr 0.093
[1.75]
−0.041
[−0.43]
0.017
[1.08]
−0.002
[−0.13]
0.023
[0.31]
−0.146
[−1.4]
0.015
[0.9]
−0.034
[−2.27]
−0.098
[−1.02]
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B.1 Semi-elasticities of Demographic Factors
Table 13 displays the parameter estimates, so called semi-elasticities for the demographic
variables in the cross-section model as well as quarterly dummies accounting for seasonality.
As can be seen, although the magnitude is in general relatively small, the majority of estimates
is significant at the one percent level of significance.
Concerning the indicated long-term effects, tenancy has a negative influence on the con-
sumed amount for the most of good categories. Solely for communication and housing the
estimated semi-elasticities are positive. Furthermore, for households with a female reference
person, the budget shares for food-in as well as food-out and for transportation are signifi-
cantly lower, while on the contrary more budget is spent on clothing, health, recreation, com-
munication and energy (in this order). As one would expect, households with children spend
more budget on food in and less for food out, while the opposite is true for single member
households. Young households tend to spend relatively more money on food out, clothing,
transportation, communication and housing and less for food in, health and energy. Hence,
leaving aside the category of recreation, young and old households exhibit inverse patterns
with the most distinct difference for the category of health.
Table 13: Semi-elasticities of Demographic Factors
food in food out clothing energy housing oper trans communic recr
ζ num.pers 0.089
[3.55]
0.032
[1.13]
−0.045
[−2.2]
−0.001
[−0.08]
0.178
[4.07]
−0.059
[−2.23]
−0.025
[−1.13]
−0.037
[−3.61]
−0.047
[−1.58]
ζ sq.num.pers 0.017
[1.73]
−0.004
[−0.34]
0.018
[2.2]
0.001
[0.27]
−0.092
[−5.36]
0.002
[0.18]
0.01
[1.2]
0.02
[4.97]
−0.004
[−0.35]
ζ tenant −0.011
[−11.23]
−0.007
[−6.18]
−0.005
[−6.52]
−0.026
[−60.03]
0.112
[65.69]
−0.027
[−26.98]
−0.004
[−4.25]
0.002
[5.06]
−0.035
[−29.86]
ζ carown 0.006
[4.58]
−0.001
[−0.88]
−0.005
[−4.8]
0.001
[1.93]
−0.002
[−0.76]
−0.006
[−4.7]
0.021
[19.71]
0
[0.25]
−0.013
[−8.93]
ζNumKids 0
[0.15]
−0.007
[−3.8]
−0.001
[−0.94]
−0.001
[−1.93]
0.017
[6.2]
0.004
[2.4]
−0.006
[−4.23]
−0.009
[−14.82]
0
[−0.01]
ζ single 0.004
[0.34]
0.032
[2.17]
−0.017
[−1.66]
−0.004
[−0.65]
0.1
[4.44]
−0.029
[−2.19]
−0.004
[−0.34]
−0.018
[−3.37]
−0.018
[−1.17]
ζFamilies −0.006
[−1.53]
−0.021
[−4.39]
0.011
[3.36]
0
[0.01]
0.001
[0.15]
0.006
[1.26]
−0.002
[−0.56]
0.011
[6.44]
−0.014
[−2.82]
ζMPHH 0.001
[0.25]
−0.013
[−2.84]
0.006
[1.68]
0.002
[1.03]
−0.013
[−1.85]
0.008
[1.94]
−0.001
[−0.37]
0.011
[6.48]
−0.01
[−2.1]
ζ oldHH 0.023
[17.23]
−0.023
[−14.93]
−0.007
[−6.55]
0.007
[11.06]
−0.023
[−9.73]
0
[0.02]
−0.011
[−9.08]
−0.012
[−21.77]
−0.007
[−4.14]
ζ youngHH −0.02
[−14.82]
0.025
[16.36]
0.006
[5.38]
−0.004
[−6.81]
−0.004
[−1.6]
0.002
[1.66]
0.004
[3.35]
0.006
[11.01]
−0.009
[−5.32]
ζQ2 0.019
[10.65]
0.003
[1.35]
0.004
[3.06]
−0.002
[−2.35]
−0.001
[−0.44]
−0.006
[−2.71]
0.001
[1.07]
−0.001
[−1.79]
−0.02
[−9.45]
ζQ3 0.013
[10.33]
0.012
[7.94]
0
[−0.33]
−0.002
[−2.94]
0
[0]
−0.006
[−4.44]
0
[0.37]
−0.001
[−2.49]
−0.018
[−11.64]
ζQ4 0.021
[12.59]
0.001
[0.3]
0.008
[5.85]
−0.003
[−3.76]
−0.009
[−3.26]
−0.004
[−2.25]
0.001
[1.08]
0
[−0.46]
−0.013
[−6.77]
food in food out clothing energy housing oper trans communic recr
ζ num.pers −0.023
[−0.23]
−1.325
[−5.87]
−0.172
[−2.16]
0.036
[2.17]
0.341
[1.91]
−0.037
[−0.13]
−0.116
[−1.35]
−0.047
[−1.43]
0.158
[0.52]
ζ sq.num.pers 0.45
[4.12]
1.188
[4.77]
0.274
[3.12]
−0.013
[−0.69]
−0.578
[−2.93]
0.038
[0.12]
0.176
[1.84]
0.065
[1.77]
−0.273
[−0.81]
ζQ2 0.006
[1.09]
−0.002
[−0.2]
0.003
[0.67]
0
[−0.17]
0.005
[0.49]
−0.001
[−0.08]
−0.003
[−1]
0.001
[0.7]
−0.01
[−0.72]
ζQ3 0.001
[0.4]
0.007
[0.88]
0
[0.13]
0
[−0.67]
0.002
[0.32]
0.001
[0.12]
0
[−0.07]
0.001
[0.87]
−0.005
[−0.49]
ζQ4 0.009
[1.83]
−0.005
[−0.49]
0.006
[1.67]
0
[−0.2]
0.005
[0.55]
0.002
[0.16]
−0.005
[−1.5]
0.001
[0.73]
−0.011
[−0.85]
Notes: Parameter estimates from cross section (upper panel) and pseudo panel (lower panel).
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B.2 Nominal and Real Expenditures
Figure 6 shows the average total expenditures. Specifically, we present the logs of nominal
and real expenditures and the respective moving averages. After a slight decrease until 2004,
expenditures increased subsequently until 2007. The consequences of the increase in energy
prices and the economic crisis after 2008, caused another slight decrease of total expenditures
in Switzerland.
Figure 6: Nominal and Real Household Expenditures
06.2001 06.2003 06.2005 06.2007 06.2009 06.2011
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5
8.6 xnom
MA xnom
xreal
MA xreal
Notes: Average household expenditures reported in logs, with and without 6 month moving aver-
ages.
B.3 Energy Consumption by Energy Sources, Household Type and Re-
gion
Table 14: Distribution of Electricity Expenses at Home
Income Quintiles Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
% Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF
Household type
Singles 3.99 51.03 2.21 42.99 1.90 45.70 1.55 46.55 1.20 54.23
Couples 3.65 70.68 2.56 74.60 2.08 75.02 1.70 76.29 1.27 85.00
Families 2.87 85.66 2.14 88.72 1.75 88.19 1.47 90.58 1.30 112.60
Other 3.27 93.91 2.35 102.72 2.06 109.84 1.67 110.27 1.39 125.74
Age
Young 2.46 62.86 1.81 58.69 1.47 54.24 1.21 51.41 0.86 50.15
Middle Aged 3.23 84.89 2.33 85.84 1.99 84.67 1.65 82.34 1.31 89.66
Old 4.00 69.37 2.70 72.48 2.18 71.65 1.86 75.39 1.42 86.42
Housing Situation
Owner 3.98 90.41 2.84 101.08 2.40 101.98 2.01 101.74 1.60 113.58
Tenant 2.38 61.47 1.80 58.22 1.51 55.75 1.26 54.44 0.94 54.84
Transport Type
Carowner 3.33 80.04 2.34 81.39 1.95 79.25 1.62 77.44 1.28 84.98
Non-Carowner 3.17 68.99 2.15 68.27 1.81 67.58 1.50 68.11 1.18 74.06
Average 3.30 78.13 2.31 79.08 1.93 77.35 1.60 75.91 1.26 83.13
Notes: The average households’ electricity expenditures at home by household type and income quintile.
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Table 15: Distribution of Fuel Expenses at Home
Income Quintiles Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
% Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF
Household Type
Singles 2.51 32.15 1.03 20.33 1.21 29.19 1.08 32.52 0.92 43.28
Couples 2.54 50.08 1.76 51.13 1.52 54.99 1.35 60.72 1.29 91.02
Families 1.05 32.87 1.05 44.66 1.09 55.78 1.12 69.49 0.94 82.28
Other 1.56 44.87 1.46 63.17 1.30 69.48 1.25 83.36 1.46 134.40
Age
Young 0.83 22.25 0.60 20.46 0.49 20.23 0.41 19.40 0.37 23.26
Middle Aged 1.49 38.28 1.27 47.54 1.28 55.13 1.20 61.37 1.07 76.34
Old 3.06 54.90 2.21 60.38 2.17 70.64 2.25 91.02 2.10 136.18
Housing Situation
Owner 2.64 58.77 2.24 77.31 2.22 90.86 2.10 103.39 1.89 132.92
Tenant 0.57 14.36 0.45 14.95 0.46 17.06 0.47 20.55 0.43 26.99
Transport Type
Carowner 1.80 41.27 1.36 47.05 1.34 54.00 1.24 59.95 1.18 81.55
Non-Carowner 1.61 33.48 1.17 37.13 1.02 38.91 1.08 49.01 0.91 60.60
Average 1.76 39.92 1.32 45.31 1.28 51.55 1.21 58.15 1.13 77.99
Notes: The average households’ fuel expenditures at home by household type and income quintile. Fuel
expenses include all expenses for fossil fuels and district heating at home.
Table 16: Distribution of Expenses for Gasoline and Diesel
Income Quintiles Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
% Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF
Household type
Singles 5.30 71.74 4.58 89.52 4.69 112.84 4.52 135.74 3.68 163.17
Couples 5.32 107.39 4.91 142.96 4.46 161.06 4.23 190.60 3.41 229.81
Families 5.01 153.16 4.31 178.75 4.05 201.15 3.53 214.43 3.02 252.18
Other 5.70 172.97 4.83 212.82 4.74 252.76 4.05 265.59 3.34 305.57
Age
Young 5.53 142.61 5.04 157.95 4.91 178.07 4.57 190.51 3.78 216.77
Middle Aged 5.32 146.25 4.64 171.00 4.40 185.78 4.11 200.41 3.48 229.57
Old 4.84 88.63 4.05 109.17 3.85 126.28 3.48 142.36 2.86 173.56
Housing Situation
Owner 5.61 137.26 4.79 173.88 4.51 194.66 4.10 209.05 3.43 241.89
Tenant 4.74 125.33 4.43 143.33 4.31 157.85 4.11 175.05 3.42 196.84
Transport Type
Carowner 5.48 139.96 4.86 169.29 4.63 185.96 4.35 203.50 3.59 230.60
Non-Carowner 4.08 95.11 3.38 106.17 3.21 118.71 2.86 124.36 2.60 159.64
Average 5.24 132.20 4.60 158.20 4.40 175.05 4.10 190.48 3.42 218.53
Notes: The average households’ gasoline and diesel expenditures by household type and income quintile.
Table 17: Distribution of Transport Expenses for Accessories, Spare Parts and Services
Income Quintiles Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
% Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF
Household type
Singles 1.70 23.65 2.46 48.59 2.78 67.10 3.72 112.84 4.44 204.79
Couples 1.86 38.77 2.22 65.01 2.76 99.83 3.39 153.71 3.91 274.42
Families 1.64 53.27 2.25 94.24 2.96 150.14 3.55 220.15 3.91 334.63
Others 1.60 51.94 2.48 111.71 3.20 174.80 3.78 250.44 4.41 407.66
Age
Young 1.66 46.54 2.18 71.44 2.73 102.83 3.65 154.61 4.42 260.29
Middle Aged 1.67 48.19 2.24 85.00 2.88 126.99 3.51 179.11 4.12 283.59
Old 1.86 35.99 2.64 70.65 3.04 100.24 3.63 147.76 3.69 236.48
Housing Situation
Owner 1.78 46.04 2.29 84.38 2.81 126.65 3.35 177.41 3.84 284.33
Tenant 1.62 43.81 2.31 76.43 2.94 111.51 3.72 164.51 4.34 261.32
Transport Type
Carowner 1.78 47.74 2.47 87.24 3.05 126.04 3.76 182.36 4.31 287.91
Non-Carowner 1.38 32.43 1.50 47.74 2.00 80.08 2.48 109.45 3.08 196.74
Average 1.71 45.09 2.30 80.30 2.88 118.59 3.55 170.37 4.10 272.40
Notes: The average households’ expenditures by household type and income quintile.
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Table 18: Distribution of Energy Shares by Region and Quintile
Income Quintiles Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
% Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF
Lake Geneva Region 6.57 134.58 4.32 140.32 4.00 154.07 3.39 157.29 2.93 196.95
Espace Mittelland 5.17 110.14 3.68 119.97 3.42 129.80 3.05 139.80 2.68 176.29
NW Switzerland 4.86 105.46 3.55 111.97 3.05 116.18 2.62 118.54 2.50 163.61
Zurich 3.92 83.53 2.73 83.44 2.39 89.23 2.32 105.23 1.77 116.14
E Switzerland 5.21 110.92 3.63 118.70 3.18 122.50 2.84 134.41 2.66 166.40
C Switzerland 4.73 104.07 3.24 109.78 2.78 111.99 2.54 116.60 1.93 131.76
Ticino 7.23 145.96 4.67 148.37 3.99 150.97 3.85 177.08 3.11 199.57
Average 5.44 114.56 3.69 119.09 3.26 124.79 2.90 133.13 2.41 158.64
Notes: Households’ energy consumption at home by region and income quintile.
Table 19: Distribution of Transport Shares by Region and Quintile
Income Quintiles Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
% Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF % Inc CHF
Lake Geneva Region 7.51 190.54 7.53 263.85 7.94 326.31 8.07 386.04 8.00 538.35
Espace Mittelland 6.94 175.48 6.79 235.33 7.29 292.26 7.74 361.49 7.40 478.29
NW Switzerland 6.11 159.23 6.53 220.02 6.86 273.12 6.96 327.20 7.15 473.11
Zurich 6.32 160.31 5.89 203.20 6.44 261.87 6.69 315.63 7.20 472.17
E Switzerland 7.03 181.08 6.90 237.85 7.21 286.89 8.07 379.96 7.90 486.56
C Switzerland 6.64 173.90 6.42 229.72 7.05 291.29 7.71 362.17 7.41 498.79
Ticino 7.70 192.14 8.27 278.46 8.36 331.67 9.23 436.07 8.22 515.74
Average 6.95 177.29 6.91 238.51 7.28 293.64 7.66 360.85 7.52 490.93
Notes: Households’ expenses for private transportation by region and income quintile.
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Chapter 3: The Direct Rebound Effect of Private Transporta-
tion in Switzerland
1 Introduction
During the last years, many countries have adopted binding energy efficiency policies. For
instance, the EU member states agreed in 2014 to improve energy efficiency by 30% by 2030.
In Switzerland, energy efficiency improvements are one of the main pillars to achieve the
reduction objectives in energy consumption and CO2 emissions. There are multiple measures
in place, ranging from the buildings program with the objective to support renovations and
investments in renewable energy sources, emissions standards and regulations for new cars,
to efficiency requirements and labels for residential appliances and equipment, respectively.
In practice, technical energy saving potentials from efficiency improvements are hardly
ever fully realized due to behavioral changes of consumers and producers. These effects are
often summarized under the broad term “rebound effects”. For example, more fuel-efficient
cars make driving long distances cheaper and therefore the efficiency improvement is at least
partially compensated by economic substitution and income effects directly affecting the use
of cars. In addition to this direct rebound effect, energy savings in one service such as trans-
portation can affect the demand for entirely other services. This process is is known as the
indirect rebound effect. The overall rebound effect is composed of the direct rebound effect
and the indirect rebound effect.
The magnitude of rebound effect yields important implications since policy objectives in
the reduction of energy consumption are harder to attain if rebound effects turn out to be
large. If these effects are disregarded, expected energy demand reductions may not realize
in practice. Furthermore, rebound effects may have far-reaching implications on other policy
areas. For example, knowledge of rebound effects in private transportation may allow to better
forecast future traffic volumes influencing transport and environmental policy. It is therefore
no surprise that in the last decades many empirical studies have tried to pin down rebound
effects for different energy services.1
Despite the relatively large literature about rebound effects, with empirical estimations
for different energy services, regions and countries, evidence for rebound effects covering
important production or consumption areas in Switzerland is still scarce. One exception is
the paper by Weber and Farsi (2014), which estimates the direct rebound effect in private
transportation. Weber and Farsi use cross-section data of Swiss households in 2010. They
find relatively high rebound effects for private transportation, ranging between 75% and 81%.
Further evidence on the rebound effect for Switzerland is available from several case studies,
considering rebound effects of high-speed transportation (Spielmann et al., 2008) and hybrid
cars (de Haan et al., 2006). Furthermore, Madlener and Alcott (2009) review the literature on
the relationship between energy rebound effects and economic growth. Somewhat related to
that is the paper by Baranzini et al. (2013) on the relation between energy use and GDP growth
1For a literature review on the rebound effect, see Greening et al. (2000) and more recently Sorrell et al.
(2009) which review the estimates of direct rebound effects for different energy services.
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in Switzerland. Finally, Jenny et al. (2013) analyze how behavioral and socio-psychological
factors, as well as rebound effects, affect selected energy-saving measures stipulated in the
energy strategy 2050 in Switzerland. The study focuses on the consequences and the specific
mode of operation of these measures.
In this chapter, we estimate the rebound effect of private transportation in Switzerland by
applying two different approaches and focusing on the direct rebound effect. In the first ap-
proach, the rebound effect is directly estimated by using efficiency measures. In the second
approach, the rebound effect is derived from the price elasticities from Chapter 2, which re-
veals a moderate effect of about 20%. For the first approach, we apply two different indicators
for useful work: the annual and the daily distance traveled by car and person. Our estimation
approach is similar to that used in Weber and Farsi (2014). We use a multivariate system of
equations with distance (daily and annual), fuel intensity and vehicles’ weight as endogenous
and personal/household specific characteristics as well as technical details on the vehicle as
control variables. For a comparison with other findings in the literature we apply both OLS
as well as 3SLS to account for endogeneity issues. We find comparable, but slightly lower
rebound effects than Weber and Farsi (2014) at around 60%, which is partly due to a different
set of control variables and a more restricted dataset.
In addition, we extend the analysis of Weber and Farsi (2014) by two important ways.
We estimate rebound effects for different household types and for different driving purposes.
The results of the first extension show that the rebound effect is decreasing with income and
increasing with the driver’s age. Moreover, the data about households’ daily distances traveled
offers additional information to distinguish between different driving purposes such as work,
shopping and leisure. We estimate rebound effects of 48% for the driving purpose work and
24% for recreational activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the rebound effect
and compares two different approaches to estimate the rebound effect. Section 3 describes
the employed data in detail and outlines the estimation approach. Section 4 presents the
estimation results. Finally, Section 5 contains the conclusion.
2 Defining the Rebound Effect
The rebound effect is usually expressed as a percentage of the possible reduction of energy
use from an energy efficiency improvement. For example, assume that a new technology re-
duces energy consumption by 10% based on engineering estimates holding demand constant
(potential energy savings). If the actual energy consumption declines by only 2 percent, this
would imply that the rebound effect is 80%. On the other hand, if the actual energy consump-
tion declines by the potential 10%, the size of the rebound effect is zero. Note that the size of
the rebound effect does not provide any information about the costs of the underlying energy
efficiency improvement.
Figure 1 displays the decomposition of the rebound effect, following the definition of
Sorrell et al. (2009). On the left, the potential energy savings from an energy efficiency im-
provement, based on the engineering estimates, are shown. The potential energy savings are
partly offset by direct and indirect rebound effects. The direct rebound effect is restricted
to the effect of an efficiency improvement of one defined service on the consumption of this
service. An efficiency improvement makes the affected service cheaper. This increases the
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demand for this service and, at the same time, real income of households rises.The first effect
is labeled substitution effect. The latter effect is labeled income effect and affects households’
demand for the affected service and the demand for other goods and services. As a con-
sequence, energy efficiency improvements also affect the consumption of other goods and
services that require energy via the income effect. The higher demand for other goods and
services, the embodied energy of the energy efficiency improvements and further secondary
effects combined represent the so-called indirect rebound effect. Finally, the difference be-
tween the engineering potential of energy savings and the economy-wide rebound effect is
the actual energy savings.
Figure 1: Classification of the Rebound Effect
 
Engineering potential  
of energy savings 
Actual energy savings 
Economy-
wide 
rebound 
effect 
Indirect 
rebound effect 
Secondary effects 
Direct rebound 
effect 
Substitution effect 
Income effect 
Embodied energy 
Source: Prepared by the authors and based on the classification of the rebound effect for consumers by Sorrell
and Dimitropoulos (2008).
Unfortunately, existing international evidence for rebound effects is still somewhat incon-
clusive and only comparable to a certain degree between different countries. The comparison
of results from empirical studies can be difficult as there is no standard approach to esti-
mate these effects and alternative definitions of the rebound effect coexist.2 Adding to these
difficulties is the fact that energy efficiency gains often come along with productivity im-
provements that are not directly related to energy consumption but affects the demand for
energy from households and firms. These reasons make it difficult to estimate the overall (or
economy-wide) rebound effect of an energy efficiency improvement. An illustrative example
are private cars. For instance, private cars in the US have undergone considerable improve-
ments of the transmission in the last 30 years. However, the demand for larger and heavier
cars and at the same time the demand shift of consumers during the period has diminished the
possible energy savings to relatively small 8% (Knittel, 2011).
2Turner (2013) discusses the problems of the current debate due to the different assumptions made in the
rebound literature and the key issues for policymakers. Turner also highlights the difference between final
consumers and producers in the rebound literature.
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The measurement of the long-run rebound effect is especially difficult. Energy efficiency
improvements are usually linked with other changes in productivity. Moreover, other factors
such as changing consumer preferences, households’ income levels or the general economic
environment affect the energy consumption. Knittel (2011) analyses the efficiency gains in
private transportation for the US. He shows that if weight, horsepower and torque were held at
their 1980 levels, fuel economy could have increased by 60 percent. The actual fuel economy
increased by only 18.5% until 2006. The reason is that today US households drive on average
heavier and more powerful cars. Similar trends towards larger, stronger and more comfortable
cars are observed in various OECD countries, including Switzerland.
In addition, the driving behavior of car owners might change if driving becomes cheaper
and Swiss households might drive more often and longer distances. This is also true for
other appliances. Hence, increasing the degree of energy efficiency might be less effective
in reducing the energy consumption as theses efficiency gains make these services cheaper
and might lead to an increased demand and offset the gains partly. Further information about
the actual mode of operations of several energy-saving measures can be found in Jenny et al.
(2013).
In this chapter, we are interested in the magnitude of the rebound effect in Switzerland.
There are several different formal definitions of the direct rebound effect, mostly depending
on data availability.3 We consider two definitions tailored to the data availability regarding
private transportation services of Swiss households. Note first, that energy efficiency (µ) is
defined as
µ =
s
e
, (1)
where s denotes the consumption level of energy services and e denotes the energy used to
provide these services. All else equal, the price for energy services becomes ps = pe/µ . The
most immediate definition of the rebound effect (Definition 1) is based on the elasticity of
service demand with respect to efficiency (Frondel et al., 2008a), i.e.,
ηµ(s) =
∂ lns
∂ lnµ
. (2)
If this elasticity equals zero, the rebound effect is zero. While this is the preferred defini-
tion of the rebound effect, it also is the most demanding regarding data requirements.
The second definition of the rebound effect makes use of the relationship between the
elasticity of the energy price and the elasticity of µ . The energy price elasticity is defined by
ηpe(e) =
∂ lne
∂ ln pe
. (3)
If demand only depends on service prices ps and energy efficiency µ is constant over time
then it is the case that ηpe(e) =−ηµ(s). This assumption does not hold if we are considering
a longer period of time. Obvious advances in energy efficiency are for instance improvements
in the insulation of buildings or the realized efficiency gains of heating appliances in the
past decades. Sorrell et al. (2009) argue, that by using energy efficiency proxies as control
variables in the estimation of the price elasticity of energy demand it can be accounted for
these efficiency improvements. This results in a measure comparable to −ηµ(s).
3See for example Berkhout et al. (2000), Frondel et al. (2008a) or Sorrell et al. (2009).
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Hence, we use two different approaches to estimate the rebound effect. Under the first
approach (Definition 1), the rebound effect is directly estimated by using efficiency measures.
Under the second approach, the rebound effect is derived from the price elasticity of private
transportation computed in Chapter 2. Both approaches have their pros and cons and the
best strategy to estimate the magnitude of the rebound effect is generally dependent on data
availability.
Estimating the rebound effect from price elasticities has the advantage that data consisting
of energy consumption and energy prices exist for a wide range of energy services. Moreover,
the rebound effect can directly be computed by using results of existing studies that have
estimated own-price elasticities of such energy services. Another advantage is the greater
variability of price data compared to the variability of energy efficiency. Finally, longitudinal
data allows to estimate short-run and long-run rebound effects.
The drawbacks of the second approach is that the rebound estimates are only consistent
with theory if energy prices are independent of energy efficiency. In reality, energy efficiency
increases faster in environments of high energy prices than in environments of low prices,
where the pressure on innovation is lower. Rebound estimates based on price elasticities are
more reliable when data of energy prices and consumption exist for a single energy service.
As soon as the energy consumption is more aggregated such as household appliances, re-
bound estimates becomes biased, as other factors, not directly observable in the data, affect
the elasticity estimate. Another criticism is the notion that households react differently toward
energy price increases than to price decreases. For example, Haas and Schipper (1998) find
that households in OECD countries adjust their residential oil and gas demand stronger under
rising energy prices than under falling energy prices.
In an world with perfect information about the energy efficiency of a service, the first
approach, where the rebound effect is directly estimated by using efficiency measures, yield
better rebound estimates. However, good measures or instruments for energy efficiency are
only rarely available. Furthermore, there are services where the used technology only changes
every five to ten years. Under such circumstances, the direct estimation of the rebound effect
proves to be difficult or at least costly, since larger data sets are needed that do not exist for
all energy services.
In summary, it depends on the availability and the variability of the existing data which
approach should be favored to estimate the rebound effect of a specific energy service (Sor-
rell et al., 2009). While the use of own-price elasticities tends to overestimate the rebound
effect, it has been argued by several authors that they provide an upper bound of the rebound
effect. Moreover, considering energy services where the energy efficiency is not directly ob-
servable, it is—under certain conditions—favorable to rely on more accurate price data than
on biased efficiency estimates. To our knowledge, this is the first study, that compares the
estimation results of the two approaches for the same energy service—private transportation
in Switzerland—to see how large the differences in the estimates of the rebound effect are.
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3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 Data
Two comprehensive surveys of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office of Statistics (SFSO) allow
us to estimate the rebound effect in private transportation. The first survey gathers data on the
driving behavior in Switzerland with detailed information about the driver and the vehicle.
The second survey has already been used in Chapter 2 and collects detailed information on
household expenditures for private transportation, food and beverages, clothing and footwear,
energy and further categories. These two surveys allow us to calculate the rebound effect
either directly from energy efficiency measures or indirectly by using substitution elasticities.
To estimate the rebound effect using substitution elasticities of private transportation, we
rely on the elasticity estimates from Chapter 2 of this report. The detailed information on
households’ expenses for private transportation and the underlying demographic characteris-
tics in the Swiss Household Budget Survey (HBS) have led to reliable elasticity estimates.
The rebound effect based on the price elasticity of private transportation is equal to −ηpe(e).
Sorrell et al. (2009) notes that ηpe(e) is often interpreted as an upper bound of the rebound
effect.
The other approach estimates the rebound effect directly from energy efficiency measures
of cars in Switzerland. Detailed data on the energy efficiency for transportation is available
from the survey “Swiss Microcensus on Mobility and Transport (MCMT) 2010” conducted by
the SFOS and the Federal Office for Spatial Development (ARE). We use detailed information
about the driver, the vehicle and the distances traveled by car. The dataset provides two
different measures for the distance traveled by cars in Switzerland. First, the annual distance
driven over the last 12 months.4 Second, the daily distance traveled by car, recorded in the
MCMT 2010 using GIS (Geographical Information System) software. Moreover we restrict
the dataset to contain only observations for cars where technical details on the vehicle are
available. These include the number of cylinders, the transmission system, the weight, the fuel
type as well as the vehicles’ energy label. Following Weber and Farsi (2014), the latter is used
to estimate the vehicles’ fuel intensity, which is not directly available in the MCMT 2010.5
Furthermore, the survey also contains information on gender, age, the family and housing
situation, as well as the drivers’ income level and education to control for demographic factors.
Table 1 provides an overview of the sample used to estimate the rebound effect in private
transportation. The average distance driven per day is approximately 44 kilometers, while the
yearly distance is almost 14,000 kilometers. The fuel intensity, measured as l/100kg, ranges
from 4.8 to 16.3 with an average of 8.9. The mean weight of cars is approximately 1861 kg,
the percentage of diesel cars is 22 and a manual transmission system is observed for three
out of four vehicles in our dataset. The average vehicle age is 5.85 years with a relatively
high standard deviation of 3.71. The number of cylinders is around four. Considering drivers’
characteristics, 33% (35%) live in a two (three) persons household. A medium household
income (monthly income between 4,000 and 10,000 CHF) is achieved by six persons out of
4All positive observations up to 200,000 km are included. No relevant differences were detected when the
maximum of annual distance was set to 100,000 and 50,000 respectively.
5We follow the approach of (Weber and Farsi, 2014, p.10) and recover the vehicles’ fuel intensity from the
2007 energy labels (A to G) used in the MCMT 2010. The fuel intensity can be computed with the aid of the
vehicle weight and the efficiency index I (FI = (600+W 0.9)∗ I/7,267. More information about index I and the
computation can be found in Weber and Farsi (2014).
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ten, a high household income (above 10,000 CHF) by 28%. We find 40% female drivers,
37% persons with children and 23% to live in an urban region. Moreover the drivers’ age
ranges from 20 to 92 years with a mean of approximately 52 years. Over 50% have a medium
educational level and around 40% a high educational level.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Distance
Annual distance 43.95 54.62 0.024 704.55
Daily distance 13,889.88 10,065.41 4 200,000
Vehicle characteristics
Fuel Intensity 8.87 1.9 4.83 16.3
Weight 1861.35 358.51 980 3500
Vehicle Age 5.85 3.71 0 17
Cylinder 4.31 0.88 3 12
Dummies
Diesel 0.22 0.41
Manual 0.76 0.43
Household characteristics
Drivers Age 52.1 13.8 20 92
Dummies
Two Person HH 0.33 0.47
Three Person HH 0.35 0.48
Medium Income 0.60 0.49
High Income 0.28 0.45
Women 0.39 0.49
Children 0.37 0.48
Urban Region 0.23 0.42
Medium Education 0.52 0.50
High Education 0.42 0.49
Notes: The estimation sample consists of 6,553 observations with positive distances reported
in the MCMT 2010.
To estimate the aggregate rebound effect, we use both, the distance traveled over one year
as well as the daily distance. While the former serves as a general indicator for demand
response after an increase in energy efficiency, the latter allows to distinguish between the
various travel purposes (work, shopping, leisure and others). Figure 2 illustrates the distribu-
tion of the endogenous variables. While the vehicle weight is almost normally distributed, the
fuel intensity is right-skewed with a median (mean) of 8.56 (8.87). Both distance measures
are distinctly right-skewed, especially the daily distance measure with 50% of observations
below 24.6 km compared to 12,000 km in case of the annual distance.
3.2 Estimation Method
Having defined two metrics of the rebound effects in Section 2, we now consider the model
used for estimating the corresponding rebound effect in private transportation. Data on energy
service consumption and on energy efficiency is readily available for private transportation.
76
Figure 2: Histogram of the Endogenous Variables
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Notes: The histograms display the descriptive statistic of the three endogenous variables, whereas distance is
measured as daily and yearly distance. Data source: MCMT survey of 2010.
This allows us derive the rebound effect from the price elasticity in Chapter 2 and to use a
more sophisticated model based on the energy efficiency of vehicles. Specifically, we use
a structural simultaneous equation model, where average distance driven (D), fuel intensity
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(FI) and the vehicles’ weight (W ) are determined simultaneously:
Di = αD0 +α
D
FIFIi +α
D
WWi +β
DXi + γDZDi + ε
D
i
FIi = αFI0 +α
FI
D Di +β
FIXi + γFIZFIi + ε
FI
i (4)
Wi = αW0 +α
W
D Di +β
W Xi + γW ZWi + ε
W
i ,
where Di is the average distance traveled by person i in kilometers, FIi and Wi are the fuel
intensity and weight of the person’s vehicle respectively. All endogenous variables are trans-
formed to logarithms. Driver and vehicle specific characteristics are included in the matrices
Xi and Z
j
i (with j ∈ {D,FI,W}) respectively. Note that the variables contained in the Z ma-
trices can indeed vary by endogenous variable. We also include an equation-specific constant
denoted by α0. The residuals are captured in εi. From the explicit form stated in Equation (4),
the rebound effect is defined as −αDFI .
Using cross-sectional data from 2010, we estimate the rebound effect of private trans-
portation by using both, simple OLS as well as a three stage least square (3SLS) estimator
to account for potential endogeneity in the system of equations. Endogeneity may occur if
the expected amount of useful work consumed (i.e. the distance driven) is taken into account
when the technology (fuel efficiency of the car) is chosen. The rebound estimates based on
OLS are presented in Appendix B. OLS is applied for comparability of our results with es-
timates from the early literature on rebound effects which often relied on OLS techniques.
Moreover, it allows for an inspection of the endogeneity problem in our specific dataset by
contrasting them to estimates gained from a 3SLS regression.
4 Results
4.1 The Average Rebound Effect
Table 2 displays the rebound effect based on the price elasticities from Chapter 2. We find
a rebound effect of 18%, which implies that the energy savings from the energy efficiency
improvement are reduced by 18%. Hence, an energy efficiency improvement of one percent
leads to actual energy savings of 0.82%, 0.18 percentage points are lost due to the rebound
effect. The upper limit of the confidence interval (UL) lies at 32% and is consistent with the
results of Sorrell et al. (2009). Since the substitution elasticities from Chapter 2 are short-run
to medium-run elasticities, these results can be interpreted as a short-term rebound effect.
Table 2: Rebound Effect based on Elasticity Measures
Category ηp RE t-value LL UL
Private transportation -0.18 0.18 2.48 0.04 0.32
Notes: The rebound effect is based on the own-price elasticity of private transportation
from Chapter 2 of the report. These elasticities are a short-run to medium-run elasticities.
Table 3 displays the rebound effect based on the efficiency measure for private trans-
portation. Considering 3SLS estimation, we obtain a rebound effect of 59% using the annual
distance and 63% using the daily distance. The size of the rebound effect is slightly lower
than in Weber and Farsi (2014).6 It is close to the value that Frondel et al. (2008b) obtain
6In accordance to Weber and Farsi (2014), we find OLS estimates to be smaller than those obtained from
applying 3SLS.
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from household panel data from Germany, with values between 57% and 67%. Nonetheless,
we find relatively high rebound effects compared to other international studies.
Table 3: Rebound Effect based on Efficiency Measures
Distance RE SE t-value
95% CI
LL UL
Annual distance 0.59 0.07 8.14 0.45 0.73
Daily distance 0.63 0.12 5.27 0.40 0.86
Notes: The 3SLS estimates of the rebound effect are based on the fuel effi-
ciency of driven cars in Switzerland. The number of observations is 6,553.
The comparison of the rebound estimates from price elasticities with the estimates from
efficiency measures shows that the latter lead to a considerably higher rebound effect in private
transportation. At first glance, this result contradicts the claim that rebound estimates based
on price elasticities can be interpreted as an upper bound of the rebound effect. A plausible
explanation for this contradiction in our study is that the price elasticity estimates of Chapter 2
are short to medium-run elasticities, whereas the rebound estimates from efficiency measures
are based on cross-sectional data. Elasticity or rebound estimates based on cross-sectional
data rather provide long-run estimates because these estimates exploit the differences between
the different subjects and such differences can be much larger and therefore can rather be
interpreted as long-run as opposed to the changing behavior of individual subjects over a short
time period. In general, long-run elasticities are expected to be higher in magnitude since a
higher time span allows for a higher degree of individual adjustment to the new conditions.
4.2 Rebound Effects by Driver Characteristics
Empirical evidence from existing price elasticity studies and our results in Chapter 2 show that
the magnitude of price and income elasticities highly depends on demographic and socioeco-
nomic factors such as income, education and further factors. This section analyzes whether
the same is true for the rebound effect. Specifically, we investigate how driver characteristics
affect the rebound of private transportation in Switzerland. To our best knowledge, this is the
first study that investigates the impact of household characteristics on the magnitude of the
rebound for Switzerland.
Table 4 displays the magnitude of the rebound effect for different household types, when
the annual distance is considered. On the one hand, we are investigating how household size
and income level affect the rebound effect. We find no impact of household size on the magni-
tude of the rebound effect. The results show that the estimates are between 55% and 63% and
not significantly different from the average value. In contrast, the income level of households
fundamentally affects the magnitude of the rebound effect. We find considerably higher re-
bound effects for low income households than for medium or high income households. Note,
however, that the confidence interval of the rebound for low income households is relatively
large.
We also compute the rebound effect for different driver characteristics. Interestingly, the
rebound effect is considerably higher for older and less educated drivers, where we find re-
bound effects of 82% and 79%, respectively. A possible explanation for the high rebound
effect for car drivers with a low level of education is the fact that education and the income
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Table 4: Rebound by Household Types, Annual Distance
Annual distance RE SE t-value
95% CI
LL UL
Household size
Single 0.60 0.15 3.92 0.30 0.90
Two persons 0.58 0.13 4.61 0.33 0.83
Three persons 0.55 0.18 3.13 0.21 0.89
More persons 0.63 0.14 4.66 0.37 0.89
Income
Low income 0.87 0.27 3.17 0.33 1.41
Medium income 0.67 0.10 7.01 0.48 0.86
High income 0.33 0.11 2.89 0.11 0.55
Age
Young 0.53 0.19 2.84 0.16 0.90
Middle-age 0.60 0.09 6.93 0.43 0.77
Old 0.82 0.19 4.34 0.45 1.19
Sex
Male 0.51 0.09 6.00 0.34 0.68
Female 0.71 0.13 5.35 0.45 0.97
Education
Low education 0.79 0.31 2.53 0.18 1.40
Medium eduction 0.56 0.10 5.43 0.36 0.76
High education 0.61 0.11 5.61 0.40 0.82
Average 0.59 0.07 8.14 0.45 0.73
Notes: The 3SLS rebound estimates are computed for annually driven distances.
The number of observations is 6,553.
category are positively correlated in our data sample. Similar to low income households, the
confidence intervals are relatively large for older and less educated drivers.
In Table 5, we also present the rebound effects based on households’ daily driven dis-
tances. The main reason for showing both tables is to see whether it matters what distance
measure is employed. The average rebound effect for private transportation in Switzerland
lies at 63% using the daily distance (59% using the annual distance). We also find the same
pattern for income and education. The rebound effect is significantly higher for low income
households and drivers with a lower level of education. Different to the yearly distance mea-
sure, the rebound effect for single households is considerably higher with a value of 99%
(compared to 60%). Overall, the rebound results are very similar and suggest that the rebound
based on daily distances is a good proxy for the rebound based on annual distance.
In summary, we find the typical pattern, well-known from other studies, that the rebound
effect is higher for low-income households. The standard argument is that the demand for
private transportation is not saturated for low-income households. Efficiency improvements
make private transportation cheaper and their real income increases. The remaining income is
over-proportionally used for driving more often and therefore energy efficiency improvements
result in increased demand for private transportation, especially for low-income households.
Interestingly, Frondel et al. (2010) find no differences in the rebound effect for different in-
come groups in Germany.
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Table 5: Rebound by Household Types, Daily Distance
Daily distance RE SE t-value
95% CI
LL UL
Household size
Single 0.99 0.23 4.26 0.53 1.45
Two persons 0.48 0.21 2.24 0.06 0.90
Three persons 0.75 0.33 2.26 0.10 1.40
More persons 0.71 0.22 3.23 0.28 1.14
Income
Low income 1.06 0.40 2.66 0.28 1.84
Medium income 0.71 0.15 4.62 0.41 1.01
High income 0.39 0.21 1.82 -0.03 0.81
Age
Young 0.07 0.32 0.22 -0.55 0.69
Middle-age 0.71 0.14 5.00 0.43 0.99
Old 0.99 0.30 3.26 0.39 1.59
Sex
Male 0.66 0.15 4.53 0.37 0.95
Female 0.52 0.21 2.53 0.12 0.92
Education
Low education 0.48 0.43 1.12 -0.36 1.32
Medium eduction 0.77 0.17 4.47 0.43 1.11
High education 0.58 0.18 3.17 0.22 0.94
Average 0.63 0.12 5.27 0.40 0.86
Notes: The 3SLS rebound estimates are computed for daily driven distances. The
number of observations is 6,553.
4.3 Rebound Effects by Driving Purpose
Empirical studies on the rebound effect clearly show that the driving behavior of households
is affected by multiple factors such as the price of gasoline, household characteristics, vehicle
type, taxes on transport fuels and further fiscal incentives by the government. Another impor-
tant factor is the structure and quality of public transport services in the country or region of
concern. A factor that has been neglected so far is the driving purpose. In this section, we
investigate how the driving purpose affects the magnitude of the rebound effect.
Table 6: Rebound Effects by Driving Purpose
Purpose RE SE t-value
95% CI
LL UL
Work 0.48 0.09 5.16 0.30 0.66
Shopping 0.42 0.12 3.46 0.18 0.66
Leisure 0.24 0.10 2.47 0.05 0.43
Others 0.50 0.15 3.34 0.21 0.79
Notes: The 3SLS rebound estimates are computed for daily distances
with the detailed purpose information from the GIS software. The
number of observations is 6,553.
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Table 6 displays the rebound effect for different transportation purposes. The magnitude of
the rebound effect lies between 40% and 50% for the majority of driving purposes. The only
exception is the lower rebound effect for leisure activities with a value of 24%. In comparison
to the previous rebound estimates, the differences between the 3SLS estimates differ to a
larger extent from the OLS estimates. Unfortunately, we could only differentiate between the
driving purposes for the daily distances, since only the daily distance measure is based on the
geo-routing system. Further research is needed to better understand the relationship between
driving purpose and the magnitude of the rebound effect.
5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we compare two different approaches to estimate the rebound effect of private
transportation in Switzerland. Under the first approach, we estimate the rebound effect using
detailed data of the Swiss microcensus on mobility and transport for the year 2010. Under the
second approach, we derive the rebound effect from the price elasticities from Chapter 2.
The energy service private transportation has the advantage, that there are two different
surveys that conduct information about the driving behavior of Swiss households. We find a
rebound of about 20% based on price elasticities and a rebound of approximately 60% based
on the efficiency measure. Hence, the rebound estimates from the two approaches reveal
considerable differences. Moreover, the result contradicts the notion that rebound effects
based on price-elasticities can be considered as an upper-bound of the true rebound effect. One
explanation of the relatively large differences is that under the former approach we employ
short-run elasticities while the latter approach estimates long-run rebound effects. Hence, in
Switzerland the rebound effect seems to be considerably higher in the long-run, at least for
private transportation.
In addition to the comparison of the two approaches, we also compute rebound effects for
specific household groups. We find large differences between certain groups with the income
level as the main driver. Considering the annual distance measure, we find a relatively high
rebound effect of 87% for low-income households and rather low values of 33% for high-
income households. A similar effect is also observed for the level of education. Furthermore,
we find the rebound effect to increase in the drivers’ age. Comparable results are found using
the daily distance measure. For the latter, we investigated how the driving purpose affects the
magnitude of the rebound effect. Considering 3SLS estimates, we find a rebound effect of
48% for work and of 24% for leisure. In summary and compared to other studies, we find
relatively high rebound effect for private transportation in Switzerland.
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A Parameter Estimates
A.1 Estimates from Annual Distance
Table 7: Parameter Estimates from Annual Distance
3SLS OLS
Distance Fuel Weight Distance Fuel Weight
intensity intensity
(Intercept) 2.151
(0.7521)
∗∗∗ 1.399
(0.3376)
∗∗∗ 6.269
(0.3704)
∗∗∗ 4.409
(0.416)
∗∗∗ 1.872
(0.0272)
∗∗∗ 6.995
(0.0291)
∗∗∗
log(FI) −0.591
(0.0726)
∗∗∗ −0.409
(0.0547)
∗∗∗
log(W) 1.194
(0.1115)
∗∗∗ 0.841
(0.063)
∗∗∗
med.income 0.148
(0.0306)
∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.0093)
∗ 0.016
(0.0103)
0.165
(0.0301)
∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.0055)
∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.006)
∗∗∗
high.income 0.194
(0.0357)
∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.0128)
∗ 0.014
(0.0142)
0.224
(0.0345)
∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.0062)
∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.0069)
∗∗∗
women −0.204
(0.0203)
∗∗∗ −0.039
(0.0099)
∗∗∗ −0.024
(0.0109)
∗∗ −0.223
(0.0193)
∗∗∗ −0.041
(0.0035)
∗∗∗ −0.041
(0.004)
∗∗∗
children −0.077
(0.021)
∗∗∗ 0.038
(0.0039)
∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.0075)
∗∗∗ −0.062
(0.0205)
∗∗∗ 0.029
(0.0037)
∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.0098)
drivage −0.124
(0.0072)
∗∗∗ 0
(0.0048)
0.008
(0.0052)
−0.127
(0.0072)
∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.0014)
∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.0015)
urbreg −0.123
(0.0216)
∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.0066)
−0.127
(0.0215)
∗∗∗ −0.011
(0.0039)
∗∗∗ −0.011
(0.0043)
∗∗
mid.educ 0.055
(0.0372)
0.055
(0.0372)
high.educ 0.137
(0.0387)
∗∗∗ 0.133
(0.0386)
∗∗∗
log(dist) 0.053
(0.034)
0.094
(0.0373)
∗∗ 0.009
(0.0023)
∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.0025)
∗∗∗
vehage 0.008
(5e−04)
∗∗∗ −0.01
(5e−04)
∗∗∗ 0.011
(5e−04)
∗∗∗ −0.009
(5e−04)
∗∗∗
manual −0.075
(0.0032)
∗∗∗ −0.135
(0.0046)
∗∗∗
diesel −0.259
(0.0029)
∗∗∗ −0.167
(0.0042)
∗∗∗
zylinder4 0.289
(0.0112)
∗∗∗ 0.32
(0.0122)
∗∗∗ 0.271
(0.0112)
∗∗∗ 0.314
(0.0122)
∗∗∗
zylinder5 0.517
(0.0152)
∗∗∗ 0.503
(0.0165)
∗∗∗ 0.464
(0.0153)
∗∗∗ 0.496
(0.0165)
∗∗∗
zylinder6 0.533
(0.0124)
∗∗∗ 0.536
(0.0133)
∗∗∗ 0.483
(0.0126)
∗∗∗ 0.529
(0.0133)
∗∗∗
zylinder8 0.625
(0.017)
∗∗∗ 0.656
(0.0184)
∗∗∗ 0.58
(0.0173)
∗∗∗ 0.652
(0.0184)
∗∗∗
zylinder10 0.777
(0.0403)
∗∗∗ 0.75
(0.0439)
∗∗∗ 0.691
(0.0404)
∗∗∗ 0.738
(0.0439)
∗∗∗
zylinder12 0.66
(0.0779)
∗∗∗ 0.726
(0.085)
∗∗∗ 0.619
(0.078)
∗∗∗ 0.723
(0.0849)
∗∗∗
hhsize2 0.012
(0.0034)
∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.0049)
∗∗∗
hhsize3 0.04
(0.0074)
∗∗∗ 0.083
(0.0107)
∗∗∗
Notes: Distance = distCH last12m; ∗∗∗ ,∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level.
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A.2 Estimates from Daily Distance
Table 8: Parameter Estimates from Daily Distance
3SLS OLS
Distance Fuel Weight Distance Fuel Weight
intensity intensity
(Intercept) −1.33
(1.2366)
1.816
(0.0702)
∗∗∗ 7.01
(0.0769)
∗∗∗ 0.64
(0.6857)
1.969
(0.0169)
∗∗∗ 7.188
(0.0175)
∗∗∗
log(FI) −0.628
(0.1196)
∗∗∗ −0.52
(0.0901)
∗∗∗
log(W) 0.848
(0.1833)
∗∗∗ 0.554
(0.1038)
∗∗∗
med.income 0.137
(0.0503)
∗∗∗ 0.023
(0.0066)
∗∗∗ 0.027
(0.0073)
∗∗∗ 0.152
(0.0497)
∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.0055)
∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.0061)
∗∗∗
high.income 0.282
(0.0587)
∗∗∗ 0.028
(0.0096)
∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.0107)
∗∗ 0.309
(0.0568)
∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.0062)
∗∗∗ 0.038
(0.007)
∗∗∗
women −0.156
(0.0334)
∗∗∗ −0.048
(0.0049)
∗∗∗ −0.04
(0.0055)
∗∗∗ −0.174
(0.0318)
∗∗∗ −0.043
(0.0035)
∗∗∗ −0.046
(0.004)
∗∗∗
children −0.144
(0.0345)
∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.0043)
∗∗∗ 0.036
(0.0077)
∗∗∗ −0.132
(0.0338)
∗∗∗ 0.029
(0.0037)
∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.0098)
drivage −0.149
(0.0119)
∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.0031)
0.004
(0.0034)
−0.151
(0.0118)
∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.0014)
∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.0015)
∗∗∗
urbreg −0.186
(0.0355)
∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.0051)
∗ −0.005
(0.0056)
−0.19
(0.0354)
∗∗∗ −0.012
(0.0039)
∗∗∗ −0.013
(0.0043)
∗∗∗
mid.educ 0.146
(0.0613)
∗∗ 0.148
(0.0613)
∗∗
high.educ 0.308
(0.0636)
∗∗∗ 0.309
(0.0636)
∗∗∗
log(dist) 0.027
(0.0175)
0.049
(0.0192)
∗∗ −0.002
(0.0014)
0.003
(0.0015)
∗
vehage 0.008
(5e−04)
∗∗∗ −0.01
(5e−04)
∗∗∗ 0.011
(5e−04)
∗∗∗ −0.01
(5e−04)
∗∗∗
manual −0.075
(0.0032)
∗∗∗ −0.135
(0.0046)
∗∗∗
diesel −0.259
(0.0029)
∗∗∗ −0.165
(0.0042)
∗∗∗
zylinder4 0.289
(0.0112)
∗∗∗ 0.32
(0.0123)
∗∗∗ 0.272
(0.0112)
∗∗∗ 0.318
(0.0123)
∗∗∗
zylinder5 0.518
(0.0152)
∗∗∗ 0.503
(0.0165)
∗∗∗ 0.467
(0.0153)
∗∗∗ 0.502
(0.0165)
∗∗∗
zylinder6 0.534
(0.0124)
∗∗∗ 0.536
(0.0134)
∗∗∗ 0.486
(0.0126)
∗∗∗ 0.535
(0.0134)
∗∗∗
zylinder8 0.624
(0.0171)
∗∗∗ 0.655
(0.0184)
∗∗∗ 0.582
(0.0173)
∗∗∗ 0.657
(0.0184)
∗∗∗
zylinder10 0.781
(0.0403)
∗∗∗ 0.759
(0.044)
∗∗∗ 0.699
(0.0404)
∗∗∗ 0.757
(0.044)
∗∗∗
zylinder12 0.653
(0.078)
∗∗∗ 0.718
(0.0853)
∗∗∗ 0.616
(0.0781)
∗∗∗ 0.722
(0.0854)
∗∗∗
hhsize2 0.012
(0.0034)
∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.0049)
∗∗∗
hhsize3 0.041
(0.0074)
∗∗∗ 0.085
(0.0108)
∗∗∗
Notes: Distance = distCH GIS; ∗∗∗ ,∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level.
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B Rebound Effect from OLS Estimation
For the sake of completeness, we present in this section the rebound estimates, based on
standard OLS.
Table 9: Rebound Effect based on Efficiency Measures
Distance RE SE t-value
95% CI
LL UL
Annual distance 0.41 0.05 7.49 0.30 0.52
Daily distance 0.52 0.09 5.78 0.34 0.70
Notes: The OLS estimates of the rebound effect are based on the fuel efficiency
of driven cars in Switzerland. The number of observations is 6,553.
Table 10: Rebound by Household Types, Annual Distance
Annual distance RE SE t-value
95% CI
LL UL
Household size
Single 0.46 0.11 4.10 0.24 0.68
Two persons 0.36 0.09 3.85 0.18 0.54
Three persons 0.34 0.14 2.46 0.07 0.61
More persons 0.47 0.10 4.48 0.26 0.68
Income
Low income 0.83 0.20 4.19 0.44 1.22
Medium income 0.49 0.07 6.82 0.35 0.63
High income 0.12 0.09 1.31 -0.06 0.30
Age
Young 0.37 0.14 2.68 0.10 0.64
Middle-age 0.41 0.06 6.31 0.28 0.54
Old 0.58 0.14 4.07 0.30 0.86
Sex
Male 0.35 0.06 5.42 0.22 0.48
Female 0.52 0.10 5.16 0.32 0.72
Education
Low education 0.51 0.25 2.04 0.02 1.00
Medium eduction 0.38 0.08 4.93 0.23 0.53
High education 0.43 0.08 5.30 0.27 0.59
Average 0.41 0.05 7.49 0.30 0.52
Notes: The OLS rebound estimates are computed for annually driven distances.
The number of observations is 6,553.
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Table 11: Rebound by Household Types, Daily Distance
Daily distance RE SE t-value
95% CI
LL UL
Household size
Single 0.73 0.17 4.34 0.40 1.06
Two persons 0.27 0.16 1.67 -0.05 0.59
Three persons 0.61 0.26 2.34 0.10 1.12
More persons 0.58 0.17 3.40 0.25 0.91
Income
Low income 0.92 0.29 3.18 0.35 1.49
Medium income 0.67 0.12 5.81 0.44 0.90
High income 0.14 0.16 0.86 -0.18 0.46
Age
Young 0.26 0.25 1.04 -0.23 0.75
Middle-age 0.53 0.11 4.98 0.32 0.74
Old 0.77 0.23 3.39 0.32 1.22
Sex
Male 0.47 0.11 4.29 0.26 0.68
Female 0.57 0.16 3.60 0.26 0.88
Education
Low education 0.57 0.33 1.72 -0.08 1.22
Medium eduction 0.69 0.13 5.32 0.44 0.94
High education 0.33 0.14 2.43 0.06 0.60
Average 0.52 0.09 5.78 0.34 0.70
Notes: The OLS rebound estimates are computed for daily driven distances. The
number of observations is 6,553.
Table 12: Rebound Effects by Driving Purpose
Purpose RE SE t-value
95% CI
LL UL
Work 0.58 0.12 4.72 0.34 0.82
Shopping 0.35 0.15 2.32 0.05 0.65
Leisure 0.44 0.13 3.35 0.18 0.70
Others 0.31 0.11 2.78 0.09 0.53
Notes: The OLS rebound estimates are computed for daily distances
with the detailed purpose information from the GIS software. The
number of observations is 6,553.
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